This Week’s Highlights
While European officials hope U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will soften America’s tone with traditional allies, senior Western officials in the U.S. capital are braced for an abrasive change when it comes to U.S.-Russia relations, the Financial Times reports. “We expect a massive toughening of the stance towards Russia,” a high-ranking Western diplomat in Washington told the Financial Times. “There is a hatred for Russia amongst [Biden’s team] that is really amazing. It’s not just rational; it’s also very emotional.”
A Biden presidency can offer a silver lining for the Kremlin, writes Brookings senior fellow Steven Pifer. First, according to Pifer, Biden’s foreign policy will be predictable. Second, Biden can be expected to professionalize relations, both on issues where interests coincide and where major differences divide the two countries. Third, Biden will want guardrails to manage the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship, beginning with arms control. Fourth, Biden has the disposition to tackle problems that may require months, perhaps longer, to resolve.
After years of mutual sanctions, diplomatic expulsions and cyberattacks, it is difficult to imagine U.S.-Russia relations getting any worse than they are today. But, writes Daniel R. DePetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, if the next U.S. president doesn’t change Washington’s overall approach to Moscow and adopt a policy more realistic in its objectives, then the relationship between the countries will further deteriorate. America should engage with Russia when it can and confront the country when it must because that is the most effective way to stabilize one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships, DePetris writes.
Whereas Turkish diplomats once claimed they were an ally in the fight against the Islamic State, the Turkish military and intelligence service has increasingly employed Islamic State veterans to further Turkey’s interests across the region, writes Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Turkey now uses Islamist proxies to wage war in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Rubin argues that any government or leader who accepts Turkey’s proxy forces on their territory should automatically lose diplomatic support, be slapped with sanctions and perhaps, even be subject to a future state sponsor of terror designation.
During the current crisis in Ukraine, many in the West and in Ukraine itself lamented the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, writes Prof. Tom Nichols. If Ukraine had kept its weapons, the reasoning goes, Russia would never have dared to threaten Crimea and eastern Ukraine. But this is the wrong lesson: what seems to have given Moscow pause is the willingness of Ukraine, outnumbered and outgunned, to fight back. Had Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, Nichols argues, a Russian invasion might have taken place a decade ago on the pretext of “securing” those systems.
I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
No significant developments.North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
No significant developments.Iran and its nuclear program:
No significant developments.New Cold War/saber rattling:
“The Inside of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy Revealed,” Tom Nichols, The National Interest, 11.09.20: The author, professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, writes:
“The outlook for Russia’s nuclear forces is less important than the serious improvements Russia is seeking to make in its conventional forces, especially in Europe. The Russians have relied on nuclear arms to compensate for conventional weakness, a practice even Moscow realizes is unsustainable and dangerous. The real threat to NATO will occur if Western military forces on the ground continue to be hollowed out by budget cuts and a lack of purpose, while Russian forces continue to improve and to recover from the disarray of the Soviet collapse.”
“During the current crisis in Ukraine, many in the West and in Ukraine itself lamented the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the United States and Britain agreed to respect Ukrainian borders and sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine releasing any claims on the last remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory. If Ukraine had kept its weapons, the reasoning goes, Russia would never have dared to threaten Crimea and eastern Ukraine. But this is the wrong lesson: what seems to have given Moscow pause is the willingness of Ukraine, outnumbered and outgunned, to fight back. What may be serving to cool further Russian ambitions, in other words, is Russian conventional weakness. Had Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, a Russian invasion might have taken place a decade ago on the pretext of ‘securing’ those systems, but if Ukraine avoids a Russian invasion now, it will not be because of anyone’s nuclear arms, but because Russia is aware that it might face a serious conventional fight even against an admittedly weaker country.”
