Orientul Mijlociu

Abstract: Iraq’s digital economy is one of its fastest-growing sectors, driven by an expanding youth population, a transition to e-governance services, and the potential for Iraq to become a regional data transit hub. As with militia monetization of Iraq’s oil sector, the telecommunications industry is attracting the attention of U.S.-designated terrorist groups. They have two motives: to generate threat finances and to control and monitor data to strengthen their grip on the population and on Western diplomatic, military, and commercial entities inside Iraq. In the year before Iraq’s November 2025 elections, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani revealed the extent of militia penetration of the sector by awarding sensitive telecoms contracts to a now-sanctioned militia economic conglomerate, while also offering U.S.-origin equipment to militias and channeling lucrative 5G mobile telephony licenses exclusively to militia businessmen.

Abstract: It has been more than 10 years since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ascended the pulpit in the al-Nuri mosque to announce that the group known as the Islamic State had, at least in its own eyes, fulfilled the requirement to become a caliphate. In doing so, he opened an era of expansion for the Islamic State in which it welcomed numerous affiliates into its fold from all over the world. While some of those affiliates remain to this day, others appear to have faded away, at least when it comes to carrying out operations. This article explores these “repressed” affiliates in an effort to provide a brief overview of potential reasons behind their decline. The stories of each of these affiliates contain both similarities and differences. The repression of Islamic State affiliates seems to be the result of a combination of factors, ranging from military power of external actors to in-group conflict to an inability to gain a foothold among a target population. The importance of nuanced counterterrorism efforts, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach, is the main takeaway of this analysis.

Abstract: This article examines the historical trajectory of “foreign terrorist fighters” associated with the Islamic State and its antecedents, al-Qa`ida and the Arab Afghans. The article argues that the threat of foreign fighters today is best understood as being in stasis. Foreign fighters continue to pursue external operations against the West. They also transfer new tactics, techniques, and procedures between conflict zones. These patterns are not new. Beyond these historical patterns, foreign terrorist fighters have become increasingly adept at reaching out to new sympathizers and serving as interlocutors between Islamic State affiliates in conflict zones and their sympathizers. FTFs also have utilized end-to-end encryption technologies, generative artificial intelligence, and cryptocurrencies to magnify their impact. Nevertheless, it is not yet time for alarm. Countries have strengthened their laws, intelligence-sharing, and law enforcement coordination over the past decade. If governments continue to build on this collective effort and devote resources toward mitigating foreign fighter flows, the threat should remain in stasis.

Syria seems to be inching back towards fracturing. On November 23, unknown individuals killed a husband and wife from a Sunni Arab Bedouin tribe in Homs Province. Authorities found slogans written at the scene that are commonly associated with Alawite and Shiite communities, such as “Ya Ali, Ya Hussein.”

Despite the fact that “initial investigations confirmed that the phrases written at the crime scene were placed with the aim of misleading and do not have a sectarian character,” according to the Syrian Ministry of Interior, more violence ensued. Bedouin tribesmen targeted mixed Bedouin-Alawite neighborhoods in Homs and destroyed several properties. Despite government forces eventually restoring control, the incident has put Syria’s internal fragility on display.

Hamas leaders and mediators from Egypt, the US, Qatar and Turkey are engaged in wide-ranging discussions in Cairo to iron out potential hurdles in the next phase of President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan, sources told The National on Tuesday.

Introduction

Qatar is a big winner in the Syrian revolution, having supported the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and its leader Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani (formerly ISIS and Al-Qaeda and now Muslim Brotherhood) who has a $10 million bounty on his head.[1] This is Qatar’s classic game: support the Islamist terrorists and then present itself as a mediator, liaison, and even peacemaker – the arsonist playing firefighter. As in Afghanistan, as in Egypt in 2010, and as in every Muslim country.

The world is watching a famine develop in Gaza that could kill many times more than the 24,000 Palestinians who have already perished in Israel’s merciless blitzkrieg.

Last month, more than 90 percent of Gaza’s population was estimated to be facing high levels of acute food insecurity, categorised as Phase 3 or crisis levels. Of those, more than 40 percent were in a state of emergency (Phase 4), and more than 15 percent in a catastrophic situation, the fifth and final phase.

Mazlum Abdi, commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has said he is ready to travel to Turkey and meet with jailed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) founder Abdullah Öcalan, as Turkish lawmakers plan to make the first parliamentary visit to his island prison under a new peace initiative.

Under a golden autumn sun, Abdallah Ibrahim harvests fistfuls of hard, green olives with evident delight.

“We were denied this pleasure for the last 14 years,” he sighs.

Barrel bombs and constant shelling caused his family and most of the residents of his village, Al Ghassaniyeh, to flee during the second year of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011. Some stayed, even as Sunni Islamist rebel groups moved in — but they too left after the priest in this historically Christian village was killed.