The issue of centralization and decentralization in Syria is a structural issue that goes beyond intellectual debate to touch the essence of state reconstruction, defining the features of national identity and the form of governance. Centralization, although considered by some to be a guarantee of the unity of the country, experience has shown that it has deepened marginalization and weakened political participation. On the other hand, many political components view decentralization as a gateway to comprehensive institutional reform, but accelerating its adoption may threaten stability and sovereignty, especially in light of the complexities of the Syrian reality.
The issue of centralization and decentralization is one of the fundamental axes in understanding the current Syrian crisis, as it is not limited to a technical debate on governance and governance patterns, but extends to questions related to national identity and the balance of relations between the components of society, making it a decisive factor in shaping the political and economic future of the country. This report focuses on providing an in-depth analysis of the concept of centralization and decentralization in the Syrian context, by reviewing its historical roots, dismantling its political and social dimensions, as well as assessing the positions of local and international actors on this issue. It also seeks to present possible scenarios for decentralization in Syria, in light of the ongoing transformations and structural challenges facing state reconstruction.
Theoretical Approach: Definition and Patterns
Analyzing the issue of centralization and decentralization in the Syrian context requires a precise distinction between the two concepts, given their respective institutional and political implications. They can therefore be defined as follows:
المركزيةCentralization: Concentration of decision-making powers within a single authority or in the hands of a specific entity, which limits the ability of lower levels to initiate and act independently.
Decentralization: The process of transferring power and responsibilities from the central government to lower levels of government, such as local councils or regional and municipal governments, thus enhancing their ability to manage their affairs according to their local specificities.
Decentralization patterns can be distinguished by:
Administrative decentralization: administrative authorities are delegated to local councils, with the central government retaining the right to make final decisions on substantive issues. It is often used to improve the efficiency of the delivery of public services through the redistribution of powers, responsibilities and financial resources.
Political decentralization: the transfer of policy-making powers and legislation from the central authority at the national level to democratically elected bodies within the local levels, allowing for wider representation of local communities in the decision-making process.
In the Syrian context, the distinction between decentralization patterns is not just a theoretical or academic issue, but a central focus on existing political differences. Discussions about decentralization in Syria show a structural contradiction between two opposing visions: the first sees decentralization as a prerequisite for political stability and the building of a modern state, and is a necessary entry point for restructuring the state on democratic and participatory grounds. The opposite vision supports decentralization as a future option after achieving stability, without which decentralization is feared to become a potential factor for the dismantling of the state, especially in light of societal divisions and ongoing security tensions.
This divergence in positions reflects the complexity of the Syrian reality, where decentralization overlaps with political and security dynamics, and is one of the most sensitive issues in the path of state reconstruction. The contradiction of views on them is also one of the most prominent obstacles to reaching a political consensus, given the existential concerns of the various parties, and the need for a comprehensive review of the nature of the relationship between the center and the parties, within an inclusive national framework.
The sensitivity of the position to political decentralization may be due, in rejection or acceptance, to the historical legacy of the strict centralized rule that has prevailed for decades, especially during the period of the Baath Party, where power and resources were systematically monopolized, marginalizing local parties and weakening institutional structures outside the center. This context has left a profound impact on political discourse and public debates about the feasibility of adopting a decentralized model, creating hesitation toward any institutional reforms that could lead to a de facto redistribution of power.
Centralization as a way to preserve national unity
The Syrian scene shows widespread adherence, including to segments of the opposition, to the idea of a strong central state as a guarantee of the country’s unity in light of the current challenges. This position does not necessarily stem from support for the former regime, but rather reflects deep-rooted fears of the disintegration of the state as a result of the cracking of the social fabric in recent years. In this context, calls for political or federal decentralization are met with great suspicion, as they are seen by many actors as a potential entry point for the partition of Syria.
