Author: M Barbu

How Rama built his power in Albania

From elections and party politics to local government, media and construction, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s hold on power now faces a new test.

In June of this year, a book setting out an ambitious vision for Albania’s physical transformation was published: The Albanian Files. Featuring a foreword by Prime Minister Edi Rama, the book brings together around 520 projects by 60 international architectural studios — from skyscrapers and luxury apartment buildings to hotels, resorts and developments proposed in coastal and environmentally sensitive areas. One of its contributors is Dutch architect Reinier de Graaf, a partner at the internationally renowned architecture firm OMA. In a deliberately provocative letter in the book, de Graaf suggests dispensing with elections altogether and having Rama continue as “president for life — maybe even King.”

Guerre contre l’Iran : Ansarullah passe à l’offensive

À la mi-juillet, l’Arabie saoudite a relancé sa guerre contre le gouvernement yéménite d’Ansarullah et le mouvement houthi :

«Les forces dirigées par l’Arabie saoudite ont bombardé lundi l’aéroport international de Sanaa, au Yémen, relançant ainsi la guerre contre les Houthis yéménites, officiellement connus sous le nom d’Ansarullah, alors qu’un cessez-le-feu tenait relativement bien depuis 2022.

Kazakhstan: A Responsible Middle Power And Strategic Connector Of Eurasia – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

  • IFIMES reads Tokayev’s Bishkek SCO speech as “responsible middle-power” policy: use the SCO’s “Shanghai spirit” and even a UNGA resolution on its principles, but treat the UN as irreplaceable. Kazakhstan would link China, Russia, the EU, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf rather than pick a bloc.
  • Tools cited include the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor (more than raw transit: logistics, industry, digital customs), deep China ties moving from energy to AI and manufacturing, 2026 as a digitalization year, a proposed UN water body and SCO water centre, and a new constitution plus unicameral Kurultai from 1 July 2026.
  • Nuclear identity is Semipalatinsk and the 2006 Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (20th anniversary statement, 8 Sept 2026). The piece also flags EU/Western Balkans interest in the corridor. The test, it says, is keeping autonomy while China supplies capital and tech. That is the institute’s interpretation of Astana’s line.

La démonstration de force des Houthis a révélé le caractère illusoire de l’OTAN islamique

Les nouveaux alliés musulmans de l’Arabie saoudite ne volent pas à son secours et même les États-Unis auraient rejeté sa demande d’intervention directe dans la dernière phase de ce conflit qui dure depuis plus d’une décennie.

L’expert russe Farhad Ibragimov a évalué avec justesse que «l’OTAN musulmane saoudienne est confrontée à sa première épreuve du feu» face à la multiplication des attaques houthies contre des cibles à l’intérieur du royaume. Le Pakistan aurait transmis à l’Iran un avertissement de son allié saoudien l’exhortant à contenir les Houthis, tandis que son ministre de la Défense laissait entendre que la poursuite des attaques contre l’Arabie saoudite permettrait de concrétiser leur alliance de défense mutuelle. Peu après, cependant, le ministère pakistanais des Affaires étrangères a minimisé cette possibilité.

Where the East-West Pipeline Actually Burned

Baghdad Says the Drones Flew From Maysan. Thermal Data and a Post-Attack Optical Frame Put the Damage on a 110-Kilometer Stretch Southeast of Medina, 1,100 Kilometers Away.

On the morning of Thursday, September 10, drones struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the 1,200-kilometer line from Abqaiq to Yanbu that has carried most of the kingdom’s exports since Iran shut the Strait of Hormuz. The Ministry of Energy shut the line “as a precautionary measure” and reported injuries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then said the drones came from Iraq and that Riyadh, at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi, had “chosen not to respond at this stage.” Early on Saturday, Baghdad said its investigation had traced the launches to Maysan province on the Iranian border and dismissed the commander of Maysan Operations Command. That is the whole public record.

L’intégration des forces ukrainiennes dans les structures de l’OTAN

L’intégration des forces armées ukrainiennes (FAU) dans les structures militaires de l’OTAN : mécanismes, portée, limites.

Le problème soulevé dans le titre n’est pas purement théorique ou secondaire. Nous constatons comment l’Ukraine s’intègre progressivement avec l’OTAN sur de nombreux points, allant de la création d’une industrie de défense unifiée à la formation des armées occidentales aux compétences et aux techniques de combat conventionnel modernes, y compris lors d’exercices. L’objectif de cette analyse est de déterminer comment le refus de l’Ukraine de rejoindre formellement l’OTAN affecte la sécurité nationale de la Russie à long terme.

How A Resurgent Al-Qaeda Is Helping Militant Attacks In Pakistan – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

An RFE/RL analysis says Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are more tightly linked since the Afghan Taliban returned to power, with AQ helping TTP strategy, training, and media as attacks into Pakistan rise. A May checkpoint attack in northwest Pakistan killed 21.

UN monitors and some researchers describe practical and public AQ backing for TTP (including an April Al-Sahab statement), plus alleged help for other outfits (BLA, IMP/AQIS). Kabul is said to have given sanctuary and ID cards to several groups. Experts disagree: Abdul Sayed calls the AQ–TTP operational bond a “myth” and says TTP influence from AQ has faded since 2014.

Understanding The US-Venezuela Oil Deal – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

  • The author describes two post-Maduro oil moves: a White House–NABEP partnership (Pentagon 35% stake, State right to buy 20% of output at cost, 100 years, 17 Orinoco fields) and Chevron’s expanded Orinoco joint ventures (~$7 billion over five years). Analysts cited say first oil from the new venture could take 10–15 years; cheaper U.S. pump prices are not immediate.
  • Interim President Delcy Rodríguez has welcomed the deals and U.S. military anti-trafficking access. The piece says little open Chavista or opposition protest, which sources attribute to authoritarian control, self-interest, or keeping Washington’s favor. U.S. Democrats call the arrangement a grab for oil after Maduro’s removal.
  • China and Russia may hold stakes or debt in some of the same fields (~$15 billion Venezuelan debt to Beijing is cited). Legal fights or a long wait-and-see strategy are possible. U.S. telecom opening that excludes Huawei/ZTE is another loss for Beijing. The author’s view: headlines outrun what is settled.

Yémen : les Houthis s’emparent du stratégique détroit de Bab el-Mandeb

Les rebelles yéménites ont pris vendredi le contrôle de la côte yéménite sur la mer Rouge et des îles du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb après une offensive éclair. Ils assurent que “la navigation est sûre pour toutes les compagnies à l’exception des navires saoudiens, qui ont déjà été interdits d’accès”.

Au terme d’une offensive éclair qui consolide leur emprise sur ce passage stratégique reliant l’Europe à l’Asie, les Houthis pro-iraniens se sont emparés vendredi 11 septembre de la côte yéménite sur la mer Rouge et des îles du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb.

The US “Burden Sharing Network” Takes Shape

In 2025, the US National Security Strategy paper would be broadly misinterpreted as a US plan to break with its historical pursuit of global primacy and instead retreat to the Western Hemisphere while somehow reconciling or coexisting with traditional targets of US aggression.