With negotiations between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Damascus stalled, clashes and tribal calls for mobilisation raise the prospect of widening violence
Tensions are simmering in Syria’s northeast as negotiations between Damascus and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stall, with low-level clashes and tribal calls for mobilisation raising the prospect of more bloodshed in post-Assad Syria.
Several Arab tribal leaders from confederations within the territory controlled by the SDF have called for a “general mobilisation” against the SDF in recent weeks.
This follows days of low-level clashes between SDF forces and Arab tribes in eastern Aleppo and Deir az-Zour governorates that have resulted in the wounding of dozens and the death of one Syrian soldier.
Syria has been rocked by bouts of ethnic violence in the months since the fall of the regime last December. In March, sectarian massacres targeting the Alawite community resulted in the deaths of at least 1,400 people, mostly civilians, according to the UN Commission of Enquiry into the events.
In July, sectarian clashes between Bedouin tribes and the Druze minority led to bloody interventions by both Damascus and Israel, killing 814 people.
Tensions are long in the tooth, but recent events in Suweida have further exacerbated frictions. With the tribes agitating and the conflict simmering, is there a chance that northeast Syria could descend into violence?
Shifting ground
Relations between the SDF and the Arab tribes are complex, and tensions are not new. The tribes are not monolithic; relations shift and vary both between and within tribal confederations.
Certain confederations aligned themselves with the opposition and others with the regime throughout the civil war. However, with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the massacre of 700 members of the Al-Sheitat tribe at the hands of IS in Deir az-Zour in 2014, many tribes increasingly aligned with the SDF and the US-led coalition.
This tribal-SDF coalition largely held together in an uneasy, although not always peaceful, partnership. In 2023, the SDF launched an operation in Deir az-Zour to arrest Abu Khawla, a tribal leader and chief of the governorate’s Arab-dominated Military Council, which sat under the SDF.
This ignited a tribal uprising, which resulted in days of clashes and the deaths of 118, according to monitoring groups.
Since Assad’s fall, many anti-regime tribes now see Damascus as “more alluring than the SDF”, Alexander McKeever, a researcher behind the This Week in Northern Syria blog, told The New Arab.
Damascus has meanwhile worked to court the tribes of northeast Syria by bringing “certain figures with tribal backgrounds into the core of the regime,” he explains.
The most high-profile example is Hussein Al-Salama, a member of the Uqaydat tribe, who was appointed Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s spy chief in May.
Long-standing grievances have deepened tribal disillusionment. Despite Arabs forming the majority under SDF control, many Arab and tribal communities “feel marginalised,” says McKeever, with power largely centralised around the Kurdish cadres of the Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES).
In particular, many tribes are frustrated that the wealth generated from oil extraction in Deir az-Zour – an entirely Arab region – is not channelled back into their communities.
Equally, the SDF are distrustful that some of the armed Arab tribes within their territory could “switch sides and align with the government in the event of a conflict,” Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an Iraq-based Kurdish affairs analyst, told The New Arab.
He points out that this happened when the Liwa Jund Al-Haramain defected from the SDF during the battle of Manbij in eastern Aleppo in 2024.
The SDF reportedly carried out a security campaign targeting members of the Arab tribes in Hasakah province last Saturday, although in an official statement, the SDF claimed to be targeting “suspicious movements by ISIS”.
Suweida factor
Tensions have also been exacerbated by recent events in Suweida and their impact on SDF-Damascus negotiations.
Negotiations between the SDF and Damascus have been underway since a 10 March agreement, which stipulated the integration of SDF military and civilian structures into the Syrian state, whilst ensuring that rights for all groups in Syria would be constitutionally guaranteed.
However, many of the technical details were left undefined. The manner in which the SDF would integrate into the Syrian military, either as a coherent unit or as individuals, has been a particular sticking point.
Yet in part due to the violence in Suweida, negotiations appear to have now all but stalled. Following the government’s intervention in the province on 15 July, the SDF quickly condemned the violence, with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the SDF, stating that “we are receiving calls from Suweida asking for safe corridors for civilians”.
The AANES donated $1 million for humanitarian aid in support of Suweida’s Druze community.
On 8 August, a conference organised by the AANES concluded with a statement that called for a new constitution enshrining decentralisation and protections for cultural and religious minorities.
Controversially, the Druze spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, who, this month, called for the creation of a separate homeland for the Druze, and the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council leader Ghazal Ghazal were both in attendance, in a move that Damascus seemed to perceive as a direct provocation.
Damascus condemned the conference as platforming what it described as “separatist figures involved in hostile acts”, subsequently suspending its negotiations with the SDF in Paris.
These dynamics risk fuelling violence, which “may have flared up more since the negotiations between the SDF and the government have stalled,” argues McKeever. “Possibly because the government isn’t putting as much effort into cooling things down.”
Violence in the future?
Analysts note that recent calls for tribal mobilisation are significant, especially following events in Suweida, but that they are far smaller than those that occurred during the Suweida crisis, being largely limited to sub-groups within certain confederations.
“[These calls] could be an effort by the tribes to get the Syrian government to intervene on their behalf,” explained Ahmad Sharawi, a Research Analyst at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, to TNA. “However, I think that is unlikely, especially given what happened in Suweida.”
Government forces suffered a bloody nose following their intervention in Suweida. They may be reluctant to repeat that mistake against a formidable opponent such as the SDF, which has been backed and armed by the United States. A move against it may damage the carefully nurtured relations between Damascus and Washington.
However, Sharawi claims that there is a “high probability” of Damascus trying to exploit pre-existing grievances amongst the Arab tribes “in order to use them as a pressure point against the Kurds”.
Wilgenburg believes that “whilst negotiations are ongoing, the clashes won’t escalate,” but with negotiations seemingly stalled, “the SDF is afraid of something similar to Suweida where Damascus uses the excuse of tribal mobilisation [to intervene]”.
He believes that Damascus won’t allow itself to be dragged into a conflict, but if it decides to use force to solve the Kurdish question, it might “seek to frame its intervention as in defence of the tribes”.
Ultimately, the success or failure of negotiations could define the future of northeast Syria. Neither side wants clashes to spiral out of control, but with negotiations stalled, even minor tribal unrest could provide the justification for a larger conflagration.