“If Moscow redresses those conventional shortcomings without an answer from the West, nuclear issues will seem, in comparison, like a quaint problem from the past.”NATO-Russia relations:
No significant developments.Missile defense:
No significant developments.Nuclear arms control:
“Will US Election Herald the Return of Arms Control?” Andrey Baklitskiy, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11.03.20: The author, a consultant at the PIR Center, writes:
“Biden [would] be president of a deeply polarized country. To ratify international treaties with Russia, two-thirds of votes in the Senate are required: something the Democrats won’t have in any scenario. So the focus would have to be on steps that don’t require ratification, such as the Russian proposal that both countries introduce a moratorium on deploying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in certain parts of the world.”
“The jumping-off point for negotiations could be Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent proposal that the moratorium should include the 9M729: a missile that has caused many arguments between Moscow and Washington. … The proposal to freeze the entire nuclear arsenals of both countries, including Russian tactical nuclear weapons, will also fall into this category.”
“For all Biden’s openness to negotiations on arms control, the U.S. development of high-precision conventional weapons (including hypersonic ones) and missile defense systems, as well as attempts to improve relations with NATO allies and to constrain Russia, will likely take Moscow and Washington back to the same standoff they were in during Obama’s second term. Only this time around, it will be coupled with the growing rivalry between the United States and China: a row in which Russia has already taken sides.”
“Moscow and Washington will still have opportunities to make specific, flexible agreements on individual measures, such as intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the development of the U.S. missile defense system (particularly its space-based elements). But the political price of major breakthroughs could be too great for the two sides. On the other hand, even simply halting the collapse of the arms control system would be an achievement, albeit a temporary calm before the storm: even if the New START is extended, it expires in 2026.”“Arms Control and Great-Power Politics,” Timothy Crawford and Khang Vu, War on the Rocks, 11.04.20: The authors, an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a doctoral candidate in the political science department at Boston College, write:
“The United States and the Soviet Union both used arms control to, among other objectives, drive a wedge in adversarial coalitions. The Limited Test Ban Treaty exploited Sino-Soviet differences in terms of the nuclear balance, and SALT I emphasized different Chinese and American policies toward the Soviet Union. In both cases, the wedge drivers achieved some limited success. … The success of these wedge strategies turned upon different strategic circumstances. The test ban treaty capitalized on an already disintegrating alliance, while SALT I countervailed anti-Soviet convergence by conciliating the United States on key issues.”
“The United States should lean forward and extend New START with Russia. Despite the Trump administration’s unpropitious demands, Moscow has sought to avoid the treaty’s collapse. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov in a recent interview affirmed that if Joe Biden is elected, Moscow is ready to extend the treaty in the short time period between Biden’s inauguration on Jan. 20 and the treaty’s expiration date on Feb. 5. This suggests that Russia is still invested in a positive relationship with the United States. Washington should embrace the opportunity to cooperate with Moscow in order to weaken the anti-American bond between China and Russia. The alternative—to insist on a deal-breaking trilateral scheme—will only reinforce the trajectory of Sino-Russian convergence by hardening the position of the United States as the common adversary.”
“Arms control has been and will continue to be an instrument to manage great-power relations. Even if extension of New START will not turn Russia into an ally in Washington’s efforts to contain China, it may help to do something less dramatic but no less important: prevent or delay a Sino-Russian alignment based on antagonism toward the United States.”Counter-terrorism:
No significant developments.Conflict in Syria:
No significant developments.Cyber security:
No significant developments.Elections interference:
No significant developments.Energy exports from CIS:
No significant developments.U.S.-Russian economic ties:
No significant developments.U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Trump’s Loss Not Necessarily Russia’s,” Steven Pifer, The Moscow Times, 11.09.20: The author, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes:
“A Biden presidency can offer a silver lining for the Kremlin. … First, Biden’s foreign policy will be predictable. … Second, Biden can be expected to professionalize relations, both on issues where interests coincide and where major differences divide the two countries. … Third, Biden will want guardrails to manage the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship, beginning with arms control. … Fourth, Biden has the disposition to tackle problems that may require months, perhaps longer, to resolve.”
