Ukraine has unveiled a new long-range weapon, a mix of drone and missile technology that Kyiv believes will significantly boost its ability to combat Russian military attacks.
Ukrainian promotional material suggested that the “rocket drone”, called Palianytsia, will have a range of 700km, and could bring around 250 Russian military targets within range, opening a new phase of the air war.
Analysis: Concerns are growing that ongoing tensions could impact the South Caucasus, where Iran’s neighbour Azerbaijan is a key ally of Israel.
As Iran delays its retaliation to Israel’s assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, concerns are growing that the escalating tensions could extend beyond the Middle East and into the South Caucasus.
Ilan Pappé is an internationally renowned Israeli historian.
Formerly a senior lecturer in political science at the University of Haifa, he is now professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Exeter.
Pappé has written more than 20 books on the history of Palestine and the State of Israel, including the seminal work, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006), which makes clear that the driving out of 700,000 Palestinians and the seizure of their land during the founding of Israel in 1947-48 was a deliberate Zionist policy.
In an interview with The Jerusalem Post on Aug. 28, Yonathan Arfi, the head of the French Jewish umbrella body Crif, complained that most of his fellow citizens have an understanding of antisemitism that is rooted in the memory of the Second World War. The indelible association of Nazism with Jew-hatred, Arfi argued, prevents today’s generations from perceiving antisemitism as a live and current threat to the Jewish communities in their midst.
On August 25, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for firing 340 rockets at air defense facilities in northern Israel and launching a large number of UAVs at IDF bases in retaliation to the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander. Earlier, the Israeli Air Force carried out a pre-emptive strike on thousands of Hezbollah missile launchers. An IDF soldier was killed during the interception of a Hezbollah rocket, a woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre, and Hezbollah’s attacks caused substantial property damage.
This reading assesses the most important elements of strength and weakness related to ISIS’s capabilities in Iraq, and also anticipates the behavior of this terrorist organization and whether it is able and willing to expand again similar to its previous expansion in mid-2014.
After a period of relative calm, tactical cells affiliated with ISIS have recently been able to carry out several operations in its main arena: Iraq-Syria. In Iraq, terrorist movements have intensified in the area known as the “Triangle of Death” located between the provinces of Kirkuk, Nineveh (Mosul) and Salah al-Din, not to mention the ability of two suicide bombers to infiltrate a commercial area in the center of the capital, Baghdad, where they killed about 35 people and wounded more than 110.
In Syria, organized networks of terrorists have surprised fixed and mobile points of the Syrian army in the Deir ez-Zor-Tadmur area, using the desert as a base for their surprise operations away from security and military surveillance.
This new wave of terrorism did not surprise security analysts. In fact, some research centers – such as the Center for the Study of War in a report published in July 2019 – expect that ISIS’s recovery will be faster and more dangerous than its recovery following the collapse of the “Islamic State in Iraq” led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2011, the remaining numbers of this terrorist group ranged between 700-1,000 fighters, while their number at this stage – according to estimates by the US Defense Intelligence Agency – reaches nearly 30,000 terrorists armed with military, security and administrative expertise gained from their previous “caliphate.”
Despite the collapse of the terrorist entity’s capabilities in 2011, it was able to rise again, as its population control extended to large areas of Iraq and Syria in mid-2014.
This paper reviews the strengths and weaknesses of ISIS in an attempt to answer the following question:
Will this terrorist group be able to expand again along the fragile incubators in Iraq?
“Real” rating
Perhaps the official international announcements that celebrated the fall of ISIS after it was stripped of all the populated lands that were under its control were exaggerated. Therefore, objective and practical accuracy requires announcing the end of the first phase of defeating terrorism, which is the phase that is carried out by military means; making it the fastest and most obvious phase of the following two phases.
In the second stage, the process of tracking terrorist pockets begins with security means that require uncovering the sources of the terrorist threat. This stage also requires starting a comprehensive reconstruction process in the economic, political and societal dimensions without excluding or marginalizing any party. This stage is intertwined with the third stage, which is considered the longest and most complex stage of confrontation, in which terrorism is intellectually defeated and stripped of its attractive factors based on a limited understanding of religious texts that have been interpreted by extremist theorists to serve destructive goals.
The field assessment of the reality of ISIS in Iraq and Syria shows that it was only defeated in the first stage. The concerned governments and the international community as a whole have a long path ahead of them to address the terrorist threat from its roots in a way that combines all the necessary security, developmental and intellectual tools. What is happening now does not reflect an effort to eradicate “terrorism” but rather only a process to contain it, reduce the sources of danger and keep it under control.
