The Eurasian landmass needs local solutions to its indigenous problems, and needs indivisible security instead of zero-sum security. The Eurasian Security Architecture aims to address this basic need.
Key Takeaways
The political wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) elected a new leader over the weekend. The Ummah Party elected Muath al-Khawaldeh as secretary general at its seventh general conference, defeating Ahmad al-Qatawneh in a closely contested race.
Khawaldeh served as the official spokesperson for the MB until Amman outlawed the group in 2022 and later banned it in April 2025. The ban followed the group’s involvement in a plot to procure drones and missiles and recruit operatives for terror activities inside and outside Jordan. The United States later designated the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for providing material support to Hamas.
The Ummah Party has been on a rebranding kick since the ban of its parent organization. After changing its name in May from the Islamic Action Front, it sought to install new leadership to signal distance from the MB. But the changes have been largely cosmetic. Despite the changes, party officials have said that “opening up to a new name does not mean abandoning its identity.” The election of an MB official to lead the party demonstrates the MB’s continuing influence.
MB Figures Take Top Spots in ‘New’ Party’s Leadership
Al-Khawaldeh has held an official role in the organization since at least 2015, when he became its spokesperson. In 2024, he joined the Brotherhood’s executive council, where he oversaw several political portfolios, including the Palestine portfolio.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s foothold in Ummah is not limited to al-Khawaldeh. The party’s Shura Council, its main decision-making body, also includes MB officials and members. On the same day as al-Khawaldeh’s election, the party elected 21 members to fill vacant seats on the council, including several prominent MB figures: Hamzah Mansour, a former head of the MB’s Shura Council; Jamil Abu Baker, a former deputy leader of the MB and member of its executive council; Mustafa Saqer, a member of the MB’s executive council; and Aref Hamdan, a member of the MB’s Shura Council and a former member of its executive council.
The Party’s Rebranding Is Less Than Skin-Deep
Despite Amman banning the Muslim Brotherhood, it allowed its political wing to continue operating and remain represented in parliament. Jordan has historically sought to manage Islamist participation rather than eliminating it. The government used a 2022 law restricting religiously affiliated party names in an effort to push the Islamic Action Front to rebrand.
The party has not moved away from its Islamist leanings. Its new constitution continues to emphasize the promotion of Islamic values and culture, as well as mobilization against “colonial projects,” including Zionism, while framing the Palestinian cause as a shared Arab and Islamic responsibility.
Following his election, al-Khawaldeh’s remarks adopted a more inclusive, nationalist tone. “We extend our hands to the national community to serve our country, our nation, and the causes of the nation,” he said. He described the Palestinian cause as “a national cause par excellence,” and stressed the party’s continued support for the Palestinians’ “resistance.”
U.S. Should Investigate Whether the Party’s Ties to the Jordanian MB Warrant Sanctions
When Washington designated the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in January, the designation did not extend to the movement’s leadership or to entities subordinate or affiliated with it, including its political wing and charities. The election of Muslim Brotherhood officials to senior positions in the Ummah Party shows personnel continuity between the two organizations.
Washington should review the relationship between the Ummah Party and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, focusing on whether the two organizations share decision-making structures, including individuals serving in dual capacities. The United States should also investigate whether Brotherhood officials direct or influence party decisions, and whether the party provides funds or other material support to the designated organization.
Donald Trump vient de prononcer, depuis la tribune de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, un discours à l’adresse du reste du monde qui est sans doute le plus grandiloquent, ignorant, agressif et scandaleux de toute l’histoire de l’organisation, vieille de 81 ans.
On regarde le Yémen sur une carte et l’on voit un pays pauvre, fragmenté, ravagé par plus d’une décennie de guerre.
On regarde son PIB et l’on voit presque rien.
Mais on regarde sa population, ses montagnes, son histoire et surtout sa position devant Bab el-Mandeb : soudain, le Yémen change de dimension.
When I think about the journey of heroin from its source to a European market, I don’t picture a criminal mastermind directing a supply chain from beginning to end.
