More than a half century after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 242—which established the principle by which Israel would give up territory it gained in the war in exchange for peace and security—the Israelis and the Palestinians have made no meaningful, much less lasting, progress on their core differences.
It is time for this to change. What little opportunity still exists for realizing progress toward a durable agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians—one that would serve both parties’ interests—is fast fading. Political and physical barriers to compromise will soon pass a tipping point.
Israel, mostly owing to its own efforts, now finds itself in a favorable security environment, in which threats along its borders and in the region have been seriously weakened, if not eliminated. The country has never been in a better position to address the strategic challenge posed by Palestinian nationalism, which will require a response with political as well as military dimensions.
But such an environment cannot last forever. Although Israel has a friend in the White House who is prepared to back it in important ways, long-term U.S. and European support for Israel is not guaranteed, especially if even more Americans and Europeans come to view it as a pariah state denying rights to others.
Israel faces a stark choice. It will either need to make a sincere bid for compromise and peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians or risk losing the international support that its long-term well-being requires. Although the two-state solution has become anathema to many Israelis, it remains the best hope for their prosperity and security. That having a state of their own would be good for the Palestinians goes without saying. But it would also be good for Israel; indeed, helping to bring about a Palestinian state has the potential to serve Israel just as much as it would serve others.
A TALL ORDER
The Israelis and the Palestinians have come close to reaching a land-for-peace agreement on more than one occasion. But over the course of the past three to four decades, diplomacy has failed, in large part because Palestinian leaders—Yasir Arafat, the former president of the Palestinian Authority, and also his successors—were unwilling or unable (owing to political weakness) to accept what Israel offered in terms of territory, the status of Jerusalem, and the ability of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Hamas’s opposition to peace was and is more fundamental, because it would require acceptance of the Jewish state as a permanent part of the region.
The costs of this Palestinian rejection of a compromise-based two-state solution have been high. More than five million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza continue to live under Israel’s control rather their own. And it has become far more difficult to reach a diplomatic outcome comparable to what the Palestinian leadership rejected in the past.
Political and physical barriers to compromise will soon pass a tipping point.This is in large part because the situation on the ground has changed. There are now many more obstacles to peace—in particular the some 140 Israeli government–authorized settlements in the West Bank (and another 200 unauthorized outposts) that are home to more than 500,000 Israelis. Each settlement and outpost makes implementing territory-for-peace and building a viable Palestinian state more difficult; every additional settler creates political resistance to such a trade and raises the economic costs of relocating people.
Israeli politics have also changed. Parties on the political left have waned, and those on the right have strengthened. This political shift has been underway for decades but has rapidly accelerated since Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government, which relies on the support of what can be described as far-right religious nationalists, has both reflected and accelerated this shift.
Many Israelis and their supporters around the world—even those angry with Netanyahu’s conduct in the war and with what many see as an assault on Israeli democracy—now strongly oppose a Palestinian state, fearing that it would become a base from which armed factions would mount operations. Some argue that a two-state solution would whet rather than satisfy Palestinian political ambitions. Others oppose a Palestinian state not just for these reasons but also because they eye Gaza and the West Bank for Jewish settlement. It turns out that radical Palestinians are not the only ones who covet all that lies between the river and the sea.
As a result of these and other developments, declaring the demise of the two-state solution has become something of a cottage industry. And for understandable reasons: at best, it is on life support.
LONG-TERM SECURITY
Still, a two-state solution is not yet dead and buried. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians would be better off with a viable, independent, sovereign state inhabited by Palestinians and run by them—but one premised on conditions that would preclude it from posing a security threat to Israel.
A Palestinian state, rather than providing a base for terror, would be more likely to reduce it in ways that the Israel Defense Forces cannot. That is because terrorists can now act with near impunity, as they are not responsible for any territory or economy and have no citizens to answer to. Absent a Palestinian state, Israel likely faces a forever war. By contrast, the government of a Palestinian state would face the military and economic consequences of any attacks it authorized on Israel, which would be acts of war rather than terrorism, and of unauthorized attacks that occurred from within its borders, which a sovereign government is expected to prevent.
This reality should motivate a responsible government—one not run by Hamas—to act in constructive ways while providing Israel recourse if Palestinian leaders proved unable or unwilling to meet their international obligations. Israel enjoyed international support for such recourse in the immediate aftermath of October 7. But Israel has lost any such understanding and sympathy during the period of more than 22 months in which it has killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and exposed many more to conditions of extreme hardship.
