Introduction
‘Every reporter knows the first rule of journalism: never betray your source. But what if your source turns out to be unworthy of your silence? What if it’s your source who betrays you?’
Thus reads an online blurb for the excellent book ‘The Messenger’ by the former investigative journalist Shiv Malik, who recounts how he struck up a friendship with the ostensible British jihadist defector Hassan Butt and was going to help him publish his life-story as a book. Butt, however, was not quite what he seemed, as he later told police under questioning that he was effectively scamming Malik, taking advantage of the journalist’s goodwill towards him in order to make money off a story that was in many respects lies and fantasy. Yet things took an even more interesting turn when Malik discovered subsequently that Butt had also been acting as an informant for Britain’s MI5 security service during a significant period of his time as an ostensible jihadist.
Over the past year or so, I have found myself grappling in particular with that question of when a source becomes unworthy of your silence. The story I am going to relate here bears some parallels with Malik’s tale, though there are also differences. It is the story of someone I initially developed a friendly relationship with and found to be rather likeable and sophisticated, just as Malik struck a friendship with Butt. Further, just as Malik wanted to collaborate with Butt for grander purposes of countering jihadism and promoting a more liberal understanding of Islam, so the person I came to know was someone I wanted to collaborate with for a bigger project. In this case, the project of documenting the history and insider stories of the Islamic State’s southern Syria affiliate called Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, which was based on the borders with Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Subsequently though, this person’s dishonest and manipulative behavior at a personal level prompted me to look more closely into him, uncovering some disturbing details not from during his time within the Islamic State, but before it when he was part of the ‘moderate’ Free Syrian Army (FSA/’Free Army’) in southern Syria. It is partly those details that have made me believe this person is no longer worthy of the protection of silence.
The main difference with Malik’s experiences is that whereas Butt’s work with MI5 was a later discovery that gave an additional twist to the story, I understood more or less from the outset that the person I was speaking to had had relations with intelligence services during his time in the Islamic State, an aspect of his story vouched for by his former handler in the MOC (the Jordan-based operations center that provided support for the ‘vetted’ FSA insurgency in southern Syria). Further, this is not an ostensible story of a jihadist-turned-reformist, but of a person who is not and has never been a jihadist ideologically speaking.
There are other interests in exposing this story. First, the person in question has already appeared in the open-source realm, though some of the information put out about him is inaccurate in significant respects and should be corrected for the record. Second, there are broader lessons to be learnt from this person’s story. For example, we often grapple with the question of what prompts people- both locals and foreigners- to join the Islamic State, but lack of knowledge of individual stories can lead to overgeneralizations. The more individual profiles we build, the more we can appreciate how varied the backgrounds and motivations can be. Further, I believe that this story can provide more insight into how intelligence agencies deal with sources inside jihadist groups, particularly in a time where more than one story has emerged in the wider media claiming such-and-such intelligence agency abandoned such-and-such person, as though it were a completely arbitrary and capricious process. Finally, I think this story illustrates broader failings in our coverage and analysis of the war in Syria, particularly in its earlier stages when there was excessive focus on changes in military positions and much less examination of the conduct of insurgent groups on the ground and how they interacted with each other. Throughout the conflict, the examination of the insurgent groups has often been distorted through the lens of counterterrorism and dichotomies such as ‘moderate’ vs. ‘extremist’.
Without further ado, this is the story of Manaf Fahad al-Deiri (hereafter Manaf for convenience). Previously a commander of an FSA formation in Syria’s southern province of Deraa, Manaf subsequently joined the Islamic State’s affiliate in that province, attaining a senior position in the affiliate while also becoming an asset for the CIA, which cut links with him as the organization collapsed in the face of a Syrian army offensive in summer 2018. I will first relate his story in-depth and then turn to the issue of my own interactions with him.
Origins and Background
Manaf originates from the town of al-Sheikh Maskeen in Deraa province. The last name al-Deiri suggests origins in Syria’s eastern province of Deir al-Zor but it should be noted that al-Deiri is one of the main families of al-Sheikh Maskeen. Manaf is also by all accounts a well-educated individual, having graduated in economics from the University of Damascus. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, he was living and working in Saudi Arabia, where Manaf says he worked as a director of accounts in an Irish company. He had few positive words to say about Saudi Arabia and its society. As he told me once:
‘I lived among them [the Saudis]. There is no greater corruption than they…the Saudi people are very oppressive so how will their regime be?’
