An RFE/RL analysis says Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are more tightly linked since the Afghan Taliban returned to power, with AQ helping TTP strategy, training, and media as attacks into Pakistan rise. A May checkpoint attack in northwest Pakistan killed 21.
UN monitors and some researchers describe practical and public AQ backing for TTP (including an April Al-Sahab statement), plus alleged help for other outfits (BLA, IMP/AQIS). Kabul is said to have given sanctuary and ID cards to several groups. Experts disagree: Abdul Sayed calls the AQ–TTP operational bond a “myth” and says TTP influence from AQ has faded since 2014.
25 years after 9/11, bin Laden’s caliphate may have failed, but he triggered wars that have since weakened US power in the Middle East, writes Hesham Gaafar.
A quarter-century tends to sharpen questions that once sounded indecent to ask out loud. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of 11 September 2001, one of them refuses to go away: did Osama bin Laden win?
Extremist Content Online: Al-Qaeda Releases Propaganda Video on 25th Anniversary of September 11 Attacks; ISIS Al-Naba Editorial Reflects on Global War on Terror, Encourages Acts of Terrorism
(New York, N.Y.) — The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) reports on the methods used by extremists and terrorist groups on the Internet to spread propaganda and incite violence. In this week’s issue:
En 2018, Washington déclenche une guerre technologique contre Pékin sur le terrain des semi-conducteurs. Pourtant, les derniers modèles d’IA chinois rivalisent aujourd’hui avec les meilleurs modèles américains. Décryptage d’une montée en puissance irrésistible.
Farhad N. was just a few months old when hijacked airliners were deliberately piloted into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, part of attacks on the United States that killed thousands of people.
Twenty-five years later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for plowing a Mini Cooper car into a crowd of people in Munich, killing two people and injuring dozens.
The clearest example is the recent “Eagles of Civilisation 2026” military exercises with Egypt. The drills demonstrated capabilities that went beyond symbolic military diplomacy. China deployed J-16 fighter aircraft, a YY-20A aerial tanker, a KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft, an electronic warfare aircraft, and other support assets to Egypt.
Key Takeaways: The essay reads West Asia through neorealism and burden-sharing: Washington still wants influence but prefers partners (Turkey, Gulf states, Pakistan) to carry more of the security load after Assad’s fall. Turkey’s Syria role, plus the Aug. 7, 2026 Mecca/Makkah pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, is framed as flexible balancing and autonomy—not a finished anti-Iran alliance; success depends on exercises, industry, and crisis aid. Iran’s “strategic depth” via Syria and Hezbollah is described as under pressure if a Turkey-friendly Syrian order takes hold; the author sees a fluid multipolar balance, not a single bloc. Strategic Reconfiguration of the Middle East: An Assessment Through International Relations Theory A phase of structural adjustment is about to begin in the West Asian geopolitical order. Neither the United States nor regional powers are merely stepping in to fill the void left by the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East. Rather, Washington seems more open to encouraging skilled allies to take on more responsibility for regional security while maintaining American strategic sway.
Il n’aura fallu que quelques missiles yéménites sur des raffineries saoudiennes pour réveiller les “dirigeants” de l’Oumma, et non les plus de 100 000 Palestiniens tués à Gaza par le culte mortifère.
Il n’aura fallu que quelques missiles yéménites tirés sur des raffineries saoudiennes pour réveiller les “dirigeants” de l’Oumma, contrairement aux plus de 100 000 Palestiniens tués à Gaza par le culte mortifère.
Key Takeaways The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement of 7 August 2026 is a defensive political-military framework among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan that institutionalises coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation rather than an immediate “Islamic NATO.” Pakistan stands to gain most in strategic profile, financial support, access to Turkish technology and broader regional influence (including through arms exports such as the reported Libya deal), while Saudi Arabia seeks security diversification and Türkiye expands its defence-industrial reach. For India the pact is neither an automatic anti-India alliance nor something to ignore; New Delhi should monitor Pakistan’s expanding external networks, strengthen relevant military capabilities, and deepen its own substantial economic and strategic ties with Saudi Arabia while maintaining engagement with Türkiye. The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 marks an important development in the evolving security architecture of West Asia. The agreement, signed in Mecca by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, provides that an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all three. The three countries have, however, repeatedly emphasised that the arrangement is defensive in character and is not directed against any particular state. Recent statements from Türkiye indicate that the pact is intended to institutionalise political and military coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation.
La bombe nucléaire n’est pas la principale menace pour le monde. Il existe quelque chose de bien plus dangereux.
La principale menace dans la confrontation entre les États-Unis et la Chine n’est pas la parité militaire, mais la surestimation mutuelle de ses propres capacités. La question devrait être de savoir comment éviter le conflit et travailler ensemble à l’élimination des menaces communes, telles que le changement climatique et l’injustice sociale.
