Key Takeaways
- Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025.
- Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables into cheaper drones to scale Russian forces’ ability to conduct drone strikes at farther ranges.
- Russian forces are trying to scale the production of fiber-optic UAVs to increasingly intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber drones.
- Russian developers reportedly introduced fiber-optic FPV UAVs that can function as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance UAVs, extending Russian tactical drone ranges to up to 60 kilometers.
- Russian forces are pursuing moving targets in the near rear with Shahed (Geran) and Gerbera UAVs with integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.
- Russian developers are fielding new countermeasures against Ukrainian drone interceptors, chiefly via newly integrated radio detectors.
Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025. Ukrainian forces reported on August 22 that they shot down a Russian Orlan reconnaissance UAV that functioned as a mothership and carried two first-person-view UAVs for the first time.[1] A source in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) later told Kremlin newswire TASS on September 8 that Russian forces are using Orlan-10 UAVs for transporting loitering munitions and that the new use of Orlan mothership carrier drones allows Russia to significantly increase the range of Russian drone strikes in the near rear.[2] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with UAVs twice as of September 4 and credited Russia’s capability to strike at an extended range to mothership drones that operate using Ukrainian SIM cards.[3] Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated in late September 2025 that Russian forces began actively using cheaply made Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones as mothership UAVs to extend tactical drone ranges beyond 25 kilometers in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.[4] Ukrainian servicemen reported that Russian forces have been using Molniya mothership UAVs as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance drones and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), as these drones allow Russian forces to target Ukrainian logistics up to 20 to 25 kilometers from the frontline.[5] Another Russian milblogger observed Ukraine’s widespread use of mothership drones that are based on heavy multicopters that simultaneously act as repeater UAVs.[6]
Russian developers are trying to expand the ways to control mothership UAVs to improve Russian forces’ ability to strike Ukrainian targets deeper in the near rear and rear. The Russian company KB Valkyriya reportedly presented the RD-8 mothership UAV, which reportedly uses radio channels, Starlink, or mobile networks up to a range of 150 kilometers.[7] The RD-8 mothership UAV can carry two FPV drones, each with a three-kilogram warhead and day and night cameras. KB Valkyriya also reportedly manufactures the RD-7, RD-10, and RD-12 variants of the UAV, with RD-12 being the largest in the lineup. KB Valkyriya advertised their RD-class UAVs as multi-purpose platforms that can be used as a reconnaissance, mothership, or repeater UAVs – a likely response to the growing need of versatile drone platforms that are necessary to overcome the expanding denial area and kill zone (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area). KB Valkyriya reportedly designed the RD-8 UAV’s functions to support clearing enemy positions ahead of further FPV UAV drone attacks. The chief designer and deputy general director of Russia’s state United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), Sergei Korotkov, told TASS on September 7 that the UAC is pursuing several projects to develop attack drones that can be launched from air-based platforms.[8]
Russian forces are trying to alleviate manpower and training requirements by reportedly developing artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities for drone swarms. A source in the Russian DIB told TASS on August 31 that Russian forces had combat-tested new AI-based technology that allows Russian drone operators to control several FPV UAVs at once.[9] The source claimed that AI allows Russian drone operators to switch control between drones while they fly in cruise control mode to conserve battery. The source claimed that drone swarms could allow Russian forces to increase firepower on the battlefield and argued that AI capabilities will shorten drone operator training by one to two months.
Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables into cheaper drones to scale Russian forces’ ability to conduct drone strikes at farther ranges. Russian sources published footage on September 13 and 14 showing Russian Molniya-2 UAVs with fiber-optic cables striking claimed Ukrainian targets in the Kherson direction for the first time, indicating that Russian forces have begun to attach the cable to cheaply-made Molniya UAVs, likely to significantly scale the number of fiber-optic UAVs on the battlefield.[10] Ukrainian servicemen have observed Russian forces using Molniya drones with fiber-optic cables, at least in the Lyman direction, as of late September 2025.[11] One Russian milblogger claimed that the Molniya-2 UAVs with fiber-optic cables have a range of up to 20 kilometers, while another claimed that Russian developers were able to attach a 40-kilometer fiber-optic cable onto a Molniya-2 UAV, making the UAV invulnerable to EW and having a high-quality video feed.[12] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov observed on September 13 that Russian forces were finishing testing of Molniya UAVs with fiber-optic cables, but noted that adding the cable would decrease the UAV’s warhead size and range.[13] Beskrestnov added that such an adaptation will allow Russia to strike Ukrainian targets in the kill zone and along the international border up to a 20-kilometer distance. Russian developers recently modified some Molniya UAV variants to operate as motherships and have thermobaric warheads.[14] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction observed that Russian forces still largely rely on radio-controlled FPV UAVs as opposed to fiber-optic UAVs due to a lack of trained drone operators.[15]
Russian forces are trying to scale the production of fiber-optic UAVs to increasingly intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber drones. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been using fiber-optic drones such as Upyr UAVs to intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber drones, which have EW capabilities to jam Russian drone interceptors.[16] The milblogger added that Upyr drones have a range of over 30 kilometers that allows them to isolate parts of the frontline and stretch out Ukrainian GLOCs by 20 kilometers. Russian milbloggers particularly attributed Ukrainian heavy bomber drone and multicopper losses to the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.[17] Another milblogger, however, complained that Russian forces do not have enough fiber-optic drones to intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber UAVs, and it is likely that Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables onto cheap Molniya drones to overcome these shortages.[18] Russian DIB is rapidly trying to address fiber-optic UAV shortages, with the Kremlin’s People’s Front movement claiming in early September 2025 that Russia delivered 1,000 Veterok fiber-optic UAVs of different modifications to the battlefield.[19] Veterok fiber-optic UAVs reportedly have a 30-kilometer range and can carry seven kilograms.[20]
