Profession: terrorist. How Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip and why Israel was not ready for the attack

Palestinian Hamas has launched the largest war against Israel in decades, with hundreds already killed. For the first time, militants were able to take control and even hold several Israeli settlements for some time. Previously, only the armies of neighboring states could pose such a serious threat to Israel and only when they acted together. Now, the real war against the Jewish state has been launched not by regular troops from Syria or Egypt, but by militants from the Gaza Strip who have neither aviation nor armored vehicles. How did it happen that Hamas terrorists came to power in the Gaza Strip and the only social ladder for the residents was jihad, and why Israel ignored intelligence warnings about the possibility of a large-scale attack – journalist Yuri Matsarsky understood all this (he previously worked in the Gaza Strip, and now serves in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and his parents, on the contrary, fleeing the war, left Kharkov for Israel and now came under fire from Hamas).

The emergence of the terrorist group Hamas as the only and uncontested authoritarian government in the Gaza Strip was like some kind of Hollywood slasher film, like “Saw” or “Halloween.” In the world, those events are usually called the Battle of Gaza, but in the strip itself they are remembered as the Civil War of 2007. Hamas then forced those who stood in their way to absolute power to capitulate, using a rather exotic, even by the standards of the Middle East, and very bloody method – the organization’s militants kidnapped representatives of competing clans and parties and amputated their arms and legs. It must be said that some of their competitors tried to act in the same way, but Hamas surpassed them in both the scale of torture and their cruelty. The massacres were often filmed and disseminated among residents of the Gaza Strip, literally paralyzing the opposition’s will to resist.

It is clear that kidnappings and amputations were far from the only tools for gaining power, but they were the ones that frightened Hamas’ opponents the most. As one of the field commanders of the Fatah organization, which in 2007 was the main opponent of Hamas in Gaza, said, to many of his comrades then surrender seemed much less evil than the possibility of losing arms or legs as a result of an extremely painful operation and forever becoming a burden to their families.

Where did Hamas come from?
And it all started, as befits a Hollywood slasher film, more or less civilized. In 2006, the political forces of the partially recognized Palestinian state agreed to hold elections – the second in history after the 1996 elections, and still the last – and the formation of a legislative council based on their results. Hamas was then an absolute political newcomer. Formed in 1987 by several Muslim preachers and their followers, the organization was anything but political until the 2006 campaign.

Having emerged as a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas managed to simultaneously position itself as a charitable organization that distributed humanitarian aid to the poor, as a religious institution engaged in the construction of mosques and madrassas and training personnel for them, and as an armed anti-Israeli group aimed at absolute destruction the Jewish state (this hypostasis, as follows from the full name of the organization – “Islamic Resistance Movement” – was initially the main one).

In fact, such a variety of functions made the group popular among Palestinians. And the overt religious bias favorably distinguished Hamas in the eyes of numerous Palestinian Muslims from its emphatically secular competitors. First of all, from Fatah (“Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine”), created back in the late 1950s, which began as a terrorist organization, but by the end of the 1980s formally abandoned armed confrontation with Israel in favor of political dialogue. Both the long-time leader of Fatah, Yasser Arafat, and Mahmoud Abbas, who headed the organization after his death in 2004, did not use jihadist rhetoric and generally avoided religious topics. Fatah called its war against Israel “national liberation,” among the notable figures of the organization and its allies were always Palestinian Christians and atheist communists, and after abandoning the armed struggle, Arafat and his comrades started talking about respecting the rights of Israeli Jews.

Religious bias distinguished Hamas favorably in the eyes of Palestinian Muslims from its secular competitors

Hamas acted very differently. He immediately declared all Jews enemies, called the war against them a holy jihad, and reduced the entire political program to a very simple and understandable formula – the destruction of Israel and Israelis and the construction of a state based on a strict understanding of Sharia.

Hamas vs Fatah. 2006 elections and civil war
This mixture of populist Islamist slogans and the already established image of defenders of the poor and trustees of mosques ensured Hamas’s landslide victory in those same 2006 elections. Candidates from the movement won 74 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Assembly out of 132. Fatah, which came second, brought 45 deputies into parliament.

Those elections were postponed more than once; several candidates, including those who eventually received mandates, were arrested by the Israeli authorities even before the vote, and some polling stations were blocked by the Israeli army. But the real difficulties were yet to come. Ensuring the functioning of parliament and the Palestinian government it formed turned out to be much more difficult than holding elections. Shortly after the start of the parliament’s work, Israel arrested several dozen Hamas deputies on suspicion of involvement in the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. MPs elected in the Palestinian territory called the West Bank are behind bars. The West Bank is separated from the Gaza Strip by several tens of kilometers of Israeli territory.