“The Biden presidency will not mean a new reset. The U.S.-Russia relationship has many troubled issues. Moscow should understand that Biden and his administration will push back against malign Russian activities. The Kremlin will have to rein its security services, which pursue unacceptable action such as stirring discontent in American domestic politics. However, if Putin and the Kremlin exercise some moderation, they can expect from the next American president a readiness for serious dialogue—including on differences—of a kind that has been noticeably absent in recent years. That will not produce rapid or broad agreement, but it could help the two countries better manage their competition and, perhaps over time, chip away at the problems that currently divide them.”“Moscow Braced for Anti-Russian Rhetoric and More Confrontation,” Henry Foy and Katrina Manson, Financial Times, 11.09.20: The authors, Moscow bureau chief and U.S. foreign policy and defense correspondent for the news outlet, write:
“By Sunday evening [Nov. 8] in Moscow, the Kremlin had yet to send a public message to the U.S. president-elect on his victory. … Moscow is braced for a renewed surge of anti-Russian rhetoric from Washington in the early days of a Biden administration, and is nervous about bills currently in Congress that could dramatically increase the impact of sanctions against the country, spearheaded by a new president with no equivocation in his disdain for Vladimir Putin’s regime.”
“Biden has vowed to harden Washington’s stance against Moscow, seeking to counter Russian aggression by reaffirming U.S. involvement in NATO and putting human rights and a new anti-corruption drive at the forefront of his foreign policy.”
“While European officials hope Biden will soften America's tone with traditional allies, senior Western officials in the U.S. capital are braced for an abrasive change when it comes to U.S.-Russia relations. ‘We expect a massive toughening of the stance towards Russia,’ a high-ranking Western diplomat in Washington told the Financial Times. ‘There is a hatred for Russia amongst [Biden’s team] that is really amazing. It’s not just rational; it’s also very emotional.’”
“While Mr. Biden’s full commitment to NATO … represents a challenge to Moscow, the president-elect is likely to seek to reverse his predecessor’s decision to abandon global arms control treaties. Mr. Biden's team has said it would seek an extension of the New Start agreement with Russia.”
“‘On balance I think a Biden presidency is more favorable for Russia, given both the opportunity for areas of cooperation and the likely more predictable nature of his administration …,’ one Western ambassador in Moscow told the FT. ‘I suspect that Moscow in October had a deal on arms control that would be acceptable to Washington but chose to hold back suspecting that Mr. Trump wasn’t going to win,’ the ambassador added. ‘That could be back on the table now.’”“Relationship Maintenance With Russia Should Be the Next President’s Priority,” Daniel R. DePetris, The National Interest, 11.03.20: The author, a fellow at Defense Priorities, writes:
“After years of mutual sanctions, diplomatic expulsions and cyberattacks, it is difficult to imagine U.S.-Russia relations getting any worse than they are today. But if the next U.S. president doesn’t change Washington’s overall approach to Moscow and adopt a policy more realistic in its objectives, then the relationship between the countries will further deteriorate.”
“As much as the U.S. foreign-policy establishment may not like it, there are certain issues Washington can’t change. … While the United States and its European allies would love to see the autocratic Belarus turn into a pro-Western democracy, Moscow will not tolerate such a shift given the extensive interests it has at stake. … More than six years after the pro-Russia Viktor Yanukovych was deposed by a popular rebellion, Ukraine remains in a state of internal conflict due in large measure to Russia’s military and financial support to separatist units in the east of the country.”
“The next U.S. administration should keep these examples in mind as it formulates its policy on Russia. Washington must separate what it really needs from Moscow and what it wants; it must be cognizant about how little influence it has in Russia’s neighborhood; and it must understand how an activist U.S. stance in Russia’s near-abroad very often makes the situation more dire. U.S. officials must also be crystal clear to their Russian counterparts about what Russian actions they won’t tolerate—blatant inference in the U.S. system of government being at the top of the list.”
