Month: November 2024

The IDF killed the head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, in central Beirut on November 17.[i] The IDF conducted a strike targeting Afif in a residential building in Ras al Nabaa, a neighborhood in central Beirut.[ii] Hezbollah confirmed Afif’s death.[iii] Afif was reportedly visiting a Syrian Ba’ath Party in Lebanon branch office at the time of the strike, according to the office’s head.[iv] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported the strike killed one and injured three others.[v]

Afif’s killing is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.[vi] Afif had served as Hezbollah’s spokesperson since 2014 and facilitated Hezbollah’s news coverage and media relations.[vii] Afif managed Hezbollah’s attack claims and documentation related to attack claims and coordinated Hezbollah‘s messaging with Lebanese media.[viii] Afif played a role in Hezbollah’s October 19 drone attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s house in Caesarea.[ix] He was a close adviser to Nasrallah and had become the highest-ranking Hezbollah official to hold public conferences in Beirut over the past month.[x] Afif’s killing is likely intended to further disrupt Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures and its attempts to rehabilitate those structures by having other officials step into previous commanders’ roles.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[i] Two individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times on November 16 that senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani conveyed this message to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut.[ii] The message emphasized that Khamenei supports “ending the war with Israel” and that Iran will help Hezbollah recover from the war.[iii] It is in Iran’s interest to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to prevent Israel from further weakening Hezbollah.[iv] Iran could also calculate that it could help rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after a ceasefire takes effect. Iran has historically transferred weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, which means that preventing this rearmament and reconstitution process would require some form of interdiction effort against Iran.[v] This report, assuming it is accurate, highlights the extent to which Iran lacks the capability or willingness to defend the Axis of Resistance against Israel. Iran failed to prevent Israel from defeating or severely degrading Hamas units across the Gaza Strip, and it now similarly appears opposed to helping Hezbollah fight Israel.[vi]

In an unexpected move, the Turkish political establishment has once again sent signals of openness to the Kurdish armed struggle. But what are the deep reasons behind this strategy? We asked sociologist Mesut Yeğen

In early October, Devlet Bahçeli, secretary general of the nationalist MHP party, shook hands with several MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM party, formerly HDP. This unusual gesture was followed by a groundbreaking speech on October 22, in which he called on PKK leader and founder Abdullah Öcalan to declare the end of the armed struggle from the parliament podium. How do you assess this development?

On November 4, 2024, the Istanbul-based Syria.tv network, which supports the Syrian opposition, reported that Lebanese drug lords linked to Hizbullah and listed on U.S. Treasury’s OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, have moved to resume operations in Syria following the breakout of hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Hizbullah in southern Lebanon.