Twenty years ago, the firebrand mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, led his party to a landslide victory in a parliamentary election that would transform Turkish politics. What followed were two decades of uninterrupted control of the government by the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which set out to prove that an Islamist party was not a threat, but could in fact move the country forward.
Soon after winning in 2002, the government launched one of its most intriguing plans: a new policy branded “zero problems with neighbors,” introduced by Ahmet Davutoglu, an obscure academic then serving as the government’s chief foreign policy adviser. “Zero problems” was not a “Kumbaya,” let’s-all-get-along notion. Instead, Davutoglu—who went on to become prime minister and lead the AKP before becoming one of Erdogan’s fiercest critics—argued that by maintaining good relations with nearby governments, Turkey could leverage its position as a bridge between Europe and Asia, between Europe and the Muslim world and between non-Arabs and Arabs.
But then, after Erdogan solidified his hold on power, moving from indirect control to openly leading as prime minister in 2003, Turkish politics started changing more rapidly. Before long, Davutoglu’s policy started unraveling. Erdogan gradually seized the levers of power and started pushing a vision of himself and Turkey as leaders of a changing Muslim world, often antagonizing Turkey’s neighbors and friends. Turkey’s policy seemed to reverse from “problems with no one” to “problems with everyone.”
Two decades later, Erdogan, now president of Turkey and its most powerful leader since founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, is making a U-turn, apparently intent on returning to Davutoglu’s model.
The head-snapping shift is a tacit admission that things are not going well—not for Turkey, and not for Erdogan—ahead of the country’s 2023 general elections and the symbolically important centenary of the founding of the modern Turkish republic. Turkey is suffering from one of the world’s highest rates of inflation, which hit 70 percent in April, a crisis many blame on Erdogan’s perplexing insistence on lowering interest rates against economists’ recommendations. The Turkish lira has lost nearly half of its value in the past year, and discontent with the AKP is growing. At the same time, the opposition is brimming with confidence after scoring important victories in local elections in 2019.
Caught on his back foot, Erdogan is now anxiously aiming to protect his position by strengthening the economy, restoring foreign investment and tourism, and repositioning the country as an influential force for regional stability. But doing all that will require fixing badly damaged fences.
In recent months, Erdogan has launched a feverish campaign to restore relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Egypt and others—countries that, not long ago, he seemed to delight in insulting. Until recently, Erdogan almost seemed intent on provoking his neighbors in order to boost support at home and with certain audiences abroad. Many are therefore skeptical about his sincerity today, and about the durability of his newfound appreciation for bilateral diplomacy. Even so, Turkey’s neighbors are grasping his outstretched hand, barely able to conceal their amazement at the shift in tone.
Many of Erdogan’s neighbors are skeptical about his newfound sincerity, and about the durability of his newfound appreciation for bilateral diplomacy.The most dramatic change has come in relations with Israel, a country that had served as a useful foil in Erdogan’s campaign to raise his standing at home and among the world’s Muslims. Erdogan had made it a practice to use high-profile opportunities to lash out against Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. In 2009, he melodramatically walked off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos after a withering exchange with Shimon Peres, then Israel’s president. The next year, he nearly severed ties with Israel after nine Turkish activists were killed in clashes between Israeli forces and a Turkish-based flotilla that had tried to break Israel’s naval blockade by delivering humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
Now, the Turkish president—who once called Zionism a “crime against humanity”—is targeting Israel in a high-stakes charm offensive. Last week, on Israel’s Independence Day, despite ongoing violence between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel, Erdogan sent a letter to Israeli President Isaac Herzog noting the date and extending wishes “for the health and happiness … and the well-being and prosperity of the people of Israel.”
The change was so dramatic, it was almost hard to believe. And many Israelis didn’t, saying they would wait to see if Erdogan’s actions matched his words. After all, it was exactly one year ago that Erdogan called Israel a “terrorist state.”
But this was only the latest of Erdogan’s efforts. In March, Erdogan welcomed Herzog with honors when the Israeli president made a landmark visit to Ankara. The two vowed to launch a new era in relations between their countries, while acknowledging their differences on the Palestinian issue. There’s talk now that Erdogan’s government may push Hamas leaders to leave Turkey, a move that would go a long way to persuading Israelis of his seriousness. That decision would also conveniently help Erdogan win the trust of other targets of his renewed diplomacy, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, which view the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an outgrowth, as a dangerous foe.
Just as stunning as the reversal with Israel has been Erdogan’s 180-degree turn on Saudi Arabia, one of Turkey’s rivals for leadership of the Muslim world. In 2018, when Saudi agents assassinated Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Erdogan unleashed his fury at the Saudi royals. That’s why it was breathtaking to see Erdogan embrace Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—the man who many, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, believe ordered Khashoggi’s assassination—during a visit to Riyadh last month. That trip came shortly after Erdogan shocked the world with an announcement that he would be satisfied if the trial for Khashoggi’s murder were to be held in Saudi Arabia, where few believe legal proceedings would be credible or impartial.
Meanwhile, Erdogan’s goal of securing desperately needed cash from wealthy Gulf states is already paying off. In November, UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed made a milestone visit to Turkey, followed in February by the Turkish president’s visit to Abu Dhabi. These have already produced a promise by the UAE to invest some $10 billion in Turkey.
A few months into Erdogan’s new campaign, it seems “no problems with neighbors” may just pay off.