On January 8, the al-Qaida affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched a meticulously planned assault on a fortified military post in northern Benin’s Alibori region, near the country’s borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. The attack claimed the lives of 28 soldiers, injured dozens more and sent shockwaves through a region long considered a fragile but reliable buffer against the violence of the nearby Sahel.
It’s important to note this was no random act of violence. It was a deliberate and calculated escalation that exposed Benin’s vulnerabilities and signaled a broader shift in the operational focus of extremist groups.
JNIM, which operates across multiple countries in West Africa, has steadily expanded its reach over the past decade by embedding itself in regions where state authority is weak and exploiting existing citizens’ grievances. In striking Alibori — a region strategically situated as a transit hub for trade, migration and goods between the Sahel and West Africa’s coastal states — JNIM demonstrated its intent to destabilize critical areas that bridge these regions.
Moreover, disruptions in key trade corridors linking the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea threaten economic partnerships vital to U.S. and global markets.
For the United States, this shift is more than a localized security issue. It’s a direct threat to regional stability, U.S. counterterrorism efforts and economic interests. This expansion risks undermining hard-won progress in countering extremism and could create new zones of instability that facilitate illicit trafficking, arms smuggling and transnational crime. Moreover, disruptions in key trade corridors linking the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea threaten economic partnerships vital to U.S. and global markets, particularly in a natural resource-rich region where strategic minerals and energy supplies are increasingly important.
A Symbolic and Strategic Escalation
This attack was as symbolic as it was strategic. Alibori is emblematic of the vulnerabilities that extremists seek to exploit, as decades of neglect have left these border communities underserved, with poor infrastructure, limited access to basic services and entrenched economic marginalization.
For instance, residents in northern Benin communities like those we met in Parakou in late 2024 — who openly reported their concerns — often lack reliable health care, education and income-generating opportunities, leaving them isolated from national development priorities.
These conditions create fertile ground for extremist groups to embed themselves by offering protection, justice or economic alternatives to populations disillusioned with absent or ineffective governance. JNIM’s assault was not only a tactical operation — it was a demonstration of how systemic weaknesses, when left unaddressed, can turn fragile regions into the front lines of violent extremism. In Mali and Burkina Faso, similar dynamics have enabled extremist groups to dominate entire regions by exploiting local discontent, a playbook they are now replicating in northern Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire.
National Responses Are Insufficient
While West African coastal states have made significant investments in border fortifications and troop deployments, the Alibori attack reveals the limits of these efforts. Programs such as Benin’s Operation Mirador and Togo’s border fortifications have increased military presence in vulnerable areas but have struggled to counter the transnational nature of the extremist threat.
Violent extremist groups are highly mobile and adept at exploiting porous borders, often crossing into neighboring countries to evade capture or pursue new targets. The tri-border region linking Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger is a case in point: Ungoverned spaces in these areas serve as havens for recruitment, training and smuggling. For example, several reports have repeatedly highlighted how weapons and fighters move through these corridors, circumventing localized security measures. Without a coordinated regional approach, extremist groups will continue using these border spaces to undermine national efforts to contain violence.
Fractures in Regional Relations
Meanwhile, the inability to confront the regional nature of violent extremism is especially compounded by deepening geopolitical fractures within West Africa. The emergence of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has profoundly disrupted regional cooperation, as these regimes have severed traditional Western security partnerships, particularly with France, citing discontent with perceived “neocolonial” policies and seeking alternative alliances.
Their pivot toward Russia, facilitated through agreements with Russia’s Africa Corps mercenaries, reflects not only a reorientation of military support but also a shift in ideological alignment. These moves have created deep divisions between the Sahelian juntas and coastal democracies like Benin, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, which remain aligned with Western-backed initiatives such as the Accra Initiative and U.S.-led counter-extremism programs. The resulting fragmentation has left critical gaps in intelligence sharing and operational coordination, weakening the overall regional response to extremist threats.
Nowhere is this fragmentation more evident than in ECOWAS. Once a cornerstone of regional integration and collective security, the bloc has struggled to maintain its relevance and unity amid these geopolitical shifts. Its response to Niger’s 2023 coup, including the imposition of sanctions and threats of military intervention, exposed internal rifts. Coastal democracies largely supported ECOWAS’s hardline stance, but Sahelian juntas rallied against it, forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to assert their sovereignty and resist external pressure. This polarization has diverted ECOWAS’s attention away from addressing shared security challenges, leaving border regions increasingly exposed. The breakdown in coordination has allowed groups like JNIM to exploit these divides, conducting cross-border operations with little interference.