These fears are reinforced by the recall of regional models that have witnessed unrest caused by the application of federal systems in fragile societal environments, where political decentralization has in some cases been linked to the exacerbation of ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the conflict of local authorities over resources and powers, which has weakened the central state and reduced its ability to adjust the national balance. In this context, fundamental questions arise about the degree of decentralization in Syria, in the absence of internal political consensus, the multiplicity of local loyalties, and the varying levels of institutional readiness between regions.
On the other hand, the positions rejecting political decentralization in Syria are fueled, in part, by the political memory associated with the partition projects put forward by foreign powers in previous historical stages, foremost of which is the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which is still being invoked as a symbol of the fragmentation of the geopolitics of the region. In this context, decentralization is seen by some representatives of the current authority as an extension of those external projects, aimed at undermining the unity of the State and weakening the central authority. This perception is not limited to power alone, but echoes large segments of the traditional opposition, which see political decentralization, particularly federalism, as a threat to the country’s unity, and considers it a “mitigating designation” of partition schemes.
Challenges of sustainable centralization
Although pro-centralized rhetoric is often based on security and nationalist considerations aimed at preserving state unity, the Syrian experience has shown this model is limited in the long run. The adoption of totalitarian centralized governance in previous decades has backfired, with the monopoly of power and resources by a narrow elite, the neglect of peripheral areas and the marginalization of out-of-centre community components.
This concentration in decision-making and the distribution of resources has contributed to deepening the development gaps between the capital and the governorates, and has led to a stark disparity in services and infrastructure, which has reinforced feelings of marginalization and exclusion. It is no wonder that this popular discontent has accumulated over time to form one of the main drivers of the movement, which began in early 2011, in an indirect expression of rejection of the central model and the lack of justice in the distribution of power and wealth.
Also, from a legal and institutional perspective, a number of experts and jurists point out that the central model of governance, with its resistance to giving local authorities a real margin for decision-making, has proven limited in responding to the daily needs of citizens, and has led to a lack of provision of basic services, and a deficit in dealing with various local challenges, which has contributed to deepening the gap between the state and society.
This deficiency is one of the structural factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, which revealed the fragility of the central model and its inability to manage societal diversity or achieve justice in the distribution of resources. Thus, centralization has become a tool to preserve the unity of society, becoming a bombing factor for social and political divisions caused by the accumulation of marginalization and exclusion in various Syrian regions.
Decentralization as a tool for consensus and state building
Decentralization in Syria’s non-governmental political discourse is one of the possible institutional options for promoting national consensus and reorganizing the relationship between the state and its societal components. Supporters of this model view it as a “lifeline” to preserve the country’s unity, by redistributing power in a societal pluralistic manner that enhances the effectiveness of local governance.
The importance of decentralization is not limited to its political dimension in building a system of consensual governance, but extends to addressing a number of structural problems at the level of Syrian domestic politics, most notably the historical marginalization of the peripheral areas, poor service delivery, and imbalances in the distribution of resources. Decentralization is also a central tool in consolidating the principle of citizenship and broadening popular participation in decision-making, thereby strengthening democratic practice and limiting the reproduction of authoritarian patterns of government.
According to a number of experts, decentralization is a fundamental guarantee to prevent the emergence of new dictatorships by dismantling the monopoly of power and expanding the base of local representation. This proposal also acquires its legitimacy from the Syrian legal legacy itself, where constitutional and legislative documents, such as the 1973 Constitution and the Local Administration Law of 1956, provide the principles of administrative decentralization, providing a legal ground on which to build to develop a more comprehensive and sustainable decentralized model.
Challenges and practical risks of decentralization
The availability of political, legislative or societal will is not a sufficient condition for ensuring the success of decentralization in Syria, as this process faces a set of structural challenges and operational constraints that may undermine its effectiveness. At the administrative and financial levels, developing countries seeking decentralized models often face obstacles related to weak institutional support from the Centre, continued centralization of decision-making, and failure to adequately transfer financial resources to local authorities.
