Trump inflige à la nation ce qu’il a infligé au Taj Mahal. Il extorque les institutions qu’il supervise pour son profit personnel, et nous autres resterons les mains vides à contempler les ruines.
Je me suis rendu au Taj Mahal Casino de Donald Trump à Atlantic City la veille de sa fermeture, en octobre 2016. Le casino était flanqué de deux immenses portails blancs encadrés par des éléphants blancs en marbre de 2 tonnes. Son entrée était surmontée d’une rangée de 70 petits minarets en fibre de verre turquoise et bleu sarcelle, ainsi que d’une douzaine de dômes aux sommets dorés. Une enseigne au néon aux lettres rouges et or indiquait : “Trump Taj Mahal Casino and Resort”. Une fontaine illuminée, juste devant les portes vitrées du casino, était ornée de deux rangées de six urnes blanches et dorées.
La bombe nucléaire n’est pas la principale menace pour le monde. Il existe quelque chose de bien plus dangereux.
La principale menace dans la confrontation entre les États-Unis et la Chine n’est pas la parité militaire, mais la surestimation mutuelle de ses propres capacités. La question devrait être de savoir comment éviter le conflit et travailler ensemble à l’élimination des menaces communes, telles que le changement climatique et l’injustice sociale.
Lorsque je me rendais régulièrement en Israël, entre le milieu et la fin des années 1990, dans le cadre de mes fonctions au sein des Nations unies, j’ai toujours été frappé par la façon dont de nombreux Israéliens s’identifient étroitement aux États-Unis. Lors des fêtes nationales, de nombreux automobilistes israéliens arboraient deux petits drapeaux en plastique aux vitres de leur voiture : l’un représentant l’étoile de David bleue et blanche, l’autre le drapeau américain. «Nous nous considérons comme une petite Amérique», m’expliquait mon hôte israélien lorsque je lui faisais remarquer cette particularité.
Vous avez sans doute tous suivi la dernière affaire hispano-marocaine avec cet invraisemblable envoi de « migrant » vers Ceuta de la part du Maroc. Cette affaire qui pourrait être en réalité assez anecdotique, le Maroc voulant depuis longtemps récupérer les enclaves espagnoles africaines au prétexte d’une légitimité essentiellement fantasmée. On rappellera que ces territoires sont espagnols depuis 500 ans, c’est à dire plus ancien que bon nombre de nations actuelles à commencer par celle qui a sans doute en partie manigancé cette affaire à savoir les USA, sans parler d’Israël. Alors effectivement d’un point de vue géographique c’est plus proche du Maroc, mais si l’on raisonne comme cela on aura tôt fait d’entraîner de multiples conflits sur la planète. Faudrait-il que la France cède Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon au Canada ? Que la Russie cède son enclave de Kaliningrad qui est un butin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dont la Russie a payé le plus grand prix humain.
Alors que les insurrections islamistes militantes enregistrent des avancées sans précédent dans tout le Sahel, les dirigeants des juntes militaires se sont attachés à museler les voix indépendantes plutôt qu’à adapter leurs stratégies de sécurité.
While the world watches the semiconductor supply chain, a far more insidious war is being waged in the silent architecture of artificial intelligence (AI).
Western tech monopolies are no longer just building tools; they are engineering the very boundaries of global thought, forcing nations to choose between cognitive subjugation and digital sovereignty. The race for AI dominance has quietly shifted from the silicon foundry to the human mind.
Iran is threatening to target energy infrastructure in the Middle East, likely to try to deter the United States and Israel from following through on reported plans to strike Iranian energy infrastructure.
The IRGC reportedly used the US-Iran ceasefire in April 2026 to coordinate with the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias to expand the conflict and increase the costs of US military operations. Two senior IRGC officers told the New York Times on August 1 that senior IRGC Quds Force officers held calls with Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia commanders during the ceasefire to coordinate efforts to expand the conflict with the United States. The IRGC officers’ decision to speak with the New York Times now is likely part of the Iranian information effort to try to deter US and Israeli strikes against Iranian critical infrastructure.