Long-term U.S. and European support for Israel is not guaranteed.Resolving the Palestinian issue would also create a context in which the Abraham Accords, and normalization between Arab countries and Israel more generally, could continue and broaden. Arab states could comfortably sell normalized relations with Israel to their citizens if they could point to a path for Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is Israel’s unwillingness to restart diplomacy predicated on the prospect of a two-state outcome that holds him back from pursuing closer ties with Israel. Similarly, a Palestinian state would enhance the stability of Israel’s neighbors, above all Jordan, because satisfying the call for such an entity would relieve pressure on the Jordanian monarchy, which has long been willing to live in peace with Israel but would face domestic instability were an influx of Palestinians to enter the country and upset its demographic and political balance. Reducing the salience of the Palestinian issue would also allow Israel’s national security establishment to focus on other pressing threats, above all those posed by Iran.
A separate Palestinian state would also be good for Israel’s identity and internal cohesion. There are some two million Arab citizens of Israel, some of whom could be radicalized if Israel continues to frustrate Palestinian political ambitions and treat Palestinians so harshly. Even more fundamentally, a Palestinian state would free Israel from having to choose between being a democracy and being a Jewish state: granting five million Palestinians equal rights would threaten the latter, while denying them such rights would threaten the former. Obviously, all signs point to Israel denying them such rights, a trend that would only increase Israel’s international isolation.
Being seen as open to a Palestinian state would help Israel avoid pariah status around the world, a reality that is gaining momentum as a reaction to Israel’s military operations in Gaza. It would reduce the threat of economic sanctions from Europe and stem the growing alienation of many Americans, including younger American Jews—a trend that over time could even jeopardize U.S. military support for Israel. Israeli openness on this matter might also reduce anti-Semitism globally.
Last but most pressing, support in principle for a Palestinian state would offer Israel a pathway out of Gaza and to getting the remaining hostages back. Articulating a path toward a two-state solution is a prerequisite for replacing Israeli security forces with an Arab stabilization force and for creating competition for Hamas, which would lose its near-monopoly on the claim that only it can deliver a state for the Palestinian masses. As the British learned in Northern Ireland, radical groups cannot be defeated with military force alone. They must also be marginalized politically, by making available a diplomatic path that offers more promise than continued violence.
LESS IS MORE
The desirability of an outcome is one thing, but feasibility is something different altogether. The immediate diplomatic focus, therefore, should be modest, given political realities both in Israel and among Palestinians. For those who still favor a two-state solution, the objective for the immediate future should be to preserve the possibility of more ambitious diplomacy and create conditions that would give such diplomacy a chance of one day succeeding.
This policy should have two dimensions: one of avoidance and another of creation. Regarding the former, governments ought to eschew calling for Palestinian self-determination. To paraphrase the Camp David accords that Washington helped broker between Egypt and Israel in 1978, the Palestinians should have the right to participate in the determination of their own future but not to declare or decide it unilaterally. A Palestinian state must be created in tandem with Israel. There is too much history and not enough territory to do it any other way.
Another form of unilateralism to be avoided is the declaration from concerned outsiders—namely Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom—of their intention to recognize a Palestinian state this fall if there is no cease-fire in Gaza. Although these powers view their actions as helpful, in practice they are anything but. The Israelis and the Palestinians must reach an accommodation, and Palestinians must internalize that a state of their own, if Israel is to allow it, cannot be delivered by others without compromise on their part. Adding to the problem is that the choice to recognize a state of Palestine now appears to reward Hamas rather than a moderate alternative.
Israeli unilateralism must also be resisted. Here, the onus falls on the United States, because politics in Israel—born of governing coalitions, demographic changes, and reactions to events such as October 7—have developed in such a way that Israel, left to its own devices, will not exercise restraint. The Trump administration should make clear its opposition to new settlements, new outposts, and any annexation of Palestinian territory. It should also communicate its expectation that settlers and Israel Defense Forces units will respect Palestinian human rights and property rights. What would add teeth to such a stance (something this and previous U.S. administrations have largely resisted doing) would be a message from Washington that, going forward, Israel will not be able to count on the United States to use its veto in the UN Security Council to protect Israel from all economic and diplomatic sanctions if it ignores U.S. preferences. Washington could also impose higher tariffs on Israel if it continues to undermine what limited prospects remain for a Palestinian state. It is possible for the United States to distinguish between support for Israel’s security and support for its open-ended occupation and expansion.
Meanwhile, the United States, European countries, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab governments should press not just for an end to the war in Gaza and for the replacement of Israeli occupation forces with an Arab and Palestinian stabilization force; those governments should also put forward a public vision for a larger diplomatic process. They should articulate what they expect of both the Israelis and the Palestinians, what those parties could expect in return, and what they are prepared to do to encourage the process and buttress the results. This would include providing Israel with security assurances and economic assistance to help relocate settlers, and providing a new Palestinian state with what it requires to meet its obligations to its citizens and to Israel. What would be required here is nothing less than a long-term commitment to nation building—or, more precisely, state building.
