Jihadist groups in the Sahel, particularly from Burkina Faso, now regularly cross into northern Ghana, using the area for logistical and medical purposes to sustain ongoing insurgencies and help expand freedom of movement throughout West Africa.
Though Ghana has thus far been spared of any major terrorist attacks, there have been attacks in neighboring countries on the West African coast, including Benin and Togo.
The impending withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025 sparks concern over the stability of the other states in the economic bloc, given the broad role ECOWAS plays in resolving conflicts and maintaining security, including along the coast.
As Ghana gears up for its 2024 general elections on December 7, socio-political conditions could become increasingly conducive to the spread of terrorism within its borders.
Islamic militant groups in the Sahel, particularly from Burkina Faso, have spilled into northern Ghana, using the area for logistical and medical purposes to sustain ongoing insurgencies and help expand their movement throughout Africa. U.S. AFRICOM commander Michael Langley briefed in mid-September that active groups in the Sahel, such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are “metastasizing and moving towards the northern borders of the coastal West Africa states of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin.” Further, in a recent interview for France24 with journalist Wassim Nasr, who is also a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, JNIM leader Hamadoun Kouffa confirmed the group’s endeavors to expand into Ghana, Togo, and Benin. After losing its toehold in Niger, the United States is focusing on training local forces in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. The French have relocated troops to Gabon, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad. Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) has moved into Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger under the guise of ‘coup-proofing’ the juntas in those countries, respectively.
According to sources from Reuters, which include alleged Ghanaian security officials and regional diplomats, “Ghanaian authorities appeared to be mostly turning a blind eye to the insurgents crossing over from neighboring Burkina Faso to stock up on food, fuel, and even explosives, as well as getting injured fighters treated in hospital.” While this approach has so far prevented a major attack in Ghana, it risks militants settling in the area along with the potential radicalization and recruitment of the local population. In response to Reuters’ reporting, the Ghanaian government released a statement rejecting these claims, stating, “The ministry strongly rejects the portrayal of Ghana as a ‘supply line’ for militants. Ghana’s counter-terrorism efforts are rightly commended by her partners in the relentless regional and global fight against terrorism.”
Though there have not yet been any terrorist attacks in Ghana, attacks have taken place in neighboring countries on the West African coast. In Benin, a group of gunmen – suspected of having ties to jihadist groups – killed at least seven security forces and five rangers in a national park in late July. According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), violent extremist groups carried out a total of 171 attacks in the country in 2023. The database also revealed that Togo experienced 14 attacks in 2023, killing an estimated 66 people in 2023, with the Africa Center for Strategic Studies stating that within the last two years, the number of violent incidents associated with militant Islamic groups near the borders of Sahelian countries and their coastal neighbors has risen 250 percent, exceeding 450 cases. Along with the expansion of these jihadist groups, migrants from the Sahel seeking to flee these groups and the destruction they have caused have traveled to coastal West African countries seeking asylum, leading to a range of human security challenges. According to the UN refugee agency Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa (UNHCR RBWCA), over 110,000 people have fled to the coastal West African states of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin since October 2024.
The impending formal withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025 sparks concern over the security and stability of the other states in the economic bloc, which also plays a role in resolving conflicts and maintaining security, including along the coast. The three army-ruled states in the Sahel where the majority of jihadist activity has taken place have opted to sign instead a defense pact known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Without ECOWAS tying the coordination between these states and coastal West African states, the risk of jihadi activity spilling over into coastal West Africa only increases.
As Ghana gears up for its general election on December 7, socio-political conditions could become increasingly conducive to the spread of terrorism within its borders. Despite Ghana’s reputation as an oasis of stability in a volatile region, there are concerns of election-related unrest in relation to possible vote-rigging and disputes over results from the previous two polls. Such concerns have also plagued Senegal, which was once viewed as the peaceful outlier in the Sahel region but experienced a wave of unrest between 2023-2024. Moreover, the Ghanaian election occurs against a backdrop of a sharp economic downturn, including rapid inflation and high unemployment. The World Bank reports that 850,000 Ghanaians may have fallen into poverty since 2022, exacerbating Ghana’s vulnerability to destabilizing influences. The continued politicization of ethnic tensions for electoral gains in the lead-up to the election and increasing mistrust in state institutions may further bolster the appeal of extremist narratives and recruitment efforts, especially in northern Ghana, where disproportionately high poverty and unemployment rates make communities vulnerable.
Regional counterterrorism initiatives, such as the 2017 Accra Initiative – an alliance between Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo – established to curb terrorism spillover from the Sahel, have faced limitations. Though initially established as an important information-sharing mechanism, cross-border capabilities have been stressed in the context of increasing violent extremism. This has facilitated a recourse to excessively militarized approaches, which has largely overlooked the domestic vulnerabilities that violent extremists are leveraging in recruitment efforts, including ethnic marginalization and socioeconomic exclusion in the northern, rural regions. This strategy has failed to adequately address the significance of domestic sociopolitical issues as an exacerbating factor. In 2019, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo underscored this external focus in counterterrorism efforts, stating, “We shall deny terrorists the opportunity to cross our border.” The outcome of the upcoming elections may present an important opportunity for Ghana to recalibrate its approach to mitigating the ballooning threat.