JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict

By attacking transportation arteries, fuel tankers, and population centers in western Mali, the JNIM coalition is targeting the economic, security, and political vulnerabilities of the military junta in Bamako.

The Maçina Liberation Front (FLM) launched a series of seven simultaneous attacks spanning hundreds of kilometers in western Mali in border towns near Senegal and Mauritania on July 1, 2025. This represented a dramatic shift in tactics and an expansion in the reach of the Jama’at Nasrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition of which FLM is the most active member. Over the past year, nearly 20 percent of JNIM violent activity in Mali—resulting in a doubling of fatalities to over 450 deaths—took place in the west and south of the country. JNIM had previously been primarily concentrated in north and central Mali. Only 8 percent of violent episodes linked to JNIM were in western and southern Mali the year before.

Will ISIS’s attempts to kidnap Syria from the transitional authority succeed?

ISIS has been witnessing a new surge in its activity inside Syria since the change of the former regime in December 2024, taking advantage of the fragility of the transitional authority and the overlap of its structure with different factions. Despite intense international strikes, the group has been able to carry out qualitative attacks and has begun to reposition, amid security and political complications facing the interim government. The scene is becoming increasingly dangerous with the emergence of more radicalized groups and the erosion of divides between regular forces and militant militants. On the other hand, the international community linked the support of the new government to its seriousness in combating terrorism and extremism, which poses a structural challenge to its security institutions and internal alliances.

US-Israeli proposal and transition towards a unilateral path in the Gaza Strip

The Israeli-American track is undergoing a qualitative shift with the announcement of US envoy Steve Whittoff of a “comprehensive deal” to stop the war in Gaza, including the release of hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, reconstruction, and the imposition of an international administration led by Washington, in a unilateral path that deviates Hamas from any negotiating role. The deal coincides with an Israeli plan to occupy the Gaza Strip in stages, and impose security control and alternative civilian administration, and this approach aims to impose the “day after” the war as a fait accompli serving Israeli goals.

My third message to our Arab Shiite brothers: the call of reason and reality

I renew my sincere appeal to our Arab Shiite brothers: Let your belonging to your Arab nation be, and let your loyalty to your homeland be advanced over any partisan or external loyalty. Face the current challenges in a spirit of courage and responsibility, it is time to say: Enough. Enough successive losses that have exhausted you and exhausted your homelands. Revisit honestly, and stay away from a project that has brought you and your partners back to the country nothing but blood, destruction and woes.

China and Russia: The Axis of War

Russia is providing equipment, technology, and training to China for an airborne invasion, the Washington Post reported on September 26. The report, based on a study issued by the U.K.-based Royal United Services Institute, notes that China is planning an airborne assault on Taiwan.

The day before the Washington Post article, Reuters revealed that Chinese experts had traveled to Russia to help that country develop drones. According to the wire service, Sichuan AEE, a Chinese company, sold attack and surveillance drones to Russian company IEMZ Kupol through an intermediary sanctioned by the U.S. and the EU.

Israeli forces advance in Gaza City ahead of Trump-Netanyahu Gaza war talks

Israeli tanks thrust closer to the heart of Gaza City on Monday, pressing a ground offensive hours before talks between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a diplomatic breakthrough in a bid to end the war.

After nearly two years of failed diplomatic efforts, Washington presented a 21-point plan to Arab and Muslim states last week that calls for a permanent ceasefire and the release of remaining hostages.

Italy to Albania, and Back: A Migrant’s Journey Through Italy’s Asylum Experiment

As Nizam* sped toward Italy on a crowded migrant boat, he filmed what he believed was the final stretch of his harrowing journey.

The 21-year-old house painter from Bangladesh held up his phone, framing his face before panning to roughly 50 others packed onto the white fiberglass vessel. Behind him, a man covered his eyes with his hands, seemingly in tears, while another, smiling, patted him on the back. The boat’s stern sat low as it cut through the twinkling Mediterranean.

Uzbek Foreign Fighter Groups in the Syrian Jihad: The Evolution of KIB and KTJ from 2011 through 2025

The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 revealed the ongoing significance of multiple foreign fighter organizations in Syria, groups that proved instrumental in Hayat Tahir al-Sham’s (HTS) campaign for Damascus. Among them were two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups that originated in Central Asia: the Imam Bukhari Battalion (Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, KIB) and the Tavhid and Jihad Battalion (Katibat Tavhid va Jihod, KTJ). Smaller numbers of Uzbeks and other Central Asians joined Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan, which also supported HTS.1 a HTS voiced no objections as these organizations’ leaders gave media interviews in Damascus, celebrating their victory, and posted images of their involvement across dozens of social media channels. These Uzbek-led groups are among some 10,000 fighters, many from Russia and China, who lent critical support to HTS for over a decade.2 In spring 2025, HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa proposed integrating such foreign fighters into the new Syrian military, a process that has now begun.3 Yet, little is known about these entities, why and how they have operated in Syria for so long, or what role they might play in the post-Assad Syria.