Manaf subsequently returned to Syria. He says that this was part of a leave permit from work, but that he was then arrested ‘because of accusations, reports and things concocted from the imagination.’ He attributes his arrest to a dispute over land that occurred between his father and his father’s cousin over a piece of land. Manaf accuses his father’s cousin of paying money to get him arrested ‘to take revenge on my father.’ He says that he was then transferred to the Syrian army and served in al-Raqqa. By the time he then defected and fled to Deraa, the Syrian civil war was already underway.
The FSA War Criminal
Manaf would become involved in the insurgency in the south. He formed his own battalion of fighters under the brand of the FSA, adopting the name of Katibat Fursan al-Islam (‘Battalion of the Knights of Islam’) and operating in the area of al-Sheikh Maskeen. Indeed, you can find Manaf quoted as ‘the commander in the Free Army in the middle region [of the south] Manaf Abu Fahad’ in a report by the pro-opposition outlet Orient News on supposed rebel intelligence about chemical weapons having been transported to Regiment 175 in the town of Izra’a at the end of August 2013.
But Manaf and his group soon acquired a notorious reputation within the al-Sheikh Maskeen area. The important thing to note is that his group was little more than a bunch of criminals, dismissed by Manaf’s former MOC handler as a ‘gang’ who ‘stole all the furniture of the houses of al-Sheikh Maskeen after the departure and displacement of its people.’ That said, it is unlikely Manaf’s group was the only one responsible for criminal behavior in al-Sheikh Maskeen. For example, when the formation of the Shari’i Commission for al-Sheikh Maskeen was announced in December 2013, one of the reasons given for the formation of the commission was the ‘spread of social, Shari’i and legal violations and infringements by some of those of sick and weak souls from civilians and armed men.’ Similarly, in July 2014, the Hawran Storm Brigade (to which Manaf’s group was affiliated) issued a statement announcing the formation of a ‘security committee’ inside al-Sheikh Maskeen. Its assignments included ‘keeping in check the violations committed by members of the Free Army and preventing the occurrence of violations and transgressions against the civilian brothers’ as well as ‘keeping in check the violations committed by from the civilians inside the town and outside it.’
Manaf and his group were not disowned by the wider FSA in the south, even as the local social media covering al-Sheikh Maskeen and Deraa repeatedly discussed the behavior of Manaf’s group.
One post from October 2013 reads:
‘al-Sheikh Maskeen: Manaf al-Deiri, in sum this person is a shabih [term in reference to thugs supporting the Syrian government] and professional thief, and with him are some criminals of his likeness. A call to the reasonable ones of al-Sheikh Maskeen (find a solution for it).’
Similarly, a post from a page covering local news in al-Sheikh Maskeen wrote the following in early December 2013 about the reported crimes of Manaf’s group:
‘For more than a year the members of the Battalion of Manaf al-Deiri have made time for deeds of plunder, stealing and rape. The leader of the battalion and a number of his members are summoned for interrogation on the case of alternation on the deed of depravity with a girl who was not yet 15 years old, after they left the fields of jihad for more than a year and their feet have not tread on a front, nor have they participated in a battle. And very regrettably we have lost today mujahideen from those working within the battalion in an explosion of a mine from the weapons heaped and stored a number of months ago. And the leader of the battalion is responsible for the error and the first one responsible for these men. These words are intended for the Shari’i court and the group of the Muslims’ security to hold accountable those directly responsible for this sleeping battalion the majority of whose members make time for operations of kidnapping, theft and rape. Is there anyone there to respond?????’
Note in particular the references to ightisab- ‘rape.’ A post from late November 2013 discusses a specific alleged incident of gang-rape, in which members of Manaf’s group are claimed to have participated:
‘There occurred today in al-Sheikh Maskeen: seven of the immoral dogs of little honor, and they are:
- Tha’ir al-Fanous
- Wisam Abu Halawa
- Wa’il Muhammad al-Boura
- The one nicknamed Louri
And three heroes from the group of al-Sheikh Maskeen’s highwayman Manaf al-Deiri, raped a displaced girl of 15 years of age, violating all the values, customs and creeds that pertain to integrity, honor and aiding the one who seeks help. They claim they are Free Army while the Free Army is innocent of them.’