Russian developers reportedly introduced fiber-optic FPV UAVs that can function as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance UAVs, extending Russian tactical drone ranges to up to 60 kilometers. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian developers created repeater drones with a fiber-optic cable that could enable Russian forces to quadruple the range of frontline drones.[21] The milblogger explained that the new fiber-optic repeater UAVs boost the signal to the attached FPV fiber-optic strike UAV. The fiber-optic cable controls reportedly allow Russian drone operators to bypass EW systems and operate at a range of up to 50 to 60 kilometers. The milblogger added that the fiber-optic repeater drone can adjust the tension of the cable to avoid the cable snagging on the ground and noted that Russian forces can connect multiple attack drones to the repeater drone. The milblogger noted that Russian forces are increasingly using mid-range drones to target Ukrainian GLOCs, but warned that Ukrainian forces are adopting similar measures.
Russian forces are increasingly employing various other repeaters to extend drone ranges in Ukraine. The Smolensk Oblast-based Drone Force company claimed to TASS that a Russian Fors FPV UAV struck a Ukrainian target at a record distance of 38 kilometers after receiving support from a signal repeater.[22] The Russian Veter design bureau presented the Veter-X FPV UAV that can strike targets at a range of over 30 kilometers by operating in conjunction with an airborne repeater and claimed that Russian forces can control the drone via radio frequency or fiber-optic cable.[23] Beskrestnov observed that many Russian drone operators operate drones via repeaters and that the use of repeaters has increased steadily over the past six months.[24] A former Russian Storm Z trainer and milblogger credited improvements in the effectiveness of Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complexes to the widespread use of repeaters linked to integrated drone control support networks.[25] The milblogger complained, however, that the Russian military command has not provided Russian military units with sufficient repeaters.
Russian forces are trying to control unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) via fiber-optic cables, likely in an effort to undermine successful Ukrainian USV operations in the Black Sea and threaten Ukrainian coastal cities. Russian VOIN (Warrior) Military-Patriotic Training Center instructors reportedly trained with Irtysh USVs, which reportedly have fiber-optic cable and Hermes communication system controls, in late August 2025.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 8 that the Novgorod Research and Production Center (also known as Ushkuynik) developed a USV with fiber-optic communications and that the Black Sea Fleet would test the USV in September 2025.[27] The milblogger claimed that the USV can function as a strike drone, USV interceptor, or as a FPV drone carrier and launch platform. The milblogger added that the USV serves as a repeater to other radio-controlled FPV drones and that the fiber-optic cable is heavy and sinks to the seafloor, which prevents it from breaking. Ukrainian military outlet Defense Express assessed that it is unlikely that Russian UAVs will use fiber-optic cables exceeding 100 kilometers, but warned that such USV carriers could bring Russian FPV UAVs in range of Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson cities if the USV carriers launch from the occupied Kinburn Spit.[28]
The Russian military command is likely trying to catch up to Ukraine’s successful integration of USVs in combat operations and reportedly provided Rubikon elements with USVs in Summer 2025.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 28 that Russian USVs attacked a Ukrainian reconnaissance ship in the mouth of the Danube River for the first time.[30] Russian developers continued to test and present other USVs like the BEK-R five-meter-long USV, which Russian manufacturers reportedly plan to equip with machine vision capabilities.[31]
Russia is still trying to overcome the lack of stable satellite internet connection to control UAVs. Russian state media reported in late August 2025 that Russian developers tested a new UAV that flew by transmitting a signal via the Gazprom-owned Yamal-601 satellite in geostationary orbit.[32] Beskrestnov explained that Russia does not have a network of low-orbit modern satellites for high-speed Internet access, instead relying on the Yamal-601 satellite that only partly covers Ukraine and has a delayed signal due to the far distance of the geostationary orbit.[33] Beskrestnov observed that Russian efforts to operate unmanned systems via the Yamal-601 satellite’s signal remain vulnerable to signal delays and to any physical obstacles between the Russian satellite and receiver terminals. Russian developers claimed to have decreased the signal delay, but Beskrestnov noted that antennas that facilitate the connection to the satellite are too heavy and large for UAVs to carry. Beskretnov warned, however, that Russian forces may try to integrate these antennas on Russian USVs because of USVs’ larger size and capability to carry more weight. Beskrestnov stated that such antennas are not new technology, but expressed doubt that the antenna will be able to maintain a stable signal when attached to a small USV rocking while at sea. Russian developers may be integrating fiber-optic cables into USVs to address the lack of a stable satellite internet connection to operate drones.[34]
Russian forces are pursuing moving targets in the near rear with Shahed (Geran) and Gerbera UAVs with integrated cameras and radio control capabilities. Russian sources published footage on October 1 reportedly showing Russian forces striking a moving Ukrainian locomotive with an MS variant of Shahed UAV in Bobrovytsya, Chernihiv Oblast.[35] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the MS variant is equipped with a thermal imaging camera and a video stream, which allows Russian drone operators to pursue moving targets in real time via radio control.[36] The milblogger added that Russian drone operators are prioritizing striking trains, traction substations, and locomotives in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with MS Shaheds.[37] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure and conducted a fly of Kyiv City with MS Shaheds.[38] Russian forces likely started fielding MS Shaheds in June 2025 by adapting Iranian- and Chinese-controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA); AI components; cameras and thermal imagers; and radio modems.[39] Beskrestnov assessed on October 1 that Russia’s use of Shahed variants with online controls remains limited and not as dynamic; that these variants have a range of up to 200 kilometers; and that UAV controls rely on Chinese cameras and radio modems.[40] Beskrestnov assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to use Shahed variants to strike individual military vehicles and will likely target railways, groupage transport, and heavy equipment.