Deputies and ministers from the sector could not get into parliament or the cabinet at all, since if they left the Palestinian territory, many of them would have been immediately arrested in connection with the same Shalit case. For some time, meetings were held via video link, but the effectiveness of such work was, to put it mildly, very doubtful. As a result, moderate secular officials from Fatah and the Islamist hawks from Hamas, who already disliked each other, completely ceased to find a common language. A political crisis erupted – the joint government bodies were inactive, Fatah accused Hamas of an overly tough position, which only angered Israel and led to more and more detentions and arrests. Hamas, in turn, found Fatah’s readiness to compromise with the Israelis outrageous.

Hamas found Fatah’s willingness to compromise with the Israelis outrageous
Over time, the crisis only intensified, and this continued until Hamas decided to take all power in the Gaza Strip, where the organization’s headquarters were located and most of its supporters lived, into their own hands, leaving the West Bank to competitors. Competitors – primarily Fatah – did not agree with Hamas’s attempt to seize power and took up arms. This is how the Civil War of 2007 began. Several hundred people died in it, and at least a thousand were injured, including from an amputation saw. The war ended in favor of Hamas, which took control of the sector.

With that bloody victory, the story of the Hamas that we know now begins – a huge terrorist organization that holds two million residents of the sector under its sole control and which has been preparing for years to fulfill its main goal.

Hamas’ goals, methods and financing
The Hamas coat of arms depicts two crossed curved sabers, the Jerusalem Islamic shrine – the Dome of the Rock and a map of the Palestinian state, the construction of which the organization declared its main goal. This map includes not only the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but also the entire territory of Israel. Hamas’s political manifesto specifically states the organization’s commitment to destroy the Jewish state. But in 2007, even the hottest Palestinian heads understood that in order to enter into a confrontation with Israel, Hamas would have to properly accumulate strength and, no less important, resources. Hamas could not do this on its own – war is a terribly expensive business, requiring constant injections of money, which in the Gaza Strip was scarce at the best of times, and after the Battle of Gaza and the subsequent economic blockade of the region by Israel and neighboring Egypt, there was none at all .

Hamas’ political manifesto commits to destroying the Jewish state
Hamas, like other Islamist groups, received help with money and weapons from radical organizations in the Middle East, the rich there, and even some governments. This was enough to support the pants of Hamas and even distribute meager humanitarian aid to the residents of the Gaza Strip, but they were clearly not enough for a real war with a strong enemy. Moreover, the flow of money from foreign sponsors sometimes came to naught – after all, most Arab countries depend on the United States in one way or another, and Washington from time to time threatened them with all sorts of problems if they actively supported terrorists.

And therefore, almost immediately after seizing power in Gaza, Hamas literally rushed into the arms of the Islamic Republic of Iran – Israel’s most determined enemy in the region, which, having already been subject to all possible Western sanctions, could afford to ignore the United States. Hamas has received money from the Iranians before, but for a long time Tehran was only one of many patrons of the organization, noticeable, but far from the most important. Hamas took money from the Iranians, but did not advertise it particularly. After all, Iran is a Shiite state that for many years has been and is still in a state of, if not a cold war, then certainly a serious ideological conflict with other sponsors of Hamas – the rich Sunni monarchies of the Middle East.

Hamas took money from the Iranians, but did not advertise it particularly
Many of these monarchies have many Shiite subjects – in Bahrain there is an overwhelming majority of them under the Sunni king, and in Saudi Arabia almost all of the oil fields that provide the country with foreign currency are located in the Shiite Eastern Province – and the monarchs there, not without reason, doubt the loyalty of those living in their countries are Shiites, who often do not recognize the religious authority of the rulers. These doubts are all the more justified because Iran became an Islamic Republic after the radical Shiites there overthrew the sole ruler, the Shah, and then called on all Muslims of the world to follow their example.

Iran vs. Israel
Hamas itself has always been a purely Sunni organization (until recently there were no or almost no Shiites in Gaza at all), but financial considerations then took precedence over religious ones. The organization did not break off relations with previous sponsors, including, by the way, Russia, but Iran has become its main partner since 2007. The Iranians and Hamas were brought together by common goals – both of them do not hide the fact that they dream of destroying Israel. True, Iranians have somewhat different motivations from Palestinians. If for Hamas the war with Israel is, albeit sacred, but still a struggle for living space, for territories that the Palestinians consider theirs, then with Iran everything is somewhat more complicated. Tehran is bending over backwards, trying to become a leader not only in the Shiite world, but in the entire Islamic world as a whole.

Hamas itself has always been a purely Sunni organization, but took money from Shiites
These attempts now look hopeless, given that Shiites in the world make up only about 20% of the total number of Muslims, and a huge number of Sunnis in the territory from Indonesia to Morocco do not recognize Shiites at all as their brothers in faith. For them, Shiism is a distortion of true Islam, a strange heresy that has almost nothing in common with their religion. The Iranian authorities intend to transform themselves from heretics into recognized leaders of the Islamic world through victory over Israel. The return of Jerusalem to Muslim rule and the expulsion of the infidels, as the ayatollahs ruling in Iran see it, will convince followers of Islam around the world that Tehran is now the main center of the Islamic world.