“While Russia can’t compete with the United States, it can’t be ignored either. The country remains the world’s largest nuclear power with a proud history and a joint force capable of projecting military power. … America should engage with Russia when it can and confront the country when it must because that is the most effective way to stabilize one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.”“Bad News: Russia Has No Strategy to Stop an Alien Invasion: The U.S. military does have a plan,” David Axe, The National Interest. 11.05.20: The author, former defense editor for the news outlet, writes:
“In an odd episode in 2013, a Russian space official admitted, unprovoked, that Moscow has no strategy for combating an invasion by galactic marauders. Luckily for Planet Earth, the United States does have a plan. And it counts on Russia and America fighting together. Sergei Berezhnoy, on the staff of the Titov Space Control Center near Moscow, said that Russian air-defense officers ‘have not been tasked with preparing for the contingency of an alien attack,’ according to Ria Novosti.”
“A team of scientists from America’s NASA Planetary Science Division disagreed. ‘While humanity has not yet observed any extraterrestrial intelligence, contact with ETI remains possible,’ Seth Baum, Jacob Haqq-Misra and Shawn Domagal-Goldman wrote in a 2011 paper. The scientists conceded that extraterrestrials could be friendly or ambivalent—but we can’t be sure.”
“As the world’s leading military powers, America and Russia would be the biggest targets … and the leaders in the eventual counterattack. Combined, the two countries could field huge air, land, sea and space forces numbering thousands of warplanes, millions of soldiers, hundreds of ships and most of the world’s spacecraft.”
“Assuming Earth survives and wins, human society could be turned upside down. Paul Springer, a history teacher at the U.S. Air Command and Staff College in Alabama, said former rivals could become close allies, even unified. ‘Keep in mind many of the greatest civilizations in human history formed to counter a common enemy,’ Springer pointed out.”“Russian Media, Officials See a Deeply Fractured US Following Election,” RM Staff, Russia Matters, 11.05.20: The Russia Matters staff writes:
“Despite Russians showing less interest in the 2020 U.S. presidential election than they did in the 2016 election, Russian media and government officials are still closely following the race between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Joe Biden. While pro-Kremlin media and Russian government officials have highlighted the possibility of civil unrest as a result of the close, contested race, others see democracy at work, like opposition figure Alexei Navalny, who called the still undecided vote ‘a real election.’ A couple common threads, however, seem to be a belief that neither Trump nor Biden is necessarily ‘better’ for Russia, and that the only clear outcome of the 2020 election so far is the deeply divided nature of American society.”II. Russia’s domestic policies
Domestic politics, economy and energy:
“In Russia, the Past Is a Constantly Moving Target,” Vladimir Kara-Murza, The Washington Post, 11.04.20: The author, a Russian democracy activist, author and filmmaker, writes:
“Last week, Russia once again observed an annual ritual known as ‘Return of the Names,’ a nationwide act of remembrance for millions of victims of the Communist regime. Every year, Russians gather near the former KGB headquarters in Moscow and in cities across the country to read out the names of relatives and others who perished under Soviet rule.”
“For, for all their propaganda resources, the forces of revisionism have not managed to fully capture Russian society. This can be seen clearly in the people standing in long lines (in normal non-pandemic years) every October to read out a name from the long list of the Soviet regime's victims. Grass-roots initiatives are not only commemorating the victims of Soviet purges but also returning once-erased names to streets and squares.”
“Last month, the local council in the historic city of Tarusa, some 80 miles south of Moscow, voted unanimously to remove the names of Communist leaders—including Vladimir Lenin, Yakov Sverdlov and Moisei Uritsky—from its streets, reinstating historic pre-1917 toponyms. ‘Our society will recover, it will heal,’ said Shlosberg, the opposition lawmaker. ‘The healthy part of society is indestructible. As long as there is even one person willing to speak about freedom, freedom has a chance.’”Defense and aerospace:
No significant developments.Security, law-enforcement and justice:
No significant developments.III. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
No significant developments.China-Russia: Allied or Aligned?
“Why the Arctic is Not the ‘Next’ South China Sea,” Elizabeth Buchanan and Bec Strating, The Washington Post, 11.09.20: The authors, a lecturer of strategic studies at Deakin University and a senior lecturer at La Trobe University, write:
“There are clear indicators of Chinese revisionism at sea extending beyond the South China Sea into the Arctic. … Lumping the Arctic and South China Sea into one basket as theaters hosting Chinese maritime revisionism, as if the exact same strategy is unleashed in all maritime strategy, clouds the reality of the two regions’ distinct strategic environments. A constant across both flashpoints is the significant role that geography plays.”
