Author: M Barbu

The Salafi-Jihadi Base in the Sahel: December 2018

Common purposes, shared histories, and ethnic and tribal affiliations unify the highly complex and fractious Salafi-jihadi base[1] in West Africa’s Sahel region. Organizational splinters have not stopped Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel from cooperating to achieve the same objectives.[2] Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) serves as an umbrella group for four factions. A breakaway faction of al Murabitoun under Abu Walid al Sahrawi, which became the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), continues to cooperate with the al Qaeda-linked groups. The relationships between Sahrawi and members of JNIM have enabled operational deconfliction and even cooperation between the groups.[3] Ethnic and tribal affiliations cut across the organizational divides and further enrich the network. Militant commanders who are dual-hatted as ethnic or tribal notables lead factions that draw on their local identities, like Iyad Ag Ghali’s Tuareg-majority Ansar al Din and Amadou Koufa’s Fulani-majority Macina Liberation Front. These cross-cutting identities have allowed the Salafi-jihadi base in the Sahel to mobilize local ethnic identity groups to gain access to communities and expand their operational reach.[4]

The Syrian Democratic Forces’ Arab Coalition is Crumbling, Creating Opportunities for ISIS, Iran, and Turkey

The coalition between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor is fracturing amid clashes over long-standing grievances. The SDF’s response to the clashes very likely will undermine its ability to maintain control in the province for at least the next several months. The SDF and the Deir ez Zor Military Council (DMC) began fighting after the SDF arrested the DMC commander on August 27. The conflict rapidly expanded after August 30, as other tribes joined the fighting driven by long-running grievances against the SDF.[1] These grievances included limited reconstruction in the Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[2] The tribes captured the southern areas of SDF-administered Deir ez Zor province by September 2.[3] The SDF recaptured the territory on September 10 by force and through actions that local media portrayed as abuses. Anti-SDF tribal fighters began conducting hit-and-run insurgent attacks on September 6, meaning anti-SDF forces are contesting the SDF’s control of the population in Deir ez Zor. CTP defines control as “uncontested physical or psychological pressure to ensure that individuals or groups respond as directed.”[4] The SDF has not taken steps to address the tribes’ grievances as of September 14.[5]

Iran Update, October 6, 2023

Key Takeaways

Turkey has conducted a series of airstrikes in northern Syria against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the United States’ sole security partner in the country—since October 5. These attacks are placing significant pressure on the SDF, which, in turn, puts at risk the US mission to defeat ISIS.
Iran has demanded that the Iraqi central government extradite members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to Iran, according to independent Iraqi outlet Al Mada. Such a demand would appear to violate international law.

The Islamic World’s Dilemma On Palestine – OpEd

Ever wondered why the Islamic world appears divided on the issue of Palestine? To unravel this intricate dilemma, I’ve integrated three levels of foreign policy analysis with the constructivist perspective of international relations. The three levels involve examining internal factors such as political structures, leadership dynamics, and public sentiment, providing insights into how these elements shape a nation’s approach to foreign policy.

Perfect Storm: Niger’s Uranium Amidst Sahelian Chaos – Analysis

After several weeks of tense diplomatic negotiations and saber-rattling between Niamey and Paris, President Emmanuel Macron’s government withdrew Ambassador Sylvain Itte and diplomatic staff from Niger in late September. France’s military mission plans to withdraw by the end of 2023. Niger’s junta government appears totally uninterested in a continuing security relationship with France, reflecting a lack of confidence that may have encouraged President Mohamed Bazoum’s ouster on July 6, 2023.

Le « Travail Politique Militaire » de la Chine et la formation militaire professionnelle en Afrique

China views professional military training in Africa as an opportunity to promote its governance model while strengthening its ties with ruling political parties in Africa.

Training foreign officers, which is part of what China calls “military political work,” has become a key area of Chinese engagement in Africa. This “military political work” (jundui zhengzhi gongzuo; ) includes all the activities of China’s Popular Liberation Army (PLA) aimed at shaping the civilian environment to achieve the political, ideological, and military goals set by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). These activities include political and ideological awareness within the army, public affairs and the “United Front strategy” (to mobilize support outside the party), as well as educational functions such as military professional training (FMP).

Iranian Proxies and Impending Conflict in Eastern Syria

Clashes in Eastern Syria curiously coincided with the claims of an impending American military operation Iyad al-Jaafari writes in Syria TV.

The Iranian response to the ongoing protests in As-Suweida, which could potentially spread across Syria, stands in contrast to their actions during the early stages of the 2011 revolution. This time, the Iranian intervention is more immediate and proactive, signalling an attempt to anticipate and shape developments on the ground by initiating a new front of conflict in the eastern part of the country. This indicates that the “Iranian axis” recognizes the gravity of the situation in Syria and fears the prospect of entering into a protracted, costly, and politically challenging war to rescue the Assad regime once again.

The Long Struggle of Deir-ez-Zor: A History of Marginalization and Resistance

From his military coup in 1970 until his death in 2000, Hafez al-Assad failed to appreciate Syria’s diverse regions, according to Bassam Youssef for Syria TV.

Deir-ez-Zor has endured significant suffering under the rule of the Baath regime, particularly during the Assad family’s leadership. Apart from intentional marginalization, impoverishment, and resource exploitation, Hafez al-Assad perpetrated a grave injustice by eroding the region’s values, ethics, and traditions, while elevating those loyal to him and suppressing its male population.