It would appear that the Shari’i Commission in al-Sheikh Maskeen claimed to have investigated this incident in response to the controversy that emerged. The Commission asserted that the girl was subject to forensic examination and it was established she was still a virgin and was not raped, but rather she was supposedly the ‘one who enticed the youth to fall into the obscenity (without compulsion).’ The commission decided that one of the members of the Free Army was guilty of being in ‘non-Shari’i seclusion’ with her without flirtation or prelude to fornication, while three others flirted with her inappropriately.
Whatever the case, the most clearly documented war crime of Manaf is his group’s participation in beheading people and Manaf’s posing with severed heads in a photo, as per the post below from January 2014. Note Manaf is in the center of the photo, and I have edited out the severed heads to reduce the graphic nature of the image, though if you would like the original image feel free to contact me.
‘The Media Office for the Battalion of the Martyr Aseel al-Jabar:
Today the heroes of the Battalion of the Martyr Aseel al-Jabar and the heroes of the Fursan al-Islam Battalion: we undertook al-qisas [retaliation] on three rats from the gangs of al-Assad who were intending to assault the town of al-Sheikh Maskeen. We count you and say to you: whoso thinks of assaulting the town of al-Sheikh Maskeen, this will be his fate.
The Battalion of the Martyr Aseel al-Jabar.
Hawks of al-Sheikh Maskeen.’
For context, the Battalion of the Martyr Aseel al-Jabar was led by Manaf’s cousin Sayf al-Deiri, another criminal gang leader. According to Manaf’s former MOC handler, Sayf compelled a girl to enter into a marriage with him, provoking an outcry in the wider Deraa region (cf. here). In my view forced marriage is tantamount to rape.
In one instance during his time in al-Sheikh Maskeen, Manaf seemed to show himself to be contemptuous of judicial authority and accountability outside that arbitrarily administered by his own group and allies. In a statement issued in May 2014, he rebuffed a Shari’i court in relation to attendance regarding the case of a thief called Uday Jum’a Abd Rabbuh (Abu Za’our). He proclaimed his rejection partly on the basis of ‘our lack of recognition of any court whatsoever in any region that operates by man-made laws and abandoning what God has revealed,’ implying that he and his associates would deal with Abu Za’our.
Now, I have no doubt that many people will take the above statement, as well as the length of Manaf’s beard in that gruesome photo where he poses with the severed heads, and cry ‘Islamist!’ or ‘Salafist!’ or ‘Jihadist!’ as though Manaf somehow had the Islamic State ideological inclination in him all along. Having known Manaf and various people who interacted with him, I can assure you this is not the case, and it will also be illustrated by subsequent events.
One could of course go on about the controversies regarding the behavior of Manaf and his associates. The issues of criminal behavior in general were partly probed in an extended interview with him published in August 2014. During that interview (for those who want the full clips, with a very rough transcript, feel free to contact me), he admitted that the ‘Free Army makes mistakes’ and that the Free Army members are ‘not angels’ but he decried what he saw as the ‘incitement campaign’ and ‘defamation campaign’ against the FSA in al-Sheikh Maskeen. He also urged listeners to take into account the particular circumstances of al-Sheikh Maskeen (i.e. that it was a besieged area at the time) and argued that it could not be compared to a fully ‘liberated’ town like Da’el.
In October 2014, there was a merger between Manaf’s group, Sayf’s group and two other groups to form the Khalid bin al-Waleed Brigade, led by Manaf himself. This brigade was incorporated into a larger conglomerate of MOC-backed groups called the First Legion, which was part of the wider MOC-backed Southern Front coalition. It was through this connection that Manaf first got to know the person who would later be his MOC handler when Manaf was inside the Islamic State’s Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, which should not be confused with the original Khalid bin al-Waleed Brigade that Manaf led in al-Sheikh Maskeen area. In the appendices are some internal records of the First Legion that demonstrate Manaf’s affiliation with this conglomeration.
The Dispute with Jabhat al-Nusra and Fleeing to the Yarmouk Basin
The first actor to make a serious attempt to hold Manaf to account for his actions was the al-Qa’ida-affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. But even here, it should be noted that Jabhat al-Nusra was not exactly acting out of some kind of moral purity. While existing accounts have noted Manaf’s troubles with Jabhat al-Nusra, the claim that the latter was trying to hold him to account for accusations of rape is incorrect. Also, it is not true that he was in Jabhat al-Nusra at any point.