In the West, these ideas may seem illogical and strange. After all, this is a pure gamble – to spend decades and billions of dollars not on your own development, but on the destruction of a state with which you do not even have a common border (Israel is separated from Iran by the territories of Syria and Iraq), and the result is not at all guaranteed. But we are talking about Iran, a state in which Western ideas about rationality do not work, in which, for example, the constitution guarantees believers who strictly observe religious precepts a return to Allah after death.

Although, against the backdrop of Russia, which is burying its economy , has found itself in deep international isolation and every day drives its own citizens into senseless “meat assaults” due to a manic desire to destroy Ukraine, the example of Iran does not seem so unique.

Hamas is not Iran’s only instrument in the war against Israel, but it is certainly the most important. Tehran also has at its disposal the Lebanese Hezbollah – at the same time an entire terrorist army and one of the leading political parties in the country, there is the ruling regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, in whose political and military decisions Iranian advisers and generals often have the final say, there are a lot of organizations and smaller factions. Even in the Gaza Strip itself, there are Islamic Jihad and Sabirin (Waiting) wholly or almost completely dependent on Iran. The first are a fairly serious terrorist group that shares the ideology of Hamas, but denies any political activity such as participation in elections, the second are Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants who converted to Shiism under the influence of Iran, who are often persecuted by their former comrades.

Hezbollah and the Syrian army are busy with ongoing crises in their countries, while Islamic Jihad and Sabirin usually focus on local, one-off terrorist attacks. The absence of a political organization (as in the case of Islamic Jihad) or an almost underground position (as in the case of Sabirin) does not allow these two groups to attempt large-scale operations that require careful planning and coordination with foreign sponsors. In general, they usually take active action after Hamas begins shelling Israeli territory.

Hamas as master of the Gaza Strip
Hamas has everything it needs to organize large-scale terrorist attacks – an extensive quasi-diplomatic network spanning the Middle East, North Africa and Russia, a constant flow of money from foreign donors, huge stockpiles of weapons, assistance from Iranian intelligence and military planners, and colossal human resource. According to various sources, between two and three million people live in the Gaza Strip. And they all depend on Hamas in one way or another. The unemployed—and they account for between one-quarter and one-third of the region’s working-age population—survive only on foreign (primarily Israeli) humanitarian aid distributed by Hamas. All government agencies, from the post office to the local fire departments, which are supported by trenches from the rich Gulf states, are simply departments of Hamas. And it is Hamas that decides how much money to pay the employees of these structures and whether to pay them at all.

All media in Gaza are also under the control of Hamas; its competitors, like the already mentioned Sabirin or ISIS, which announced its presence in the region several years ago, do not even have the opportunity to print propaganda leaflets – Israel prohibits the supply of printing paper to the Gaza Strip , which is why only Hamas, which controls all routes for the supply of smuggled goods (including paper), has the opportunity for printed propaganda. Residents of the Gaza Strip literally receive food, money and information from Hamas.

Residents of the Gaza Strip literally receive food, money and information from Hamas
And Hamas successfully takes advantage of this, firstly, from childhood, teaching residents of the region to hate Israel and Jews, and secondly, leaving for them only one path to a more or less prosperous existence – an armed terrorist struggle against Israel. Yes, there are wealthy people in the Gaza Strip who are not engaged in terror—the local equestrian club has several dozen members who work as doctors, lawyers, and engineers—but they are tiny compared to the hundreds of thousands of poorly educated poor people to whom the There is only one social ladder – jihad.

Yom Kippur War and its aftermath
The last time Israel faced a real threat to its existence was exactly half a century ago, during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Then the Jewish state was simultaneously attacked by the armies of Syria and Egypt, reinforced by Jordanian and Iraqi units, soldiers and officers from Morocco and Saudi Arabia, and even military specialists from North Korea and Cuba. Palestinian factions also took the side of the invading armies. That war lasted about three weeks and ended in Israeli victory. But Israeli politicians understood that the threat of new attacks from hostile neighboring states would only grow.

With the help of American and European partners, the Israelis began negotiations to normalize relations with their Arab neighbors. The first peace agreement was signed with Egypt in 1978. In 1994, peace was concluded with Jordan. Around the same time, negotiations were underway to normalize relations with Syria. But the then Syrian President Hafez al-Assad refused peace with Israel. Probably under pressure from Iran, which is very close to it. However, in any case, two of the four neighboring Arab states recognized Israel’s right to exist and abandoned the idea of ​​its destruction. Two more – Lebanon and Syria – remained in a formal state of war with the Jewish state, but internal crises, contradictions and conflicts in these countries made it very unlikely that the formal war would turn into a real one.