Kuwaiti air defenses intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones targeting Kuwait on August 1. Iran has not claimed nor commented on this attack at the time of this writing.
Iran continues to illegally assert control over the Strait of Hormuz with force by attacking civilian vessels that attempt to use non-Iranian-approved routes through the strait. Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping are also likely intended to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian demands.
Toplines
Iran is threatening to target energy infrastructure in the Middle East, likely to try to deter the United States and Israel from following through on reported plans to strike Iranian energy infrastructure. An unspecified senior security official told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency on July 30 that Iran has prepared an attack plan that includes attacks on regional energy infrastructure in response to reports that US President Donald Trump has ordered new strikes on Iran.[1] IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reiterated this threat and published a list of regional energy facilities that it said Iranian missiles can reach.[2] The list included oil fields and other energy infrastructure in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.[3] Iran issued these threats after Western media reported that the United States and Israel are considering conducting large-scale strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure.[4] An Iranian analyst close to the regime stated on August 1 that an attack on Iranian infrastructure would be a “terrifying scenario for everyone” and urged regional and international actors to prevent the “crisis.”[5] Iran likely seeks to prevent US or US-Israeli combined force operations by signaling that any attack on Iran’s energy sector would trigger Iranian retaliatory strikes against regional critical infrastructure.
The IRGC reportedly used the US-Iran ceasefire in April 2026 to coordinate with the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias to expand the conflict and increase the costs of US military operations.[6] Two senior IRGC officers told the New York Times on August 1 that senior IRGC Quds Force officers held virtual conference calls with Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia commanders during the ceasefire to coordinate efforts to expand the conflict with the United States.[7] The officers added that Quds Force commanders and advisers also worked directly with these groups on the ground.[8] ISW-CTP has observed reports that are consistent with some of these officers’ claims. The IRGC reportedly set up covert cells in Iraq to carry out attacks on Gulf countries that host US forces during the ceasefire, according to eight Iraqi sources speaking to Reuters, for example.[9] The officers told the New York Times that the objective of this coordination was to make the war as costly as possible for US President Donald Trump.[10] These statements are consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that Iran seeks to weaken US resolve by increasing the military and political costs of sustained US operations against Iran.[11] The IRGC officers’ decision to speak with the New York Times now is likely also part of the Iranian information effort to try to deter US and Israeli strikes against Iranian critical infrastructure.
Kuwaiti air defenses intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones targeting Kuwait on August 1.[12] Iran has not claimed nor commented on this attack at the time of this writing. The drones targeted “vital facilities,” including a government building in northern Kuwait and a vehicle belonging to a civilian company on Bubiyan Island.[13] Iran claimed attacks on Bubiyan Island, which hosts US anti-aircraft equipment, in late March and on July 21.[14] Six IRGC officers previously attempted to infiltrate Bubiyan Island using a chartered fishing boat to carry out unspecified “hostile acts” against Kuwait in early May.[15] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could have conducted the August 1 attack on Kuwait, but no militia has claimed or commented on the attack at the time of this writing. Iraqi militias conducted multiple attacks on Gulf countries, including Kuwait, in March and April and likely struck Kuwait’s Abdali border crossing with Iraq on July 23.[16]
Iran continues to illegally assert control over the Strait of Hormuz with force by attacking civilian vessels that attempt to use non-Iranian-approved routes through the strait. Iran’s attacks on commercial shipping are also likely intended to impose economic costs on the global economy to erode the United States’ willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iranian demands. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a projectile struck the Bermuda-flagged GASLOG SHANGHAI oil tanker 11 nautical miles northeast of Limah, Oman, on July 31.[17] The likely Iranian projectile damaged the vessel’s engine room but caused no casualties.[18] UKMTO separately reported on July 31 that another projectile landed near a second unspecified vessel 21 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, causing no damage or casualties.[19] Iran has repeatedly targeted civilian vessels that transit through the strait using alternative routes to Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme, such as the southern Omani route.[20] Alternative routes through the strait, including the southern Omani route, undermine Iranian efforts to assert full control over the strait. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) issued a statement on July 31 that Iran will continue to strengthen Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and close other waterways–presumably referring to the Bab al Mandeb Strait–in response to the US blockade of Iranian ports. The SNSC added that “the price [of increased Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz] will be paid by” US citizens and the global economy, particularly the energy sector.[21] The SNSC’s emphasis on the economic costs for US citizens is part of Iran’s effort to increase domestic pressure on the US government to end the war. The SNSC’s statement follows an announcement from Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority on July 31 that it will not issue transit permits for vessels to pass through the strait until the United States ends military operations in the region.[22]