In reality, Manaf was carrying out repeated attacks of a dishonorable nature against members of Jabhat al-Nusra. You see, contrary to the claims of FSA supporters, it is not always the case that Jabhat al-Nusra was the transgressor against the FSA groups. The First Legion however worked to protect Manaf from Jabhat al-Nusra, and eventually there was an assassination attempt against him, after which he fled to the Yarmouk Basin area in southwest Deraa countryside that was at the time controlled by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, which had clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra at the end of 2014 as Jabhat al-Nusra had (correctly) accused the group of Islamic State links.
As Manaf put it in one conversation when I asked him why Jabhat al-Nusra wanted to kill him:
‘By God brother half of their amirs in the south were in the regime and I used to kidnap them, force them to defect, and take their weapons. So they resented me, began to concoct rumors, betrayals and slander my reputation in order to kill me, despite the fact that they fled and abandoned us in battle to ourselves. Evil dogs, the nurturing of the Syrian regime. When they enter an area, they liquidate the commanders from the Free Army so no one remains to compete with them for authority, in addition to the fact that they declare takfir on the Free Army.’
These words should make clear that Manaf is no jihadist. His former MOC handler speaks in similar terms regarding Manaf’s problems with Jabhat al-Nusra:
‘Jabhat al-Nusra had many members from al-Sheikh Maskeen, especially from the amirs, and all of them were on hostile terms with Manaf. The reason is the killing [by Manaf] of many on the pretext they were agents [of the Syrian government] without evidence, and among them [i.e. those who were killed] relatives of some members of the organization. Therefore there were suspicions of criminality against him, and they demanded his arrest and to remove the cover from him, but I insisted on protecting him therefore al-Nusra delayed arresting him because of my pressure, especially as the stage was difficult and the battles of al-Sheikh [Maskeen] had not ended. But an operation to blow up his car occurred in the end but the damage was material. After that he fled to the [Yarmouk] Basin.’
As should be evident, Manaf decided to flee to the Yarmouk Basin simply because it was an area where Jabhat al-Nusra could not get to him. Incidentally, Manaf was not the only person from his own group who came to the Yarmouk Basin. According to Manaf, ‘Omar al-Bahri’ (appointed head of the Fursan al-Islam contingent in the Khalid bin al-Waleed Brigade as per the October 2014 formation statement) joined Manaf at a later point in the Yarmouk Basin. Like Manaf, Omar al-Bahri fell into trouble with Jabhat al-Nusra and fled to the Yarmouk Basin. He was subsequently killed while fighting for Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed.
Inside the Islamic State
When Manaf first arrived in the Yarmouk Basin, he did not join the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade straightaway but actually stayed in the locality of Nafi’a for some time, but he was then arrested by the group and imprisoned, apparently on suspicion that he was an agent for some hostile entity. Eventually though, it would appear that Abu Ali Saraya, who headed the group’s Islamic court system at the time, intervened on behalf of Manaf and convinced him to work with the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. Like Manaf, Abu Ali Saraya was originally from al-Sheikh Maskeen.
Thus began Manaf’s work with the Islamic State-affiliated Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, but not because he somehow identified with Islamic State ideologically. He remained in the Yarmouk Basin and decided to work with the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade primarily because he saw it as the way to ensure that he would remain out of Jabhat al-Nusra’s reach. As one friend of Manaf put it to me: ‘You know, I know, and all people know that Manaf was with the organization [Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed/Islamic State] but not per his wish. Jabhat al-Nusra is the one that compelled him to enter the Basin. Otherwise they would have slaughtered him.’ This friend first got to know Manaf when Manaf came to the area, had secured him refuge in Nafi’a and hates both Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.
You see, not everyone who joins Islamic State and its affiliates does so out of religious beliefs or ideology.
It would seem that the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade appreciated Manaf’s level of educational attainment and organizational skills, and thus he played a role in the development of the group’s ‘Islamic Police’ apparatus: hence one of Manaf’s nicknames is Abu Omar Shorta (lit. ‘Abu Omar Police’), since it is common for people in jihadist organizations to take nicknames in relations to their positions within those organizations.
