Africa

Without being overly paranoid or pessimistic, we are witnessing a major upheaval in the Sahel. This upheaval is political, with six coups d’état in West Africa since 2020, the latest of which overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in Niger. It is also security-related, as evidenced by the North-South confrontation in Mali, and diplomatic, with the expulsion of diplomats, the reversal of alliances, the deterioration of relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the banning of the international organizations. Finally, it is demographic—the region’s population is set to rise from 84 million to 196 million by 2050—and climatic, as evidenced by the expansion of the Sahara, whose surface area has increased by 10 percent in a century to over 9.2 million km2.

Le recul de la France s’accompagne d’une implantation russe mais aussi d’un maintien de la présence américaine. Tandis que la Chine pourrait avoir une base navale en Afrique de l’Ouest.

Le 30 mai 2016, la 601e réunion

du Conseil Paix et Sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA) aurait pu être une réunion parmi d’autres. Mais cette fois, les conclusions ont montré un talent rare de prédiction des périls qui pesaient sur le continent.

How local factors shape Libya’s security sector, and what this means for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

In the absence of durable political and security institutions at national level, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) across Libya. But as the country’s sprawling security sector continues to grow, with fresh recruits signing up to join the many state-affiliated and non-state-affiliated armed groups, it is clear that planning for DDR cannot wait for a ‘post-conflict’ situation.

Coups Are a Symptom—Not the Cause—of Political Dysfunction

These days, a question crops up when African officials gather to discuss governance: Which president will be ousted by his military next? In the first two decades of this century, 13 successful coups took place in Africa. But from August 2020 to November 2023, seven African leaders were toppled by their own militaries. While these military takeovers have so far primarily occurred in a belt of instability that stretches from Niger to Sudan, the risk of broader contagion is real. In already fragile states, coups tend to reverse economic and political progress, and so stemming their rise may be the most urgent task for Africa in the coming decade.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is shocked and appalled by a deliberate attack on its humanitarian convoy in Khartoum on Sunday.

The incident, which occurred in the Al-Shajara neighborhood, claimed the lives of two people and injured seven more including three ICRC staff members. The injured have been rushed to hospital for medical treatment.

Sudan’s warring lords General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Republic of Sudan, and his rival Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti), commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have agreed to hold a face-to-face meeting. IGAD is expected to make preparations and designate a team of senior diplomats and interlocutors for the talks.

La nouvelle force conjointe du G5 Sahel, dont l’opérationnalisation a été actée début juillet 2017, a suscité beaucoup d’espoir depuis sa création, dans la région du Sahel et au-delà. Mais elle semble en butte à nombre de difficultés qui pourraient nuire à son efficacité dans une région confrontée au terrorisme, à la criminalité organisée et à l’aggravation des conflits locaux sur fond de compétition autour des ressources naturelles et de rivalités pour la conquête du pouvoir politique.

When looking at the current situation in Libya, one has to admit it is hardly understandable: Two governments, hundreds of tribes and autonomous armed groups, and the growing presence of competing jihadists groups amongst which the local Islamic State. This article attempts to give an overview of today’s situation in Libya, and to highlight a few important factors, such as the control of the economic resources.

For the last year, the media has been abuzz with rumors of Saudi Arabia’s impending withdrawal from Yemen. Many analysts have ascribed the normalization deal with Iran to the Saudi exist strategy from the conflict, which has cost the Kingdom tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid alone, let alone military and other expenses towards the war effort and assorted administrative tasks. Attempted negotiations with Houthis have thus far not worked out after the Houthis demanded extraordinary concessions, in a new de facto rejection of the Saudi overtures. That left the fate of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition forces in limbo – while further complicating the situation inside the conflict-fraught country and raising questions about the future of South Yemen. In the latest diplomatic salvo, pointing to the Kingdom’s search for an exit strategy, Riyadh is making moves to strengthen its positions in Aden and Hadramut, by forming administrative councils (de-facto militias), aimed at promoting unity. Meanwhile, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) leadership, particularly popular in parts of the South, is more determined than ever to forge a pathway to independence. So where does that leave us?