Russian forces also installed cameras and radio modems onto Gerbera UAVs, likely in an effort to identify Ukrainian interceptor drones and improve Russian drone reconnaissance capabilities at a lower cost. Ukrainian forces also intercepted a Gerbera reconnaissance drone equipped with two visual detection cameras for interceptor UAVs.[41] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that Russian forces began using modified Gerbera drones in Fall 2024, but did not scale the use of such modifications until recently.[42] A Ukrainian detachment commander noted that Russian forces have been increasingly using modified Gerberas as reconnaissance UAVs in the Pokrovsk direction because these UAVs are cheaper to procure than Orlan, ZALA, and Supercam reconnaissance UAVs.[43]
Russian forces are remotely mining Ukrainian positions and logistics routes deeper in the rear using Shahed (Geran) UAVs. Kherson Oblast Military Administration warned on August 28 that Russian forces began using Shaheds to remotely mine roads and areas in the near rear with anti-vehicle mines.[44] Kherson Oblast Military Administration noted that the anti-vehicle mines automatically detonate after 16 to 24 hours. Ukrainian sources later reported on September 21 that Russian forces likely dropped Lepestok PFM-1 anti-personnel mines from unspecified drones, likely Shahed or Gerbera UAV, over Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast.[45] Russian milbloggers published footage in August and September 2025, reportedly showing Russian forces using Shahed UAVs with PTM-3 anti-tank mines in Ukraine.[46] Ukrainian aviation expert Valeriy Romanenko observed on August 22 that Russian forces started to attach anti-tank mines to Shahed drones with fasteners for sewer pipes and noted that such adaptations are primitive but effective.[47] Romanenko assessed that Russian forces aim to use Shahed remote mining capabilities to interdict certain roads in the near rear, particularly dirt roads. Romanenko assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to scale the remote mining campaign using Shaheds because Russian drone operators will need to fly these UAVs no further than 100 to 120 kilometers from the frontline to maintain visibility and fly at low altitudes to target logistics routes. Romanenko added that Shahed drones are expensive and that Russian forces can only achieve some effects when using Shahed remote mining capabilities in urban environments with many active targets.
Russian developers are fielding new countermeasures against Ukrainian drone interceptors, chiefly via newly integrated radio detectors. Beskrestnov observed in early September 2025 that Russian developers installed signal receivers into most Supercam fixed-wing UAVs, which detect strong radio signals from Ukrainian drone interceptors.[48] The receiver automatically alerts the Russian drone to evade the interceptor and jams the drone interceptor’s video signal.[49] Deputy General Director of the Russian Machine Vision Systems company, Dmitry Sadovnik, similarly announced on September 25 that the company started producing interceptor detectors operating at a new 7.2 GHz frequency.[50] Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces installing radio detectors for automatic evasion of Ukrainian drones in Fall 2024, and that Russian developers began equipping ZALA drones with similar detectors in October 2024.[51] Beskrestnov later observed in March 2025 that Russian developers began installing additional cameras on reconnaissance UAVs to detect and evade Ukrainian interceptors.[52]
Russian developers continued to test kinetic drone countermeasures in an effort to undermine the Ukrainian tactical drone wall along the frontline, but are unlikely to have fully developed effective kinetic countermeasures at this time. Russian Novye Ruskiye Technologii (New Russian Technologies) project developers claimed on October 2 that they tested a new Izdeliye 545 kinetic drone countermeasure and that the new system can destroy drones of all variants within a 100-to-150-meter radius.[53] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin responded to the developers’ claim, stating that it was “great but confusing” and that Russian developers should test these countermeasures on the battlefield before making such announcements.[54] The former Storm Z instructor and milblogger observed that Russian forces have not developed significant drone interception capabilities and low-altitude air defense systems to decisively counter Ukrainian drones.[55]