Manaf remained with the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade as it evolved into Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed in May 2016, following a merger with other groups that had come into the Yarmouk Basin. Manaf eventually came to occupy a senior internal security position in the organization. The impression I got from Manaf was that he was the overall head of internal security. His former MOC handler clarified more specifically that he was head of internal security for the ‘Old Basin’ area (encompassing the areas from Ma’ariya in the south to Ain Dhikr in the north and to al-Qusayr in the east).
It should be noted that some time prior to the defeat of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed by Syrian government forces, the Islamic State had already dubbed the Deraa and Quneitra area to be its ‘Wilayat Hawran’ (‘Hawran province’) without publicly declaring it. A wali (‘provincial governor’) of Hawran and his Shura (‘consultation’) council oversaw Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed at the highest level. Manaf claims that he was on this Shura council under the nickname of Abu Abdullah al-Sheikh Maskeen. Manaf’s former MOC handler has cast some doubt on this claim, but it could be plausible as the wali himself (Abu Ali al-Safadi) and Shura council member Abu Osama al-Der’awi were also from al-Sheikh Maskeen.
During the final days of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, Manaf, like many other administrative members of the organization, was mobilized for a military role, acting as a frontline manner for the group in the Tel al-Jumu’ area. As for the claim that Manaf had some involvement with a supposed chemical weapons capacity for the group, this is false.
Working with Intelligence
That Manaf had a relationship with intelligence apparatuses is established. So far the brief published accounts about him have claimed that he was working for Syrian government intelligence and is now serving in the Syrian military. I will make clear here that these claims are false and are part of the usual pro-opposition narrative that claims a special collusion between the Syrian government and the Islamic State. In fact, Manaf was an agent first for an MOC intelligence team tracking Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, and then a separate CIA-affiliated intelligence team.
The accounts seem to differ somewhat on when exactly Manaf first became an asset for foreign intelligence. The impression I got from Manaf was that he was working with MOC intelligence from the outset of his time inside the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and this was part of the reason he stayed inside the Yarmouk Basin (besides wanting to avoid being targeted by Jabhat al-Nusra). Manaf’s former MOC handler, however, says that the intelligence connection did not begin until around mid-2017 or August 2017. The deal was simple: Manaf would supply information in various forms (his own accounts of various matters, documents etc.)., and in return the intelligence would provide payments for him, and whenever the time of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed’s collapse should come about (presumably at the hands of the MOC-backed rebels), he and his family would be granted safe exit and refuge.
So what went wrong? It is my understanding from Manaf’s former MOC handler that Manaf thought he could somehow game the world of intelligence, contacting more than one intelligence apparatus and supplying the same information in a bid to obtain more money. It seems he did not appreciate that the MOC would not find out about this behavior, which is a cardinal sin in the world of intelligence. When intelligence agencies recruit informants, an important condition is the exclusivity of the relationship of the informant with the handler/handler’s respective agency. After all, if the information provided is not exclusive to the intelligence agency, why pay the informant for the work at all? Think of these affairs as similar to the world of media outlets that pay for articles: they pay for articles from the contributors on the basis of exclusive submission of those articles to them.
Subsequently, the decision came from the MOC to stop working with Manaf and make him the sole responsibility of the separate CIA-affiliated intelligence team, a point confirmed by both Manaf and his former MOC handler.
However, in the end, the CIA-affiliated intelligence team decided to leave Manaf in the lurch and did not provide him and his family the safe exit and refuge he had hoped for. I cannot claim to know the precise reasons why this decision was made. In Manaf’s telling, the Americans simply decided to ‘betray’ him, and when I first got to know Manaf, I was sympathetic to his claim. I also expect many others would have instinctively reacted in the same way: ‘Yeah, betraying and abandoning people, that’s just what the Americans do.’
Yet thinking about this matter more closely and knowing what I know about Manaf now, I expect there was more to it than just an arbitrary decision to abandon him. Perhaps Manaf continued his games of trying to contact other intelligence sides and entities to maximize his earnings, or perhaps he had supplied false information to the CIA-affiliated intelligence team. The latter issue of being deemed an unreliable source is another reason why an intelligence team might cut off an informant, though it is not my impression from Manaf’s former MOC handler that the intelligence Manaf supplied to the MOC was thought to be falsified or unreliable in general. Maybe the CIA-affiliated team knew about Manaf’s record of war crimes and appalling behavior when he was an FSA commander and decided it would bring the CIA into disrepute if his safe exit and refuge were secured.