“China’s Four Sha strategy is based on an assumption of sovereign ownership of contested land features in the South China Sea. Russia, too, bases its extended continental shelf claim—which pushes the Russian exclusive economic zone up to the North Pole—on contested features of the Arctic. … The underwater ridge which Russia argues is an extension of the Siberian continental shelf extends up to the North Pole along the Arctic Ocean seabed. This ridge is also claimed by Denmark (by way of Greenland) and Canada. … Contested land features are a hallmark of the current overlapping claims to the North Pole, but there is no avenue for China to tap into this particular contest of land features in the Arctic.”
“Overall, the South China Sea and the Arctic are very different maritime regions with distinct geopolitical characteristics. China is clearly borrowing from the great-power exceptionalism playbook in the South China Sea. Yet while Beijing has articulated a clear strategic interest in the Arctic, a replication of its South China Sea play book in the Arctic is highly unlikely. Maritime exceptionalism in approaches to UNCLOS are localized and interest-based according to geography … This has implications for understanding challenges to multilateral governance of the global commons, particularly for how states seeking to preserve norm-based standards should calibrate their policies according to specific geographical regions, rather than relying upon a generic appeal to a ‘rules-based order.’”War in Karabakh:
“The Problem With Turkey’s Proxy Militias Isn’t Just Military,” Michael Rubin, The National Interest, 11.09.20: The author, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:
“Turkish-backed Arab militias are becoming an increasingly frequent presence in operational theaters, from Libya to Syria to Armenia. Whereas Turkish diplomats once claimed they were an ally in the fight against the Islamic State, the Turkish military and intelligence service has increasingly employed Islamic State veterans to further Turkey’s interests across the region.”
“Turkish-backed militias are now also undercutting efforts to achieve a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in continued fighting around the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. On Nov. 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov estimated that Turkey has imported 2,000 Middle Eastern fighters into the fight, a number consistent with U.S. estimates. Because the conflict has displaced tens of thousands of Armenians and perhaps even more Azeris over the decades, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have incentives to reach a peace accord.”
“Not only do Arab fighters impede diplomacy now and make it less likely that Baku will recognize that they cannot achieve a military victory, but they also give Erdoğan an effective veto over any local peace agreements in the future. Once inserted into the region, it will be hard for the international community to force their departure. … Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev [will] soon learn that the al-Qaeda veterans whom Erdoğan sent will constrain all future actions and alliances, especially with regard to Israel and the United States.”
“Turkey now uses Islamist proxies to wage war in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Too often, states and diplomats shrug off their presence as a military problem; they should not. They are the chief impediment to diplomacy. As such, any government or leader who accepts Turkey’s proxy forces on their territory should automatically lose diplomatic support, be slapped with sanctions and, perhaps, even be subject to a future state sponsor of terror designation.”“US Recognition of Kosovo Sets a Precedent for Artsakh,” Alex Galitsky, The National Interest, 10.31.20: The author, communications director of the Armenian National Committee of America, writes:
“While addressing Armenian supporters at a campaign rally on Sunday [Oct. 25], President Donald Trump invoked Kosovo in his pledge to resolve the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the South Caucasus. In doing so, Trump may have inadvertently acknowledged the solution to Azerbaijan’s decades of aggression against Armenia—the recognition of Artsakh’s independence.”
“Artsakh, like Kosovo, was an autonomous province under the administrative control of a constituent republic—Soviet Azerbaijan—which, like the Socialist Republic Serbia, ceased to exist upon the dissolution of the parent state. Like Kosovo, Artsakh was subject to a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing at the hands of Azerbaijan … Artsakh has also earned its sovereignty, having achieved independence through a popular referendum and developed institutions of governance that have ensured the peaceful and democratic transition of power for three decades. And finally, in light of the threat of genocide posed by Azerbaijan, independence is the only remaining recourse that can safeguard the existence of Artsakh’s indigenous Armenian population.”