The breakdown in coordination has allowed groups like JNIM to exploit these divides, conducting cross-border operations with little interference.
And while the Accra Initiative still offers a promising framework for collaboration, it remains constrained by its limited scope and exclusion of Sahelian partners like Burkina Faso and Niger. This omission is significant, as these states are central to disrupting the transnational networks that sustain groups like JNIM and IS Sahel.
Moreover, the Accra Initiative’s operational capacity has been hampered by member states’ reluctance to deepen integration, often out of fear that shared security efforts could infringe on national sovereignty or overburden already limited resources. For example, joint operations under the initiative have been sporadic and reactive, lacking the sustained coordination necessary to address the root causes of insecurity.
Compounding these challenges is the absence of Nigeria — a key regional power whose influence on both security and economic matters is undeniable. Without Nigeria’s engagement, Accra Initiative efforts to contain the expanding threat risk being fragmented, limiting the initiative’s overall effectiveness.
Overcoming Governance Failures
There is much that can be done to improve the region’s response to violent extremism. However, the heart of this crisis is a deeper governance failure.
In regions like Alibori and Atacora in Benin, northern Ghana’s Upper East and Upper West, Togo’s Savanes, and northern Côte d’Ivoire’s Bounkani and Tchologo, decades of neglect have left communities underserved and vulnerable. Poor infrastructure, limited economic opportunities and inadequate access to basic services have fostered resentment toward central governments, creating conditions that extremists exploit to build support networks.
For instance, in these regions, extremist groups often step into roles traditionally filled by the state by mediating disputes, providing basic services, or distributing food and financial assistance. This strategy, which has been extensively documented in Mali and Burkina Faso, is now taking root across neglected borderlands where state-led development remains absent or insufficient.
Prioritize Long-term Resilience Over Short-term Containment
The urgency of the situation cannot be overstated. National responses, no matter how well-funded, are insufficient in isolation. Extremist groups have adapted to fragmented state responses, turning national borders into opportunities rather than obstacles. There needs to be a unified regional security strategy that transcends growing political divides and prioritizes collective action.
But security measures alone will not create lasting stability. A comprehensive stabilization framework is required, focusing on both security and governance reforms. West African coastal states must go beyond military deployments and invest in community-centric security initiatives that build trust between local populations and security forces. Training programs that emphasize civilian harm mitigation for government forces and armed groups, community policing, and intelligence-led operations will ensure that state responses do not exacerbate grievances.
At the same time, governance failures must be directly addressed. In regions like Alibori, the state must reclaim its legitimacy through meaningful investment. Decentralizing governance and empowering local leaders to manage security and development initiatives will help counter extremist narratives and provide communities with credible alternatives to militant governance structures.
Accelerating development in vulnerable regions is equally critical. ECOWAS must work with governments to fast-track investments in borderland economies and prioritize infrastructure, agricultural modernization and vocational training programs that provide viable alternatives to illicit economies. Côte d’Ivoire’s integrated service delivery approach offers a useful model, demonstrating that a blend of development and security interventions can reduce extremist appeal.
Finally, coastal states must rethink their engagement with Sahelian neighbors. While diplomatic rifts have undermined security cooperation, economic and development partnerships remain viable entry points for dialogue. Cross-border trade facilitation, environmental conservation and agricultural projects — particularly in conflict-prone areas — could maintain strategic engagement without legitimizing junta regimes.
Coordination with Nigeria must also be prioritized. As the region’s largest economic and military power, Nigeria’s absence from key security initiatives has left a major gap in West Africa’s peacebuilding and stabilization efforts. Ensuring that Nigeria plays an active role in intelligence sharing and regional security coordination will be essential to closing off extremist supply chains and operational corridors, particularly in the borderlands that suffer from the absence of governance.
West Africa stands at a crossroads. Without a coordinated strategy that blends security, governance and development, states will remain reactive, which allows extremist groups to continue exploiting divisions and gaps. The region must break this cycle — and instead prioritize long-term resilience over short-term containment — before the instability of the Sahel becomes an irreversible reality along the Gulf of Guinea.