One should also remember the following in the bigger picture: the MOC and backers of the Syrian rebels in the south had extensive intelligence penetration of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, but the actual campaign to defeat the group was a failure. The rebels fighting this group could manage no more than a stalemate, and it took a campaign by the Syrian military- backed by Russian airpower- to put an end to the group territorially speaking in summer 2018. Over the years, the rebel supporters in the West in particular upheld the rebels as supposedly the best fighting force to counter Islamic State, often making their case on the basis of a misleading picture of the events of early 2014 when what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham changed its strategy and reduced its spread over northern Syria and concentrated around al-Raqqa as it waged all-out war with the Syrian rebels. But other experiences of direct fighting between the Islamic State and its rebel rivals- such as the group’s takeover of Deir az-Zor and the southern experience- should put an end to such legends.
The point is, intelligence agencies do not collect information on jihadist groups merely for the sake of information, but also to do something with it: to undermine and if possible destroy these groups. Manaf’s information may have helped the MOC and Americans understand the inner workings of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed better, but did it undermine the group in any significant way or contribute to its downfall? No. So in the end, having paid him for information already, what else did the MOC and Americans really owe Manaf?
These words are inevitably rather speculative in nature, but I suspect it is for one or more of the above reasons that the CIA-affiliated intelligence team cut him off as well, and I would urge you to be skeptical of Manaf’s claim that the Americans simply ‘betrayed’ him.
My Own Experiences with Manaf
I first got to know of Manaf in August 2018 just before my 26th birthday. When he first reached out to me, I realized he had definitely been involved in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed as he told me how he used to arrest those who were in touch with me. Note for context that it was the general policy of the group to arrest people who had been in contact with me, as the group wrongly thought I was Israeli/working with Israeli intelligence, an impression that Manaf initially had of me when he contacted me.
In the very first conversations with him, I thought he was somehow an ex-member of the group who had become disillusioned, but then it very rapidly became apparent he had been working with intelligence and had not believed in the group’s ideology from the outset. I quickly found him to be likeable and an intellectual type, even if we did not necessarily see eye-to-eye politically. Indeed, I had him write an article on the security apparatus of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed. I also came to know of his former MOC handler, who had kept in touch with Manaf out of personal sympathy for his apparent plight and their time together in the First Legion in the Southern Front. His former MOC handler (who had reservations about talking to me) recommended keeping Manaf as a source of valuable information. I sympathized with Manaf’s situation, seeing him as a victim of unfortunate circumstances.
One idea I had was to set up a joint project with the two using some of the documents and video clips Manaf’s former MOC handler had gathered in order to create a series on documenting the history and inside stories of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed. This would have been part of my broader proposal of working with an institution on the archives of Islamic State documents I have. Ultimately, the proposals did not work out, though I have used some of the documents and clips in posts on the Islamic State Archives project. Manaf, however, misled me into thinking that all these materials had originated from what he had left with him, when actually his former MOC handler gave them to him to hand over to me.
The turning point in the relationship with Manaf was when he suddenly ‘vanished’ in May 2019, at which point his former MOC handler came to realization that Manaf had swindled him. In turn, I received messages from someone claiming to be Manaf’s wife (though in retrospect, I suspect it was Manaf himself) accusing me and his former MOC handler of ‘betraying’ him and attempting to extort me. I did not give in to these stupid threats from ‘Manaf’s wife,’ who also attempted to harass me under more than one fake Facebook account.
Realizing that he had exercised poor judgment, Manaf’s former MOC handler began to open up on the more dubious aspects of Manaf’s past, such as his attempts to game intelligence agencies for greater earnings. I also learnt that the reason Manaf’s former MOC handler had distrusted talking to me in general was because Manaf had continued to plant the idea within him that I was working for Mossad. Manaf’s former MOC handler also showed me that photo of Manaf holding the severed heads. These things prompted me to look further into Manaf’s background, and understand better his reprehensible conduct.
