Katehon think tank
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine. The objectives of the Special Military Operation were the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, the elimination of the military threat coming from the Kiev regime to the Donbass republics (DPR and LPR). The conflict immediately took on a global character: NATO and EU countries, led by the United States, as well as New Zealand and Australia began providing military support to Ukraine, setting as their goal the military defeat of Russia. Sanctions were imposed against Moscow, its gold and foreign exchange reserves frozen, and Western business began to leave Russia. The Special Military Operation became a challenge for Russia itself, both militarily and politically, ideologically and economically.
Despite all the problems, the Operation led to the expansion of Russia’s territory: after the September 23-27 referenda, the regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye became part of Russia.
Military aspect of the Special Military Operation
From a military point of view, the Operation revealed the most serious problems in the functioning of the Russian armed forces and the departments that run them, in providing troops with weapons, communication and intelligence systems, combat personal protection equipment, personnel training in strategies and tactical planning and command and control.
The initial gamble on a series of rapid attacks by small forces against the enemy, which, arguably, should have forced the Ukrainian armed forces to give up resistance and bring sane and negotiable leadership to power in Kiev, has not been justified. As a result, the Ukrainian air defense system was not suppressed, complete air supremacy was not gained, and Western arms supply routes to Ukraine were not disrupted. The forces and means were not sufficient to solve the tasks set at the beginning of the operation. Therefore, Russia was forced to give up the initiative in the conflict, leave northern Ukraine, the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson, taken under control in the first phase, and go on the defensive.
At the same time, the volunteer units of the DPR and LPR, where ideological motivation is strong, as well as the Wagner Group PMC, proved to be the most effective formations. The latter demonstrated the presence of an effective control system, excellent training and fighters’ spirit.
The partial mobilization, which began in October 2022, has somewhat offset the numerical superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) observed throughout the year. According to official data, 150,000 out of 300,000 mobilized are in the Special Military Operation zone, which currently allows us to establish parity with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, if tasks are to break through Ukrainian defenses in the new year, Russian society must be ready for new waves of mobilization.
For the successful outcome of hostilities, Russia will need to resolve the tasks of providing troops, including producing sufficient ammunition, saturating the armed forces with drones and other weapons that have proven their worth during the conflict, and establishing functioning integrated communication and control systems. Separately, it is worth noting the problem of eliminating excessive bureaucratic sluggishness, speeding up decision-making processes in the troops, and ensuring vertical mobility: replacing personnel who have proven negative or are not ready for a war situation at all levels of the command staff with combat veterans.
Ukraine will try to compensate for human losses by mobilizing new categories of the population, including women, and weapons and ammunition will be procured through supplies from abroad, including Soviet-type weapons produced by Eastern European countries, mainly Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.
Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure will negatively affect the functioning of the military system. However, it is obvious that Russia will have to change the tactics of the attacks: whenever Ukraine manages to adapt, it manages to quickly eliminate their consequences and minimize the damage. On the agenda is the question of intensifying the attacks, increasing their accuracy, and quickly assessing the consequences for the effective disruption of infrastructure and control systems in Ukraine.
Western countries will strengthen support for Ukraine through mercenaries and the supply of arms and ammunition.
Internal security aspect
The Special Military Operation has identified critical vulnerabilities in Russia’s internal security: continued shelling of territory, sabotage, including the evil murder of Daria Dugina in the Moscow region, drone attacks on the strategic air base in the city of Engels, Saratov region, indicate Moscow’s insufficient readiness to counter a war of sabotage. The fears are caused by information about the participation in the sabotage war of “sleeper” cells created by NATO intelligence services.
Ukraine and the NATO countries in charge of them demonstrate efficiency in the field of intelligence and psychological operations. On the agenda in 2023 will be the issue of countering the enemy’s information-psychological warfare, strengthening control over the Russian segment of the Internet, creating and implementing our cyber-psychological warfare strategy aimed at undermining the morale and fighting spirit of both Ukraine and and NATO countries. Previously, some effectiveness in this matter had been demonstrated by a series of Russian structures that received the name “troll factories.”
In 2023, some personnel changes are likely in Russia in the institutions of culture, science, and education, where there is a complete discrepancy between the current situation of strategies and personalities.
The agenda will also include the issue of conducting our sabotage and cyber operations in Ukraine and NATO countries. First of all, in the key points related to the production and supply of weapons to Ukraine, training of personnel and provision of intelligence information to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Diplomatic aspect
Russian diplomacy has repeatedly stated that it is impossible to reach an agreement with Kiev. At the same time, Moscow declares itself open to negotiations. However, in 2022, all attempts to get out of military confrontation by peaceful means – in Minsk and Istanbul – ended in failure. The West and Ukraine interpret the current situation as a defeat for Russia and propose obviously unacceptable conditions only for the start of negotiations: a return to the 1991 borders. Russia cannot make such concessions.
The U.S. political-military leadership, in turn, is satisfied with the situation in which Ukraine can exhaust its geopolitical adversary, Ukraine and the EU bear the main costs of the war and sanctions, and Washington can move on to confrontation with China, on condition its military-industrial complex with budget injections under the pretext of helping Ukraine.
Reaching peace agreements on the Ukrainian issue in 2022 is extremely unlikely. More likely are attempts, under the guise of peaceful initiatives, to probe Russian elites in order to identify weak links, with the goal of subsequent “in the dark” recruitment or use by Western intelligence services. Distractions in other directions are worth waiting for: new attempts to destabilize Nagorno-Karabakh and Central Asia, attempts to stir up protest moods in Russia, using liberal networks and separatist structures in the national peripheries.
At the same time, the Special Military Operation intensifies Russia’s rapprochement with the non-Western world, including China, India, Iran, reveals Turkey’s great role as a mediator and partner, and the importance of Third World countries.
In the global confrontation, Moscow must gain the support of the non-Western world, explain its actions in the paradigm of decolonization and de-Westernization, strengthening the sovereignty of civilization. The Russia-Africa summit in July should become a kind of litmus test. By how many countries on a continent sufficiently vulnerable to Western pressure agree to participate, it will become clear how successful Western attempts to isolate Russia have been.
Economic aspect
The economic sanctions that Western countries have imposed on Russia in connection with the Special Military Operation have a delayed effect. It is in 2023 that it is worth observing how they will affect the Russian economy. A decline in GDP should be expected (the IMF predicts a slowdown in growth). Economists predict a global recession in 2023, which will also affect the purchase of hydrocarbons from Russia. Reduced budget revenues, along with military and social spending, will be a problem for the government’s economic bloc. The question of a transition to intensive management of the economy is already arising: investment in domestic production, including investment in rubles, stimulation of demand and development of the domestic market, and expansion of the range of exports.
The Special Military Operation requires the transition of the economy to a military base, the establishment of import substitution, including high-tech industries, and the prevention of capital and technology outflow from Russia.
Restrictions on capital outflow and stimulation of ruble investment will become an urgent necessity, requiring a change in the very paradigm of managing the economy and finances in Russia, which was previously based on the opposite approach (denial of investment, withdrawal of foreign exchange earnings abroad, ostensibly to combat inflation in accordance with IMF recommendations).
The Special Military Operation stimulated Russia’s refusal to make payments in the currencies of hostile countries (dollar, euro), the shift to the use of electronic payment systems independent of the West (SWIFT). In the future, we should expect an expansion of the list of countries and the range of goods for which Russia will make payments in national currencies. Gold and the Chinese yuan may also replace the dollar in international agreements. Perhaps plans for new global settlement currencies, including digital ones, will emerge in the new year.
Original column by Katehon think tank