“The only discrepancy between the two cases is geography. Yugoslavia was in Europe’s backyard, so there was a strong geopolitical impetus for engagement with the region. … Artsakh, by comparison, was an afterthought.”
“But today, the geopolitical landscape is very different to what it was during the war thirty years ago. Erdogan’s Turkey … sees Azerbaijan’s campaign for Artsakh as central to their shared pan-Turkic vision of regional order. … Russia … has increasingly sought to reassert its regional authority. … Iran is another important factor … These factors combined pose a significant risk to regional stability. … But above all of this is the threat of genocide looming over the Armenians of Artsakh.”
“With Artsakh, the international community has the opportunity to reaffirm the fundamental principles of human rights enshrined in international law in the face of one of the most egregious modern threats to humanity.” “Is Stopping the War Between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Russia’s (Vital) Interest?” Simon Saradzhyan, Russia in Global Affairs, 11.06.20: The author, founding director of Russia Matters, writes:
“One of Russia’s vital interests that is already being impacted by that war is the need to prevent, deter and reduce threats of secession from Russia, insurgency within Russia or in areas adjacent to Russia, and armed conflicts waged against Russia, its allies or in the vicinity of Russian frontiers. … This interest is put at risk by an armed conflict fought less than 130 kilometers away from Russia’s borders. … The other interest is ensuring the survival of Russian allies and their active cooperation with Russia.”
“Another vital interest … is the prevention of large-scale or sustained terrorist attacks on Russia. That vital interest is already being threatened by the participation of thousands of foreign mercenaries in the Karabakh conflict.”
“If Russia does intervene to stop this war, then that will have a positive impact on … establishing and maintaining productive relations, upon which Russian national interests hinge to a significant extent, with core European Union members, the United States and China.”
“Should Russia intervene on Armenia’s side to stop the war, that would probably make Azerbaijan and Turkey reconsider their economic ties to Russia. However, given that Turkey and Azerbaijan account for less than 1/20th of Russia’s overall trade, … these costs would be manageable.”
“It is not too late for the Kremlin to make a meaningful effort to discontinue the war and it has the leverage to do so, such as its ability to block a multi-billion flow of remittances from Russia to these countries. … Russia can also impose constraints on the operations of businesses owned by citizens of the warring countries or on employing such citizens and restrict trade with these countries. … Russia can also team up with the EU and U.S. … to threaten these warring countries’ elites with freezing their assets.”“It’s Time for Pro-Israel Groups to Divorce Azerbaijan,” Michael Rubin, The National Interest, 11.09.20: The author, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes:
“Israel … has bragged that the military equipment and drones it provided to Azerbaijan has given the oil-rich dictatorship a decisive advantage over more democratic Armenia. … Israel’s bargain is clear: It receives 60 percent of its oil from Azerbaijan and, in exchange, it arms Aliyev’s government.”
“Pro-Israel groups and Jewish activists have long embraced the Israel-Azeri relationship for two reasons: First, Azerbaijan is generally religiously tolerant and protects its small Jewish community. Secondly, Azerbaijan has long positioned itself against the Islamic Republic of Iran. … Washington-Baku relations, meanwhile, developed against the backdrop of the two states’ counter-terror partnerships in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism attacks.”
“While many pro-Israel strategists continue to support Azerbaijan because they believe it is opposed to Iran, they may be blind to changes underway that alter reality. So, too, are those U.S. strategists who applaud Azerbaijan’s post-9/11 counter-terror posture.”
“Firstly, Iran is on the same side as Azerbaijan in the assault on Nagorno-Karabakh. … Additionally, Azerbaijan’s full-throttled embrace of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime should also raise alarm bells. … Erdoğan’s Turkey may trade with Israel, but it holds Israel in contempt. … To embrace Turkey is to also empower Iranian proxies.”