The issue of institutional capacity-building at the local level is also one of the most prominent challenges facing decentralization, especially in contexts that witness a sharp developmental disparity between the center and the peripheral regions. The lack of managerial competencies, poor infrastructure, and varying levels of institutional readiness weaken the ability of local entities to effectively exercise their powers, threatening to transform decentralization into a mere formality that does not achieve its developmental and political goals.
In the same context, more complex concerns about decentralization, especially in light of the fragility of the Syrian state and the multiplicity of local actors, are emerging at the political and security levels. It is feared that the delegation of authority from the Centre to local authorities will enable local elites to control governance within their areas, potentially leading to the emergence of multiple and extremist authoritarian patterns that reproduce tyranny in fragmented forms and weaken the state’s ability to maintain unity of decision-making and national sovereignty.
All these concerns are an extension of the concerns associated with state fragmentation, with political decentralization seen, in some quarters, as a potential entry point for dismantling Syria and increasing institutional degradation, rather than being a tool for reconstruction. This perception reinforces the absence of institutional guarantees, the multiplicity of loyalties, and the uneven levels of readiness between regions, making decentralization a challenge that requires a precise and gradual approach, taking into account the balance between promoting local participation on the one hand, and preserving the unity of the state on the other.
Power dynamics and key component positions
As previously pointed out, the positions of the actors in the Syrian scene towards decentralization vary significantly, and this difference is due to the association of each party with the defense of its political interests, its regional and local alignments, and the nature of its influence on the ground. The position of decentralization is built not only on theoretical or institutional foundations, but also within complex contexts of political competition, alliances, and security considerations.
In this context, the positions of the most prominent actors can be classified as follows:
First: The position of the new government in Damascus
Historically, as the Syrian regime has adopted a rejectionist stance towards “inclusive decentralization,” driven by fears that it could lead to the dismantling of the state and undermining the country’s unity, this approach has continued under the current transitional government, which categorically rejects any federalism and insists on maintaining the centralization of the state as a governing framework. However, at the theoretical level, the Government is willing to grant limited margins of administrative decentralization. This is what some consider a continuation of the policy of monopolizing power, where any reduction in the powers of the central government is seen within the central government institutions as a direct threat to the influence of the state. In this sense, the acceptance of power by limited administrative decentralization can be interpreted as a tactical step aimed at creating the impression of political openness, without translating into a real shift in the structure of power or a real redistribution of power.
Second: The position of the Kurdish component
The Autonomous Administration in northeast Syria, represented by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), is one of the most prominent parties supporting political decentralization, including the federal model. This position is based on a vision that considers federalism a constitutional guarantee of the rights of national components, led by the Kurds, and an effective tool for achieving fair participation in the management of state affairs.
To enhance the relevance and entitlement of its demands, the political discourse of the Kurdish component is based on the fact that federalism is an organizational formula for a voluntary unity, not aimed at dividing the country, but at preventing the monopoly of power by one group, and at promoting the balance between the center and the parties, so that the expanded decentralized model is seen as an institutional framework that allows greater political representation of all components, and contributes to the building of a multi-identity state, based on the principles of partnership and democracy.
What distinguishes the SDF from the other parties supporting decentralization is that it has an organized and effective military force on the ground, which gives its demands a character that goes beyond the administrative or constitutional debate, to reach the level of conflict over national sovereignty and redefine the relationship between the center and the armed components. The presence of a military force independent of the traditional state institutions is a decisive factor in reshaping the balance of power, and poses fundamental challenges to any project to rebuild the Syrian state on a decentralized basis.
