Israël va poursuivre ses massacres pour atteindre ses objectifs immédiats, mais à long terme, le contrecoup du génocide condamne déjà l’État sioniste.
Le génocide d’Israël a alimenté les rangs de la résistance palestinienne, transformé Israël et les USA en parias méprisés, qui gagneront sans doute cette manche, mais ont signé à terme leur propre arrêt de mort.
Since the mid-1990s, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have established a stronghold in the UK, despite the British government’s decision in 2001 to designate Hamas (including its political wing) as a terrorist organization.
The report unveils the activities of Hamas-related organizations in the UK.
On October 16, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented his “bet-will plan” in the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Verkhovna Rada. The plan consists of five points and three secret applications. The proposed strategy, according to Zelensky, is designed to strengthen Ukraine and its position so that after the war the country “was with muscles.” To implement this plan, according to the President of Ukraine, it is possible with the partners of the country, and this “deutively does not depend on Russia”. According to Zelensky, if you start to fulfill the points of strategy now, the war can be ended no later than 2025. The broadcast of Zelensky’s speech was in the YouTube channel of the office of the President of Ukraine, the text of Zelensky’s speech was published on the website of his office. We tell you what the “plan of victory” of Ukraine consists of.
Des décennies après la fin de la guerre froide, les États-Unis continuent d’avoir recours aux guerres par procuration comme stratégie centrale dans leurs confrontations avec les principaux rivaux mondiaux, en particulier la Russie et la Chine. Cette approche leur permet d’étendre leur influence et de poursuivre leurs objectifs géopolitiques sans engagement militaire direct, en comptant sur des acteurs tiers pour faire le sale boulot.
Summary
Iran’s nuclear program and missile arsenal have garnered increased international scrutiny amid its flaring conflict with Israel.
Introduction
Many foreign policy experts warn that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be broadly destabilizing for the Middle East and nearby regions. A first-order concern is that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would pose a major, perhaps existential threat to Israel, its longtime foe. Other foreign policy experts say Iran would be assuring its own demise if it were to launch a nuclear strike on Israel, a close U.S. defense partner and possessor of its own nuclear weapons arsenal, which is undeclared. Either way, there would be a dangerous potential for miscalculation that could result in a nuclear exchange, analysts say.
Since the HAMAS attack on Israel on 7 October, 20231 and the ensuing war in Gaza, many countries have seen an unprecedented rise in reported antisemitic incidents.1 Dozens of research and policy reports have since been published, many of them aiming to count and map the extent of these antisemitic incidents.2 Other reports have focused particularly on the online dimension of antisemitism since 7 October.3 Few reports, if any, have aimed at identifying and understanding the key antisemitic actors behind many of
these incidents.
Eliminating or Exacerbating Violent Extremism?
For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.
Since 1948, Israel has made a habit of targeting Palestinian refugee camps, striking the people it’s already displaced.
During the thick of summer, around 8 a.m. one day in late July 1971, bulldozers crept into the Gaza Strip’s Jabalia refugee camp. The Israeli military had already warned several families of their impending evictions, and a large show of Israeli forces gathered to confront any potential resistance. Soldiers stormed homes Palestinian families refused to evacuate, clubbing them with sticks and batons, and dragging them out into the morning heat. Within a few days, the bulldozers had leveled around 50 homes on the edge of the camp. Some 500 people, refugee families who had already lost their homes elsewhere in historic Palestine some 23 years earlier, were now homeless once again. Another week passed and the number of homes Israeli forces destroyed swelled to 400.
Hugh Smith is a Visiting Fellow in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is the author of On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005).