What do members, future members, dialogue partners and future dialogue partners of this exotic blend of nations [the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO] have in common?
With their growing democratic deficits and authoritarian-to-dictatorship regimes, they are at cold war with the world’s democratic bloc of nations.
First of all, how should we define radicalization? Radicalization refers to a social and moral disruption process. This leads an individual to the adoption of a new vision of society, and new behaviors that, in the end, break the social pact. The European Union gives another definition according to which radicalization is the adoption process, by an individual, of a radical ideology in which violence is advocated in order to reach a specific objective.
Plus de 80 % des 137 millions d’africains faisant face à une insécurité alimentaire aigüe—un chiffre record—se trouvent dans des pays en conflit. Cela reflète le fait que le conflit demeure le principal facteur de la crise alimentaire en Afrique.
Points saillants
Une panoplie d’acteurs, de facteurs et de motivations caractérise l’environnement sécuritaire de l’ouest du Sahel. Cette réalité appelle à des réponses adaptées à chaque contexte.
Le nombre d’évènements violents impliquant les groupes islamistes militants a quadruplé dans l’ouest du Sahel depuis 2019. Les 2 800 évènements violents prévus pour 2022 sont le double de l’année précédente. La violence s’est étendue dans son intensité et sa portée géographique :
Turkey has enjoyed friendly treatment in the Russian press that has praised Turkey for refusing to knuckle under to the Americans and join the sanctions against Russia. It is the tough interlocutor that looks after its interests as opposed to the supine Europeans, who are shooting themselves in the foot by following the American lead. Yes, there are places such as Syria, where Russian and Turkish interests diverge, but this only attests to the diplomatic acumen of Vladimir Putin, who manages to achieve a modus vivendi with Ankara that serves both Russia’s and Turkey’s interests.
Iran sees Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr as an ally worth keeping despite his harsh criticisms of Iran and its allies in Iraq.
Hundreds of Sadrist protesters joined a demonstration today in Baghdad’s Liberation Square, marking the third anniversary of the start of the so-called October protest movement. On Oct. 25, 2019, massive protestors were confronted with a violent response from the then-government, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi.
One year after Iraq’s elections, the designated prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, stands poised to form Iraq’s newest government.
Prime Minister-designate Mohammed Shia al-Sudani officially requested of parliament Tuesday evening a session to vote on his cabinet.
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Armenia in September 2022 caused some limited geopolitical commotion, as most readers of Baku Dialogues are keenly aware. Without downplaying its regional significance in the slightest, it was, however, her visit to Taiwan in August 2022 that made global headlines and triggered a new round of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. At the core of that controversy is the status of Taiwan. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) condemned the visit as a violation of the “one China principle,” the U.S. government and Pelosi herself insisted that it was consistent with America’s “one China policy.”
“Jîna giyan, to namirî, nawit ebête remiz” (“Jina, my soul. You won’t die. Your name will become a symbol”), these are the Kurdish words engraved on Jina Amini’s gravestone by her family,[1] a few days before she became the national symbol of the revolution against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization, better known by its initials, CSTO—or by Moscow’s aspiration that it should be an equal counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—is now on the brink of collapse, yet another case of the collateral damage Russia has suffered in the post-Soviet space from President Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war against Ukraine. When the CSTO was created in 1992, Russia and five other post-Soviet states were members; a year later, it had grown to nine. But in the intervening years, it contracted to six. Now it is becoming more clear that, by next year, the CSTO, which Moscow had placed so much hope in, will most likely be reduced to only three: Russia, Belarus and Tajikistan.