Of course, had I known of the conduct of Manaf from his FSA days, I would never have contemplated maintaining contact with or working with Manaf in any way, and in retrospect, I should have looked into those things at an earlier stage. Manaf eventually reappeared online and began soliciting my help for publishing articles to earn money, while also begging me to support him financially and denouncing his former MOC handler as a ‘liar’ who ‘betrayed’ him ‘more than 1000 times.’ By that point though, I had made up my mind that Manaf was not worthy of any sympathy or goodwill. As far as I was concerned, if he wanted to go tell his story to some media outlet, he was free to do so, but I had no intention of supporting him or working with him. In our last conversation in August 2019, in which he again begged me to support him as it was his supposed ‘right’, I confronted him more directly about his fraudulent behavior towards his former MOC handler, which he essentially tried to justify. After that, the contact ceased and I have not heard from him since.
Incidentally, several months ago, I came across something that may have been a reflection of Manaf’s duplicity when he dealt with the world of intelligence. I noticed the outlet Step News Agency published as a supposed exclusive one of the video clips I have featuring Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed interrogations with the supposed assassins of the group’s first amir Abu Hashim al-Idlibi. Since the only people who had those video clips until then were myself, Manaf, Manaf’s former MOC handler, and various intelligence agencies, I strongly suspect that it was Manaf or an associate of his who attempted to dupe Step News Agency into believing it was going to publish a set of video clips exclusive to the agency and its source. In any case, I alerted Step News Agency to the matter, and the outlet decided to cease cooperation with its ‘source’ (though the outlet has not disclosed to me the exact identity of that source).
Conclusion
For a long time, I vacillated between being determined to write this piece and letting the matter go. A few people- among them a senior U.S. official working on Syria policy- advised against writing this piece, pointing above all to the issue of Manaf’s previous role as a CIA asset. However, to this I say a few things. Firstly, it is not the role of journalists, analysts and writers to be subservient to international intelligence agencies and refrain from publishing things that might embarrass them. Otherwise, it leaves us open to allegations that we are just extensions and proxies of those agencies. I certainly do not pursue the work I do with a view to pleasing intelligence agencies. Secondly, the issue of Manaf’s work with foreign intelligence when he was inside Islamic State is for me not the primary issue, however fascinating a story it might seem to the reader. It is within the prerogative of intelligence agencies to cut off informants, and based on my understanding of the case, I would have cut him off too if I had been in the position of the CIA or MOC. Thirdly, if anyone was going to endanger people, it would have been Manaf himself, as he told me of his intention to raise a court-case against the CIA (pretty ludicrous, I know). I have no doubt he would have named names. Well, that is not going to happen now. As for Manaf’s current whereabouts, I refrain from giving information on the matter, though the last time I interacted with him, he was not inside Syria.
More disturbing and important for me is the conduct of Manaf and the group he led during his FSA days. To be clear, I am not saying that Manaf is a ‘terrorist’ or has ‘terrorist’ intentions, but rather that he is a war criminal who should not be granted any sympathy and should be held accountable and imprisoned for his crimes. Participation in the beheading of Syrian army personnel/people linked to the Syrian government and posing with those severed heads are war crimes, and should not be thought of as somehow more acceptable or excusable than the Islamic State’s beheading of Western hostages. For me to stay silent on this matter is tantamount to covering up for Manaf’s crimes.
As it happens, I take a generally negative view of human nature, and believe the evil impulses of humans are particularly liable to come out in war. As it is written in the Book of Genesis (8:21): ‘The imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth.’ But this does not mean we do not try to hold ourselves as humans accountable to high standards of decency. For similar reasons I must dismiss those who say things along the lines of ‘Well, it’s the Middle East, so what do you expect?’ That strikes me as insulting.
For me also, this entire affair illustrates a lot of what has been wrong with the tracking and analysis of the war in Syria. The outside community became obsessed with viewing things through the lens of counter-terrorism and ‘extremism.’ Too many rushed to judge groups by whether they called themselves the ‘Free Army,’ whether their social media logos used the FSA flags, how many times their fighters said ‘Allahu Akbar’ in their videos, the length of their beards and so forth. In this context, I have no doubt many would have rushed to characterize Manaf as a ‘jihadist’ and ‘extremist.’ But the truth is that Manaf is none of these things: he is simply a bad person, whose conduct reminds me much of the murderous thug Jamal Ma’arouf, who was once hailed as one of the most important ‘moderate’ forces in northern Syria.