US CENTCOM reiterated on July 31 that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to all vessel traffic.[23] Commercially available maritime shipping data indicates that at least four vessels transited through the strait using the southern Omani route since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on July 31.[24]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report. Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
See topline section. US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report. Iranian Domestic Affairs
Unspecified armed individuals reportedly killed a Sunni cleric in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 1.[25] Borna News Agency claimed that unknown gunmen shot and killed Iranian Sunni cleric Molavi Khalil Barichi in Zahedan.[26] Several Iranian outlets recirculated Borna’s report but did not independently report or verify the attack.[27] Unspecified armed individuals previously killed Sunni cleric and Friday Prayer Leader Molavi Mohammad Anvar Rigi in Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on July 20.[28] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotspot for anti-regime activity, including by anti-regime Baloch separatist groups that frequently attack Iranian security forces.[29] Lebanon
Nothing significant to report. Iraq
Nothing significant to report. Arabian Peninsula
The Houthis denied on August 1 that they are currently imposing fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[30] The Houthi-controlled Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) issued a press release on August 1 that emphasized that transit through the Bab al Mandeb Strait remains free of charge.[31] The HOCC is a Houthi body that liaises between the Houthis and international shipping companies.[32] The HOCC also stated that services for authorized vessels, which almost certainly excludes Saudi and Israeli ships subject to the Houthis’ blockade, are voluntary and cost-free.[33] This denial comes after regional sources told Reuters on July 29 that the Houthis may start imposing fees on international commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait.[34] The Houthis could decide to impose fees at any time of their choosing, however. ISW-CTP assessed on July 29 that the Houthis may intend to impose fees on international shipping to further coerce Saudi Arabia to end its blockade on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and deter future Saudi strikes on Houthi targets by raising economic costs and international pressure on the Saudi government.[35]
Ursula von der Leyen praised Spain’s handling of the 60,000 migrant arrivals in Ceuta, saying Spanish and Moroccan authorities efficiently prevented further illegal movement into mainland Europe.
She used the incident to call for stronger EU border controls, including physical barriers, better monitoring, early warning systems, dismantling smuggling networks, and faster deportations.
While describing Morocco as an important partner, von der Leyen warned the EU would not tolerate migration being used as political pressure and suggested a strategic discussion at the October European Council.
To “secure its national interests”, America went to war multiple times over the past several decades, yet all of the wars ended in stunning failures with wide ranging implications for the countries involved.
It is said that national interests triumph over every other consideration in the realm of foreign policy. The idea of national interest varies for different countries, depending on their history, politics, economic development, and relationships with their internal and external actors. The nature of interests, Hans Morgenthau contended, changed over time. In contemporary times, state actors resort to a variety of means to secure their national interests. In today’s time, coercive measures seem to have acquired a particularly strong currency among leaders. Among coercive measures, war, which was deemed to be the measure of last resort when everything else failed, has now emerged as the first option.
Houthi attacks and growing instability in the Horn of Africa—particularly the merging of Sudan’s civil war with Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions and Somalia’s internal disputes—are creating new threats to Red Sea navigation and energy flows through Bab el-Mandeb. Competing Middle Eastern powers (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel) are fueling local conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and northern Somalia, raising the risk of a broader regional confrontation that could disrupt one of the world’s key maritime corridors. Europe faces direct economic and security risks from further Red Sea disruptions and should expand the mandates of its naval missions, engage more actively with northern Somali actors, and press Middle Eastern powers for restraint to prevent the crisis from escalating.