The failure of efforts to integrate Kurdish forces into the official military system is one of the most prominent problems that deepen this tension, as the continued presence of an armed force outside the framework of the central state fuels fears that political demands will turn into separatist steps, including security, administrative, and economic aspects. Thus, the issue of decentralization in this context cannot be separated from the broader debate about the future of the military, the unity of sovereign decision, and the post-conflict form of the state
Third: The position of the Syrian opposition
The Syrian opposition’s attitudes toward decentralization, particularly federalism, are characterized by a clear divergence that reflects the multiplicity of political references and the uneven perceptions about the future of the state. The majority of the opposition is rejected by the principle of federalism and is conservative in political decentralization based on a range of historical and political considerations. Among them is the lack of confidence in the intentions of the federalists as a political option. In addition to the fear of undermining the national identity of the whole in favor of the rise of regional or ethnic sub-identities.
On the other hand, some parties to the Syrian opposition adopt a more flexible attitude towards decentralization, as it supports the idea of “extended administrative decentralization” as part of the project to build a new democratic state, reorganizing the relationship between the center and the local community on a more just and effective basis. However, an analysis of opposition positions shows that its understanding of decentralization often departs from the prevailing international perception (which it sees as a tool for sharing power within a negotiating framework with the existing regime) and treats it as a means of full regime change, rather than as a tool for redistributing powers within a political settlement. This understanding, which is contrary to international approaches, has weakened the opposition’s ability to present viable perceptions, which has negatively affected its negotiating position and enhanced the prospects for building a sustainable national consensus.
Fourth: The state of the Druze in Sweida
The situation of the Druze community in Sweida governorate embodies a microcosm of reflecting the complexities of the broader Syrian landscape, particularly on the issue of decentralization and the redistribution of power. Some of the community’s references and local leaders have expressed a clear trend toward demanding “autonomy” or administrative independence, understood within the framework of preserving state unity, and avoiding the outright proposition of secession or partition.
The demands of the Druze revolve around the need to establish a civil state based on a constitution that guarantees equal rights for all citizens and establishes the principles of justice and citizenship. This proposal was also accompanied by a clear and firm public attitude towards the new transitional authority, where the community expressed a lack of confidence in the Damascus government towards representing the aspirations of local communities or ensuring the desired change.
The Druze position is an important factor in highlighting the specificity of the interaction between local identities and the political center, and highlights the importance of building a model of governance that takes into account community pluralism without compromising the unity of the state, in light of the escalation of local demands and the decline in confidence in the center, especially since the assertion of the Druze community on the demand for decentralization is no longer just a local orientation, but has become part of intertwined regional and international dynamics, as the Amman meetings, which brought together representatives of Jordan, the Syrian Transitional Government, and the US envoy on August 12, 2025, revealed that the issue of Sweida has shifted from an internal file to a political paper discussed within broader regional agendas.
This means that the Druze demands, previously put forward in a limited administrative framework, are being employed in the context of political pressure on the new central government. The external parties are now viewing the Sweida file as a negotiating tool that can be used to reshape the balance of power inside Syria, or to push for institutional reforms that go beyond the local dimension, giving the issue a strategic character that goes beyond the borders of the province.
On the other hand, in light of the escalating regional and international interest in the issue of Sweida, the Druze community is trying to adopt a political discourse that warns against the exploitation of its demands by external parties, and to turn these demands into tools of geopolitical pressure.
Finally, the issue of centralization and decentralization in Syria is one of the structural issues that goes beyond the theoretical intellectual debate to touch the essence of state reconstruction. It is not just a technical option in the organization of power, but reflects divergent perceptions of national identity, the form of governance, and the future of coexistence among the components of society. If some see centralization as a guarantee of the country’s unity, historical experience has shown that it has contributed to deepening marginalization and weakening political participation. On the other hand, despite the adoption of the decentralized system by several Syrian parties and political components as an entry point for comprehensive institutional reform, but the speedy implementation of it is not without risks related to stability and sovereignty, especially in the context of the complex Syrian context. Beyond this contradiction requires the consensus of all Syrians on a gradual and comprehensive approach, based on national dialogue and mutual trust among all their components and spectrums.