In turn the obsessive focus was on tracking the course of battles and changes in territorial control for the different sides. Little solid consideration was given to analyzing the day-to-day conduct of these groups on the ground. Perhaps if we had spent more time doing so, it would have been understood that various crimes attributed to groups of the Turkish-backed ‘National Army’ in places like Afrin do not represent a fundamental shift to criminality. These problems have been around from the start of the insurgency.
On a concluding note, I strongly urge you to consider supporting the efforts of those working to investigate war crimes and abuses, such as international human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as more local initiatives such as Syrians for Truth and Justice.
Appendices
Appendix A: Manaf’s own testimony about his experiences, written in 2018. Note I have slightly condensed it for clarity and have redacted various names Manaf mentions in his account (also his chronology is not wholly precise):
I would first like to speak about what happened with me personally and what happened with me from involvement and betrayal and the hell I have lived through because of my work team that has abandoned me and left me to death, captivity and destruction.
I was a commander in the Free Army. After a number of great battles for liberation in Hawran and specifically after the liberation of al-Sheikh Maskeen, al-Qa’ida (al-Nusra) blew up my car of type Jeep Sonata, without myself being wounded. This was in mid-2014.
The advice came from the MOC in Jordan to be aware and cautious.
I left the areas of control to an area that was more secure- the locality of Nafi’a in the Yarmouk Basin, and at the time the Free Army filled the area and it was forbidden to Nusra because of the disagreement between al-Khal and al-Nusra.
I remained for a time observing everything that was happening from the disagreements until I was arrested and imprisoned in the UN prison by Liwa Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk [Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade]. I was later released after I pledged to the one of the Shari’is who interviewed me that I would work with them as they thought I was an agent for some side.
I spoke with [redacted] and he advised me to monitor and be cautious, and that he would sort out my situation, and at the time began the study and exchange of information about the truth of the affiliation and appearance of Da’eshi [Islamic State] signs in Shuhada’ al-Yarmouk.
And the work began and the assignment was for a short time only. Thus were the promises and guarantees, until he asked me to continue for necessities of work as it was a sensitive time and the MOC needed me on the ground right now.
By virtue of my expertise, personality, reputation and strong ability to work with devotion, I was able to reach the highest ranks in Da’esh.
And here appeared multiple problems that I faced, among them the transfer of contact and work with the first team to a specialist American team from the CIA. I was contacted by [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] and this continued for a long time, around 8 months. Then I stopped the contact and asked to get out, fearing for myself, my children and my wife. They promised me to wait only for a month or two and the promises were as follows:
- A dignified life for you, your family and your children in a land of your choice in addition to wealth to suffice for you and support you.
We waited and endured for a while and the contact returned but this time with the presence of a Jordanian officer in every conversation and connection and joint discussions.
[Redacted] at the time was keen for Jordan’s security as were the rest of the team keen for its security and the security of the neighboring states.
The work continued until the battle and it was decided to get out my family as they would contact [redacted] and [redacted] to get them into Jordan so that my exit could be secured and I could meet my family there, after which we would be got out and secured. On the day of the battle, and a week before it, all the connections and numbers were cut off and closed. And I fell into the trap of the CIA at the time and my matter was discovered by Da’esh and they began to look for me inside the Basin for reasons of leaking information, suspicions and because I had got my family out with my own money.
Here I became the first wanted man for Da’esh, the regime and the Free Army (auxiliaries for the regime).
I have mentioned all this so that the day will come for the one who has betrayed and abandoned me when he finds himself in the same place of being squeezed, pursued and pressured, while facing poverty, tiredness and death.
And here I say if you are truly interested in what is a humanitarian person and honest in all that you speak about in your place, you will find the solution. What the Americans did to me is nothing but true betrayal and I hold them responsible for all that has afflicted my children from losses, flight and suffering. They are responsible for all of this.
All I wish now is for my message to reach the noble and honest in the war on international terrorism.
Appendix B: Some internal records of the First Legion (c. end of 2014). Note that I have redacted the weapon inventories and phone numbers from the records. The remaining records show the formation names, the leader names, the areas of deployment, the total number of personnel in each formation and the number of armed personnel among that total number in each formation. It should be noted that formations regularly exaggerated their personnel numbers in order to obtain more money from their backers.