Month: September 2025

The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 revealed the ongoing significance of multiple foreign fighter organizations in Syria, groups that proved instrumental in Hayat Tahir al-Sham’s (HTS) campaign for Damascus. Among them were two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups that originated in Central Asia: the Imam Bukhari Battalion (Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, KIB) and the Tavhid and Jihad Battalion (Katibat Tavhid va Jihod, KTJ). Smaller numbers of Uzbeks and other Central Asians joined Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan, which also supported HTS.1 a HTS voiced no objections as these organizations’ leaders gave media interviews in Damascus, celebrating their victory, and posted images of their involvement across dozens of social media channels. These Uzbek-led groups are among some 10,000 fighters, many from Russia and China, who lent critical support to HTS for over a decade.2 In spring 2025, HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa proposed integrating such foreign fighters into the new Syrian military, a process that has now begun.3 Yet, little is known about these entities, why and how they have operated in Syria for so long, or what role they might play in the post-Assad Syria.

Abstract: Al-Qaida has evolved considerably over the past four decades. Today, it is no longer a hierarchical organization with charismatic leadership, but rather a decentralized network of franchise groups dispersed throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. The group has not conducted spectacular external operations (EXOPS) for many years, but instead has been focused on patiently rebuilding, dedicating its resources and manpower to forging relationships with regional affiliates and championing their grievances, which are often locally focused. Al-Qaida Central, including its senior leadership, has been attenuated, but the organization’s branches in Somalia and the Sahel are gaining momentum, and there is growing concern that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also looking to rebound. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of decline in the overall tempo of Western counterterrorism efforts, signaling the end of more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. Even in its diminished form, 24 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida and its global network of affiliates pose a serious latent security threat, including to the West, which takes these groups for granted at its own peril.

Syria’s transitional government is cracking down on the production of Captagon — an illicit synthetic stimulant that flourished under the sponsorship of the Bashar al-Assad regime until its fall in December. But production and trade of the drug are continuing, particularly in parts of Syria not yet under the control of the new administration.

Environ 50 000 anciens membres de l’État islamique (EI) et leurs familles sont actuellement détenus dans 27 prisons et centres de détention à travers le Nord-Est de la Syrie. Ils ont été les théâtres, au fil des années, de tentatives d’évasion, dont certaines ont abouti à la libération de djihadistes qui sont ensuite venus renforcer les rangs du groupe terroriste.

The Lebanese government’s efforts to secure a monopoly over weapons are advancing, but can it ignore Iran?

The decision of the Lebanese government on August 5* to officially endorse the state’s monopoly over weapons was an important milestone. Yet it was also incomplete, because it didn’t really address a dimension that has been largely overlooked in public statements, namely that, today, Hezbollah’s weapons are effectively controlled by Iran.

Knitting law and politics together into a constitution that serves as a repository of hard-won agreements is a matter of trust and bargaining, rather than foresight. But Syria’s will need both.

In March 2025, interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa issued a constitutional declaration to govern the country’s transitional phase. The goals inferred were clear: to assure Syrians that order and justice would be restored, that their rights would be recognized, and that the Syrian president would guide the country away from its dark experience with oppressive dictatorship.

Hizbullah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem said in an address aired on Al-Araby TV (Qatar) on September 19, 2025, that Saudi Arabia should turn a new leaf with the resistance. He called for dialogue that addresses problems and fears and is based on the principle that Israel – not the resistance – is the enemy. He urged freezing past disagreements so the focus can shift to confronting Israel. Qassem added that pressure on the resistance only benefits Israel, warning that if the resistance did not exist, these countries would eventually be targeted. He said that the resistance in Palestine serves as a dam against Israeli expansion.

On September 16, 2025, Lebanese Islamic scholar Sheikh Khaldoun Arimat said on Al-Manar TV (Hizbullah-Lebanon) that the conflict with Israel is an existential one. Speaking on behalf of the Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Abdul Latif Derian, Arimat said that Muslims fought the Crusaders for 200 years and that they are only at the beginning of their war with the “Zionist enemy,” even if it takes centuries. He stressed that Muslims will continue to believe that all of Palestine, from the River to the Sea, is an endowment land that belongs to Allah. Arimat concluded by saying that these are dreams – but dreams often come true.

A forensic investigation of 219 killings in two years of war points to Israel’s deliberate targeting of reporters to suppress the truth about its assault on the enclave

More than 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza since the start of Israel’s war on the Palestinian enclave. So who were these journalists? Under what circumstances did they die? And were they deliberately targeted by Israel in an attempt to suppress the truth about what is going on in Gaza?