Author: M Barbu

Paul Salem
Vice President for International Engagement
Paul Salem

While Israel is winning on the battlefield, it does not have a sustainable vision for any of the days — or months or years — after in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, or the region; for the Palestinians, the last year has been an unmitigated disaster, causing devastation and displacement comparable with that of the Nakba of 1948.

In the past three weeks, Israel has dealt a near-knock-out blow to Hezbollah; for the immediate future, Tehran’s primary strategic asset cannot deter Israeli or American attacks on Iran, leaving the Islamic Republic vulnerable.

Many of the investigative reports examining October 7 focus intensely on the intelligence, ignoring the failures on the strategic and political levels.

Indeed, the intelligence, tactical, and operational failures that led to the disaster were many, but these will be discussed in a separate article. This document will focus solely on the political and strategic levels.

Abstract: The Iran-backed Houthi movement has delivered a strong military performance in the year of anti-Israel and anti-shipping warfare since October 2023. They seem to be aiming to be the ‘first in, last out,’ meaning the first to cross key thresholds during the war (for instance, attack Israel’s major cities) and the last to stop fighting (refusing to be deterred by Israeli or Anglo-American strikes inside Yemen). Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.

In the initial sales pitch to Hezbollah two years ago, the new line of Apollo pagers seemed precisely suited to the needs of a militia group with a sprawling network of fighters and a hard-earned reputation for paranoia.

The AR924 pager was slightly bulky but rugged, built to survive battlefield conditions. It boasted a waterproof Taiwanese design and an oversized battery that could operate for months without charging. Best of all, there was no risk that the pagers could ever be tracked by Israel’s intelligence services. Hezbollah’s leaders were so impressed they bought 5,000 of them and began handing them out to mid-level fighters and support personnel in February.

[O]ne thing is certain: his [Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s] 30-year-long policy of using costly proxies to keep war away from Iran has failed. Now he may be forced into doing his own fighting.

Depending on how far this goes, Khamenei’s latest move could put the very fate of his regime in the bargain.

Terror organization: Hamas

Status: Current chairman of Hamas’s political bureau;

Role: Palestinian politician who is a senior political leader of Hamas, the current chairman of Hamas’s political bureau; as of 2023, Haniyeh lives in Qatar;

Location: Qatar;

Born: 29 January 1962;

The general secretary of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, is gone. Decades of his reign over Hezbollah, his personal connection to the spiritual leader Khamenei, and his everlasting equations – all gone. He may be mourned by his followers, maybe even by Hezbollah experts, who have studied Nasrallah for years, but many are celebrating. Many more than you could imagine. The reason for it is much more complex, much more delicate and sensitive, and far more dangerous than meets the eye. This is unexpected, and mind-blowing but makes a lot of sense. Where did the intel come from? Who played along? Why would anyone double-cross the undisputed leader and “guardian of Lebanon” and the best friend of the Iranian homeland? To understand it fully, you have to know the basic facts.

Terror organization: Hezbollah

Status: Was a Lebanese cleric and politician who served as the secretary-general of Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist political party and militia, from 1992 until his assassination in September 2024

Role:

Under Nasrallah’s leadership, Hezbollah acquired rockets with a longer range, which allowed them to strike at northern Israel. After Israel suffered heavy casualties during its 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon, it withdrew its forces in 2000, which greatly increased Hezbollah’s popularity in the region, and bolstered Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon

How Israeli spies penetrated Hezbollah

In a shocking report The Financial Times reports that Israel’s relentless efforts to eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership have reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, marked by cutting-edge intelligence gathering and military precision.