Ideally, this would encourage the emergence of a more moderate Palestinian leadership willing to speak and act in ways that reassured a majority of Israelis, which in turn might encourage the emergence of a more moderate Israeli leadership. What comes to mind is the impact of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s outreach to Israelis just four years after Egypt attacked Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which persuaded Israelis that they had a partner whose cooperation would justify the evacuation of settlements and the return of territory that Israel had gained in 1967. The precise terms of a Palestinian state would be addressed and negotiated further down the road by a new generation of Israeli and Palestinian leaders.
It is impossible to describe a path such as the one outlined above with optimism, given where the parties involved are now and how they got there. But there is some reason for hope. One is U.S. President Donald Trump, who sees himself as a peacemaker and who finds himself in a position to be one here. Trump is popular in Israel, and he has the support of many American Jews who define themselves as staunchly pro-Israel. The same holds for evangelical Christians. In some respects, Trump’s position calls to mind that of U.S. President Richard Nixon. Nixon was able to extend a hand to communist China in no small part because, unlike other American presidents who might have wanted to do so, he did not have Richard Nixon to worry about.
Much the same holds for Trump when it comes to Israel. His negotiation of the Abraham Accords, moving of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and, most recently, bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites all insulate him from criticism and provide him with leverage available to few, if any, of his predecessors. And no Democrat is likely to make hay with the argument that Trump would be selling out Israel by pressuring it—because so many in the Democratic Party want him to do just that. In addition, an active American push for peace would enhance the standing of the United States around the world—and that of its president. The choice is his to make.
Another reason for some hope is that the Arab world is ready to make peace with Israel. Several governments have already done so, and Saudi Arabia is prepared to move forward. Then there is the New York Declaration—the result of a UN conference chaired by Saudi Arabia and France on the two-state solution in late July—which among other things includes a call for Hamas to end its rule in Gaza and to hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority. The declaration underscores just how far the Arab world has evolved in its willingness to live alongside Israel.
Finally, there is the fluid political situation in Israel. The number of Israelis protesting the weakening of the country’s courts and democracy, and more recently advocating for an end of the war in Gaza and the return of the hostages, suggests that the legacy of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who sought to make careful compromises for peace, remains a strong force in Israeli politics.
THE TIME IS NOW
Bringing about a Palestinian state will require help from the United States, Europe, and the Arab states. Most important, it will require that the Palestinians demonstrate in word and action that they are prepared to live in peace with Israel. If they are willing to do this, then there is a chance that politics in Israel will evolve—not to mention that Israel will be on the hook to respond in good faith.
It is, of course, possible that Israel will not have a diplomatic partner in the Palestinians, who are deeply divided politically. If so—if Palestinians are not prepared to reject Hamas and embrace moderation and a willingness to compromise—then Israel would be much less likely to be viewed by many, as it is now, as the principal impediment to peace. It would avoid some of the domestic divisions as well as regional and international opprobrium being directed its way. To be sure, Israel would still have to contend with the many internal consequences associated with having more than five million Palestinians living under its control. It would also have to approach Palestinians in a far more humane and responsible way than it has recently in both Gaza and the West Bank. But it would be in an improved situation all the same.
A Palestinian state would not solve every problem. A variation of Winston Churchill’s famous assertion about democracy comes to mind: it is “the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” A cynic might say the same thing about the two-state solution, that it is the worst form of diplomatic outcome except for all the others.
Absent a Palestinian state, Israel likely faces a forever war.Whatever its risks and shortcomings, a two-state solution would leave Israel better off than the alternatives. The status quo of open-ended occupation risks pushing Israel further down the path toward becoming an international pariah. Israel would forever face terrorism from a people who felt they had nothing to lose. The forced transfer of millions of Palestinians out of Gaza and the West Bank would have the same effect, and possibly destabilize Jordan and other neighbors, jeopardizing the peace that Israel is enjoying with those Arab countries that have sought it. A one-state solution, in which Palestinians became Israeli citizens, would threaten Israel’s Jewishness, democratic rule, or both.
Abba Eban, Israel’s erudite foreign minister at the time of the country’s 1967 and 1973 conflicts with its Arab neighbors, once famously said that when it comes to making peace, the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. He had a point. But today the dictum applies to Israel, as well. Never in the country’s history has Israel been more secure from external threat. It is at peace with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. It has significantly degraded Iran’s proxies in the region, above all Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran, Iraq, and Syria are all relatively weak. Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest Arab country, and one that enjoys a unique status in the Islamic world, has signaled its readiness to normalize ties if Israel demonstrates a willingness to address Palestinian national demands under reasonable conditions. And Israel has a staunch friend in the White House.
The United States should make good on its legacy of being Israel’s closest friend. Policymakers and American citizens should consider that what is deemed today to constitute a pro-Israel stance could well be judged differently by history. It is in the interests of Israel and the United States alike to try to bring about a Palestinian state before the possibility disappears forever. It is literally now or never.