This geopolitical configuration – two neighbors refused war, two more were too busy with their internal problems – existed for decades and actually guaranteed Israel a more or less calm situation on its external borders. In fact, the main and only real threat to Israel since about the end of the 1990s has been Iran and its proxy forces – primarily Hamas. Hamas has attacked Israel many times with rockets fired from the Gaza Strip or sent suicide bombers into Israeli cities, receiving fire from Israeli planes, tanks and ships on targets in Gaza in return. To some extent, this became a routine: the Israelis knew that at any moment, as soon as Hamas accumulated a sufficient number of rockets, hundreds and thousands of rockets would fly into their cities, some of which would be intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system, but some would still will reach residential areas and kill or injure one of the local residents. People simply accepted it as a necessary evil.

How did what happened on October 7 become possible?
Could the Israelis, who have been living for decades in the “rockets are about to fly from Gaza, let’s wait out the threat in a bomb shelter” mode, expect what happened in October 2023? Could they have imagined that the matter might not be limited to a couple of hundred rockets and several suicides who blew themselves up on buses or shopping centers? They could. Moreover, they knew that this was exactly what would happen. About six months ago, Israeli military intelligence reported that the next Hamas attack promises to be much larger than all previous ones. Intelligence officers warned that the matter would no longer be limited to missile launches and lone suicides who managed to get out of Gaza through underground tunnels. That the missile attack will be much more massive than before, and while the missiles are still in the air, Hamas will neutralize observation posts on the border with Gaza, break the wall surrounding the enclave in several places and use significant forces – several hundred, or even several thousand people will begin an operation to capture Israeli settlements neighboring the region. It was also said in intelligence reports that the capture of settlements would be accompanied by public reprisals against their inhabitants. This is exactly what happened according to this scenario.

Indeed, the fact that Hamas was about to launch new attacks was clear to experts several months ago. Israel, with the mediation of the United States, has in recent years achieved a real breakthrough in relations with a number of Arab countries – its right to exist has been recognized by Sudan, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Negotiations on recognition of the Jewish state by Saudi Arabia were also at the finish line. The Saudis are largely forced to make peace with Israel by their very difficult relations with Iran.

Now it is the ruling house of Saudi Arabia, on whose territory the main Muslim shrines of Mecca and Medina are located, that can lay claim to the title of the main rulers of the Islamic world – the very title that Iran is going to challenge (it is possible that with the help of nuclear weapons, the development of which Tehran, most likely, he has been busy for a long time and not without success). Saudi Arabia really wants to receive security guarantees in the event of a war with Iran from its main international partner, the United States. The states are ready to give these guarantees, but with a number of conditions. The main one is the recognition of Israel. For Iran, a Saudi-American military alliance clearly directed against it is one of its worst nightmares. After all, it will not only mean strengthening the main competitor in the region, but will also push those Muslim countries that are oriented towards Saudi Arabia towards peace and cooperation with Israel.

The more ominous and plausible the rumors about Iran’s willingness to build its own bomb became, the more accommodating the Saudis became. By the end of the summer, the signing of peace between them and the Israelis seemed a done deal. And, apparently, this is where Iran and its proxy Hamas decided to take active action. Actions aimed at demonstrating to the Arab world the Palestinians’ readiness for large-scale military action and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrating to the same world the casualties and destruction in the Gaza Strip after guaranteed retaliatory strikes from Israel. All this should convey a simple and understandable slogan: “The Arabs cannot make peace with Israel, which is fighting against its Palestinian brothers.”

But if the Israelis realized the danger posed by Hamas, if intelligence warned of the preparation of an unprecedented attack on the Jewish state, if the international situation indicated that this attack would take place in the near future, then why did the Israeli authorities do nothing to prevent such a development of events ?

There is a simple answer to this question: “What if the intelligence was wrong, what if Hamas is still incapable of complex, daring operations? Is it worth starting the evacuation of thousands of people, calling up entire brigades of reservists, spending millions and billions of dollars to prevent a threat that may not exist? What will happen to the government that spent all these millions and billions, took people out of work and school, to dress them in camouflage and send them to guard the wall around Gaza? How soon will this government be accused of alarmism and incompetence? How long after this will the already not the most popular and stable government last?”

Much more popular with voters than the current Israeli cabinet of Netanyahu, the Ukrainian authorities did not carry out a mass evacuation of residents of the border regions in the winter of 2022 and did not announce a large-scale mobilization even when the American authorities openly called a Russian attack inevitable and indicated the approximate dates of the invasion. And this was not done for the same reason that the Israeli government was inactive – for fear of looking like fools and alarmists in the eyes of voters if nothing happened.