The allegation that the party seeks to revive its military capabilities in non-Shiite areas is much easier said than done.
As the Lebanese watch with horror Israel’s systematic destruction of villages, towns, and neighborhoods in predominantly Shiite areas of Beirut’s southern suburbs, South Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley, they are also thinking of the demographic implications this may have once the conflict ends.
This has been exploited by Hezbollah’s foes to create a sense of panic in Lebanese society. A Shiite television cleric opposed to the party has claimed that Hezbollah, now that areas of Shiite demographic concentration have been obliterated, will try to revive itself militarily in non-Shiite areas of Lebanon. This is profoundly worrisome to many Lebanese, since it opens the door to the possibility of civil war. However, before reaching for our guns or suitcases, let us deconstruct the idea a bit.
It’s probably correct to assume that Hezbollah’s leadership and Iran are now preparing a fallback position in order to survive and rebuild the party’s capacities. But it’s equally true the Israeli strategy is to ensure that Shiites, or more specifically the party’s supporters within the community, are isolated inside Lebanon and that their presence in non-Hezbollah areas becomes toxic. In doing so, the Israelis are creating rifts between the mostly Shiite displaced and the rest of society, which will only be exacerbated by the growing demand of most Lebanese that the party bring its war with Israel to an end. But what the Lebanese are actually seeing is Hezbollah wanting to continue the conflict indefinitely, in a bid to survive politically and militarily, encouraged by its Iranian patrons.
This begs the question: Can Hezbollah pursue its war amid the hostility of a majority of Lebanese who, even if they have no sympathy for Israel, see no point in this senseless carnage, at a time when the Shiite community is already suffering terribly from the consequences? Some might respond yes, since Hezbollah doesn’t care about what its countrymen think. Its survival and Iranian priorities will always be more important than any domestic discontent expressed. That may be true, but all this means is that the party is allowing Israel to further destroy its social and economic environment, which had long been the essence of its autonomy and strength. It is highly unlikely the party could recreate this in non-Shiite areas, at least without provoking civil conflict that could engulf Hezbollah in multiple miniwars.
A Hezbollah ally made a related point in 2020, when he implied the party had reacted inadequately to Lebanon’s financial collapse. Anis Naccash, in an interview with the pro-Iran Al-Mayadeen television channel, warned that engaging in resistance involved more than military operations; Hezbollah also had to consider the impact of the country’s economic crisis. As he put it, “[N]ational security is not limited to arms and armed defense … [it is tied to] education, the economy, agriculture, and health. Armed action is a part of this, but it is not enough to defend the nation.”
Naccash indicated that Hezbollah’s power had to derive from its ability to develop a support base on myriad fronts and surround itself with a society that had an interest in defending the party of resistance and its institutions. But it was also true that the society around the party had to have the means to sustain Hezbollah financially, morally, politically, and with manpower.
But is this still possible today? Hezbollah will retain the loyalty of its community for the foreseeable future, which will be reinforced if the presence of the Shiite displaced is resisted throughout Lebanon—strengthening a feeling of communal solidarity. But loyalty also brings responsibilities. Hezbollah’s social base has been devastated and impoverished, and the party now has to take care of it, and is expected to do so. That is why the community will remain a major burden for Hezbollah in the years ahead, one that will make the party’s efforts to reconstitute its military infrastructure infinitely more difficult, particularly in areas hostile to Hezbollah.
Moreover, Hezbollah made major mistakes in the past by violating many of the unwritten rules of Lebanon’s sectarian social contract. It stands accused of assassinating a major Sunni leader in Rafiq al-Hariri, and it deployed forces to Syria on behalf of a regime opposed by many Sunnis, to defend the strategic interests of Shiite Iran. It is viewed by many Christians as responsible for the Beirut port explosion, before it stormed into the Christian quarter of Tayyouneh in October 2021 to undermine an investigation into that explosion. It has also tried to impose its candidate as Maronite Christian president, against the wishes of a vast majority of Christians. Everywhere the party has generated resentment, so it can expect strong pushback against its agenda, possibly through a resort to weapons.
However, let’s assume that a sectarian conflict breaks out, and Lebanon plunges again into a war in which Hezbollah finds itself fighting a coalition of communities. Would Iran allow the party to fall into that trap? The experience of the Palestine Liberation Organization is rich in lessons. For the PLO, being drawn into the Lebanese civil war in 1975 led to its undoing. The organization found itself caught up in regional rivalries—first provoking a Syrian military intervention in 1976, before the Israelis invaded in 1982 to expel the Palestinians from Lebanon. The PLO would regret its involvement and later issued a public apology to the Lebanese.
It is a certainty that if another civil war broke out in Lebanon, many countries would intervene on the side of Hezbollah’s opponents, not least Israel, to help defeat the party. Lebanon would doubtless be ruined, everyone would lose, but from an Iranian perspective the outcome would be especially unsatisfactory. That is why it’s difficult to see leaders in Tehran green lighting Hezbollah measures that might lead to a sectarian conflict that would further ravage an already greatly damaged Shiite community.
At the same time, Iran may not be able to offer Hezbollah and its supporters much in terms of assistance. For Iran to simultaneously rearm Hezbollah and rebuild Shiite areas would cost several billion dollars, which the Iranians may not be able to spare at a time of economic hardship. More fundamentally, officials in Tehran have to wonder if a major new investment in the party is really worth it today. With Hezbollah incapable of putting its Shiite community through a new ordeal of nationwide annihilation, its military capabilities have effectively been neutralized, probably for decades. Much the same holds for Hamas in Gaza. This imposes on the Iranians a cold assessment of whether their calamitous “Unity of the Arenas” strategy even merits salvaging.
Two thoughts come to mind here. In case of a civil war on several fronts, would Hezbollah be in an advantageous position? The geography of the Shiite community today is already one of vulnerability. There are three areas of communal concentration—southern Lebanon, the southern and northern Beqaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs. At the best of times, joining these areas in times of conflict would be a challenge, as communications links among them are dominated by other communities. However, if, as the panic-mongers claim, Hezbollah tries to anchor itself in non-Shiite areas, without a social base present, the party would be in an even direr situation to prosecute a war, specifically one seen by its enemies as having existential implications.
A second thought comes to mind as well. What about the Lebanese army? We tend to forget that there is still an armed force in this country that can control unrest if need be, and that is even willing to intervene with lethal force if this is necessary to maintain civil peace. That’s precisely what it did during the Tayyouneh incident, when it prevented Hezbollah and Amal gunmen from advancing on mainly Christian neighborhoods. The military doubtless realizes today that it is as close as it has ever been since the end of the civil war in 1990 to imposing the authority of the state (no matter how deficient it may be) on society.
Lebanon has many hardships looming, which come on top of the multitude it has faced in the last five years. Few countries have had to endure as much in so short a time. However, the latest scare story of Hezbollah reconstituting itself in non-Shiite areas turns a highly difficult scheme into a deceptively simple one. Hezbollah in the coming years will have a mountain to climb under the best of circumstances, and it is not likely the party will want to do this while it is at war with the rest of Lebanese society.