Terror organization: Hamas
Status: Deputy of Salah al Aruri in the leadership of Hamas’ West Bank.
Role: Besides being deputy of al Aruri, Jabarin is deeply involved in the construction department which oversees developing the combat terror capabilities of the organization.
Moreover, he oversaw Hamas’ financial department and took care personally about financial operation, established of businesses and money laundering in Turkey, Qatar, Lebanon and more.
Clinton’s Two Tracks Collide – NATO Enlargement and Russia Engagement
Washington, D.C., November 24, 2021 – The biggest train wreck on the track to NATO expansion in the 1990s – Boris Yeltsin’s “cold peace” blow up at Bill Clinton in Budapest in December 1994 – was the result of “combustible” domestic politics in both the U.S. and Russia, and contradictions in the Clinton attempt to have his cake both ways, expanding NATO and partnering with Russia at the same time, according to newly declassified U.S. documents published today by the National Security Archive.
The continued looting of humanitarian aid trucks demonstrates that Hamas’ internal control remains limited and severely weakened. Armed groups looted 98 of 109 humanitarian aid trucks that entered the southern Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing on November 16.[i] It is unclear if these armed groups are affiliated with any Palestinian militia group, but the armed men were likely part of organized criminal groups that have replaced Hamas’ police forces in much of the Strip.[ii] Hamas claimed that it conducted a joint operation with local family groups in which Hamas and locals killed 20 individuals who had looted the vehicles.[iii] The fact that Hamas had to cooperate with these local groups indicates that Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip remains weak. Hamas has long fought local families and organized criminal groups for control over the Gaza Strip. The UNRWA spokesperson said that the aid convoys are not allowed to maintain any armed guards and that they usually attempt to drive fast to avoid ambushes by armed groups.[iv] The IDF has recently taken several steps to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing and facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[v] CTP-ISW has not observed the IDF escorting any aid itself, however.
The Ukrainian president formally presented his plan calling for ramped-up Western military firepower and economic aid and at least a promise of NATO membership to help accelerate the war’s end. The country’s supporters should heed his calls for fortifying Ukraine’s defenses.
With the Russian-Ukrainian war approaching its third anniversary, many Ukrainians and their supporters are feeling dejected because there is no end in sight. More than 300,000 Ukrainians have been killed or wounded (according to U.S. intelligence estimates) and Ukraine is facing painful electricity blackouts during the winter. Far more Russian troops have been killed or wounded—more than 600,000—yet Russian forces keep attacking. They are slowly making gains, at great cost, in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian morale is starting to sag and support for Ukraine in the West could start to decline as well, especially if former President Donald Trump wins the White House again in November.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria reflected a more assertive foreign policy. However, its ability to expand its influence to Lebanon and beyond has been restricted.
Russia’s role in the Levant and its involvement in the region’s power politics have undergone a significant shift over the past decade, mainly because of opportunities created by geopolitical and regional developments, including, most critically, the pivoting of U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and forever wars. These developments opened the door in 2015 to a more active Russian role in reshaping a region that was in the throes of societal upheavals and expanding conflicts. The United States’ growing disengagement became especially evident following the failure of U.S. former president Barack Obama’s famous red line in preventing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from launching chemical weapons attacks against Syrian citizens in 2013. This created an opportune moment for Russia to launch a new strategic and somewhat pragmatic foreign policy in the Levant, through which it sought to carve out a space for itself in a changing order. Since then, Moscow has acted as a broker of sorts between different actors involved in the Syrian conflict, while balancing out its relationship with each actor in favor of its own national interests. In the process, it has sought to redefine a regional security architecture more amenable to these interests.
Russia’s outreach to the region has successfully exploited regimes’ frustrations with the West. Yet it has encountered difficulties in navigating the complex interrelations and rivalries.
The Arab-majority states of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have become an increasing focus of Russian engagement and influence. Moscow is demonstrating a growing appreciation of their strategic value, especially in the domains of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). Geographically, these countries are part of Africa and are members of the African Union and therefore serve as important elements in Russia’s growing power projection on the African continent. They are also situated on the Mediterranean basin, offering Moscow potential points of leverage on the flow of oil and natural gas and irregular migration into the southern flank of NATO-dominated Europe, as well as potential warm water ports for its navy. Further, linguistically, culturally, and politically, the Maghreb is part of the Arab world and plays a role in Russia’s broader “return” to the Middle East and its increased strategic focus on issues such as counterterrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and Syria.
Introduction
For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.
Throughout 2024, as the world was shaken by ongoing violent conflicts and other crises, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams continued to provide essential medical services and humanitarian aid—because when our patients need us, we are there.
Cet article a pour but d’informer le public francophone que le terrorisme est souvent utilisé pour diaboliser la lutte d’autodétermination palestinienne et minimiser la souffrance du peuple palestinien, que le terrorisme a été initié par les sionistes. Loin d’être châtiés, ils ont été récompensés par l’octroi d’un État (55% de la Palestine pour 20% de la population). Les palestiniens désabusés n’ont fait que suivre l’exemple de leurs «grands frères» dans le métier. Si un sioniste vous accuse de soutenir le Hamas parce que vous dénoncez les crimes d’Israël, rappelez-lui que les sionistes aussi ont été des terroristes.
The country’s former foreign minister explains the powderkeg that is three leaders in a cannot-lose standoff
BETWEEN 2016 AND 2022, Western diplomats and journalists frequently asked Ukrainian officials what Ukraine was prepared to concede to Russia for peace. This was more than mere curiosity. It was the tip of a policy iceberg submersed in the belief that peace could be achieved by sacrificing Ukrainian interests to Russia. Look at the headlines since February 2022 to see where this approach has led.