What I see instead is a farmer, then a transporter, a courier and perhaps a broker who moves the drugs only as far as the next village. Another broker might get them across a border, after which a gang takes over one stretch of the journey before handing it to another. By the time the heroin arrives in Europe, still more people may be responsible for moving it to wherever it eventually ends up.
The Transition from Young Marx to Mature Marx
Louis Althusser’s interpretation of Karl Marx is marked by a fundamental distinction between the early writings of Marx and the theoretical work that emerged from the mid-1840s onward. In For Marx and Reading Capital, Althusser develops the argument that Marx’s intellectual development cannot be understood simply as a gradual accumulation of ideas. Instead, he identifies a decisive theoretical transformation, which he describes through the concept of an epistemological break.
Key Takeaways:
From consumer to provider. Building on Jakub Grygiel’s five U.S. choices for Europe, the author says Albania and Kosovo can no longer treat NATO and Washington as a fixed shield; allies will be judged by what they add—modern forces, a defense industry, cyber, intelligence, and civil protection.
Ten theses, one horizon. The platform calls for Eastern-Flank partners (Poland, the Baltics, Nordics, Czechia; dialogue with Romania and Slovakia), an Adriatic–Kosovo “southern gateway,” functional Albania–Kosovo integration that could later become a democratic “Albanian Federation,” one security map for Albanians across the region, and a realist stance toward Serbia as the main Balkan power channel for Russian (and some Chinese) influence—balance and deterrence, not reflex hostility.
Power beyond the ministries. Diplomacy should fuse defense, energy, industry, and tech; the diaspora should be treated as national power, not remittances; strategic-intelligence centers should outlast election cycles. End-state named: an indispensable NATO actor on the Adriatic and in the Western Balkans, not a bargaining chip.
Key Takeaways:
Saudi Arabia built the East-West Pipeline in the Iran–Iraq War as redundancy past Hormuz, moving crude from the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea. A 10 September drone strike—Riyadh blames Iranian-backed militias in Iraq—forced a temporary shutdown. The piece says that hits about 4% of world oil supply. Rystad: as of late August, up to 4 million b/d on the line. Prior hits: Houthis at Afif (2019) and Iranian drones in the 2026 Iran war.
Bypassing Hormuz shifts risk to Bab el-Mandeb. The author says Houthis now hold more ground around Perim, Hanish, Mocha, and Dhubab. Hormuz flows: 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025 to 4.9 million in Q2 2026; Bab el-Mandeb 5.4 million to 8.1 million; Suez/SUMED ~5.8 million. Aramco’s 15% SUMED stake is a backup, but much of that still needs the pipeline and Yanbu; ship size and pipe capacity cannot swap every barrel.
2019: pipeline hit, Hormuz open. April 2026: Hormuz squeezed, Bab el-Mandeb less constrained. September 2026: pipeline, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb under pressure at once. Author: alternatives that share the same nodes are not independent risk. Count independent capacity under simultaneous hits, not the number of maps on the wall.
La «clause des États ennemis» place l’Allemagne sous la tutelle des vainqueurs de la Seconde Guerre mondiale depuis 1945. Jamais abrogée, cette disposition souligne les limites actuelles de la souveraineté allemande.
Remarques préliminaires
Récemment, la «clause des États ennemis» de la Charte des Nations unies — tombée depuis longtemps dans l’oubli — est revenue sur le devant de la scène. Comme j’étudie cette question depuis plusieurs années déjà, je souhaiterais l’aborder une nouvelle fois dans l’article qui suit. La première partie de mon analyse a déjà été publiée en janvier 2024, notamment dans Overton Magazine le 18 janvier 2023, ainsi que dans mon ouvrage Niemand soll hungern, ohne zu frieren (Personne ne devrait souffrir de la faim ni du froid), paru en 2024. La deuxième partie est un extrait de mon ouvrage Geopolitik im Überblick. Deutschland-USA-EU-Russland (La géopolitique en bref : Allemagne-États-Unis-UE-Russie), publié en juillet 2025, dans lequel j’aborde, entre autres, l’importance de la «clause des États ennemis» pour la situation politique actuelle, qui devient de plus en plus tendue.