“For decades, Israel languished in isolation. It was willing to develop ties with any country that would have it, regardless of the baggage that the country carried. … The Israeli government no longer needs relations at any price; it can afford to raise the bar. … It is time for any activist who seeks to enhance Israel’s security in the region to recognize that the reality of Azerbaijan is in dissonance with its propaganda. It’s time for both Israel and the U.S. Jewish community to step away from its former Caspian ally.”Ukraine:
“This Is How Ukraine Will Destroy the Rule of Law While Claiming to Defend it,” Nicolai N. Petro, The National Interest, 11.03.20: The author, a professor of politics at the University of Rhode Island, writes:
“In the year following his election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s approval has fallen from 73 percent to a new low in the latest local elections. … [T]he president’s party … suffered a major defeat, being unable to win a single mayoral race or even a majority in any regional parliament or city council. … Zelenskiy seems to think that he has found a way to return to center stage by declaring Ukraine’s entire Constitutional Court a threat to national security.”
“What did the Constitutional Court, the nation’s final authority in constitutional matters, do that was so awful? It set aside eighteen articles of the law ‘On Preventing Corruption.’ In doing so it severely reduced the purview of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), which was set up with much fanfare in 2015. …Yet, despite spending more than seven billion hryvnia (more than a quarter-billion dollars) within the past five years, not a single high-profile official has been prosecuted. This had led a number of Ukrainian analysts to suggest that the real purpose of these institutions may, in fact, be to blackmail the officials it investigates into acting and voting in a manner that the government deems congenial, rather than bringing them to justice.”
“By attacking the Court, which has almost no political supporters, Zelenskiy can also simultaneously appear to be fighting corruption and Russian infiltration.”
“It is ultimately in the best interests of both the West and of Ukraine to allow Ukrainian politics to develop however it sees fit and to rely on its own institutional checks and balances, rather than on ones that are imposed and administered by the West. As we have seen time and again, the West’s failure to trust the institutions of other nations results in those nations eventually turning away from the West, in order to get them back.”“Ukraine’s Big Backslide Continues,” Melinda Haring, The National Interest, 11.08.20: The author, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, writes:
“Ukraine has been backsliding in a big way for months. And it just got a lot worse. The country of forty million is teetering on the edge of a major constitutional crisis that could kill Ukraine’s reform project and destroy its standing as a troubled but hopeful country deserving of Western attention and support. And it may well do in President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, whose support has ebbed at home and abroad.”
“On Oct. 27, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine gutted the mandate of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, one of the country’s anti-corruption institutions established after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. The idea behind the agency was simple: officials should declare their official income and assets online annually for cops, citizens, and watchdogs to scrutinize. Now, no one has to declare anything. Corrupt officials will be delighted. With no declarations, they no longer face criminal charges if there’s a discrepancy between their official income and lifestyle. For the chosen few, the good old days have returned.”
“Tackling corruption remains a necessary, if insufficient, step in the overall process of reform. Anti-corruption efforts were among the most positive results of Ukraine’s 2014 revolution. The setbacks on this front are a stark warning that progress isn’t permanent and can be lost with depressing ease.”Belarus:
“Belarusian Leader Resists Efforts to Unseat Him,” Ann M. Simmons, Wall Street Journal, 11.08.20: The author, Moscow bureau chief for the news outlet, writes:
“Three months after Belarus's widely disputed presidential vote sent waves of protesters into the streets to contest the re-election of longtime leader Alexander Lukashenko, the demonstrations have continued unabated but Mr. Lukashenko has managed to repel the attempts to unseat him.”
“‘He managed to remain in power because he controls law enforcement and there haven't been any political cracks within the ruling regime,’ said Artyom Shraibman, founder of Minsk-based political consulting firm Sense Analytics. Maxim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center, a think tank, said Mr. Lukashenko's administration resembles ‘a military junta, because…people in important positions are from the military or security services and they are still loyal to Lukashenko.’”
“Support for Mr. Lukashenko from the ruling elite has also been bolstered by the knowledge that Russia has the leader's back, and the inability of the West to dislodge the longtime leader from power.”Russia’s other post-Soviet neighbors:
No significant developments.