The Covid-19 pandemic has increased the burdens facing Baghdad, as efforts have focused on confronting the health and economic consequences of the virus outbreak, and the priority of confronting terrorism has declined. In addition, the preventive measures taken by the state’s security and military apparatuses have contributed to loosening the security grip, which has created loopholes that have been exploited by the “vigilant” cells of the “organization” seeking to reorganize its ranks.
To illustrate this observation of “containing terrorism, not eliminating it,” we can point out the following factors that increase the risk of a second wave of “occupation” terrorism in Iraq:
Of course, the issue of raising popular political representation in the official structure remains a prerequisite for preventing societal groups from joining unofficial structures whose orientations and goals are usually confrontational with the state, and through which terrorism can infiltrate again, which places the Iraqi elite before great responsibilities to bridge the gap of trust with various segments of the people. The citizen in a state of law and institutions feels, first and foremost, that he is part of a state that provides him with the requirements of life, and therefore does not resort to alternative entities that promote the performance of the function of the “state.”
The international strategy has contributed to drying up the financial sources of terrorism, but ISIS still has the means to circumvent and evade international oversight. For example, it is said that digital currencies are considered a safe haven for illegal operations, including terrorism.
Such formations would further cloud the security landscape if they continued to operate outside Baghdad’s official will. In return, the community tendency – among Sunni tribes – to join informal military units similar to the Popular Mobilization Forces could be reborn, creating a “Sunni” need to rebuild another “ISIS” to defend themselves from perceived threats.
He has proven his relative prowess in this offensive position, which gives him a preferential advantage in determining zero hour. He thus possesses the element of surprise and surprise over a wide geographical area, making it difficult for the security services to monitor and thwart the next operation.
Military experts agree that terrorist organizations can withstand guerrilla warfare much more than they can withstand traditional warfare based on defending populated territories, as this war requires sustainable logistical supplies and the employment of integrated military staffs, on land, in the air, at sea and cyberspace.
At the administrative level, ISIS has moved to a decentralized style of governance, by delegating the second-tier field leadership to make the necessary decisions. By getting rid of the burden of population management, this terrorist group has been able to free itself from some of the restrictions in its internal structure, and has also relatively gotten rid of the burden of centrally managing its external provinces, as the “leadership” is no longer responsible for financial and recruitment matters in these provinces.
This adaptation at the tactical and administrative levels gives ISIS the flexibility to respond to the requirements of its survival as a chronic threat, waiting for the “right moment” to expand or deepen its material and ideological gains.
This overlap is due to the vital importance of the Syrian-Iraqi border, as it is the link between what is called the “Shiite Crescent” extending from Iran through Iraq and Syria and reaching the Mediterranean coast in Lebanon. Therefore, this border area will remain a soft underbelly and a rear base for terrorist activity until a political solution is crystallized to the region’s multiple crises.
To this day, some of these children are still in shelters that house women and men who have been indoctrinated with extremist ideology. It is said that the Al-Hawl camp, located in Kurdish-controlled areas, has turned into an “ISIS” town in terms of its residents being subject to a style of government imposed by terrorists, or in terms of funding “ISIS women” who continue their work in secret in service of the goals and interests of this terrorist group.
Shelters and prisons include individuals of foreign nationalities whose countries refuse to return them for security and legal reasons. For example, some governments have begun to revoke the citizenship of their citizens who have engaged in terrorist operational activities. Those who have lost their citizenship and are prevented from returning to their countries of origin have no choice but to be imprisoned or flee to terrorism again.
Temporary latency or extinction?
The above does not mean an inevitable return of terrorism in Iraq, as many factors weaken its capabilities and prevent it from achieving its ultimate goals. The most prominent of these factors are:
But this ideological narrative of the caliphate myth has not yet collapsed in the minds of extremists. According to classical strategic thinking, the real defeat is not on the ground but in the enemy’s realization that he has been defeated and cannot win, which makes him unwilling to think about fighting another round. It is difficult to predict how such a victory will be achieved against the stubborn extremists.
In contrast, the Iraqi forces have gained accumulated practical experience in the midst of their efforts to defeat terrorism, making them more vigilant and prepared to respond to various emerging threats. The successive collapse of state agencies in mid-2014 in the face of the terrorist invasion turned into a difficult lesson that revealed shortcomings – which were addressed as much as possible.
Certainly, there were regional and international causes that contributed to the expansion of ISIS in 2014, but these causes were not direct for the most part. Rather, the regional fighting led to a state of security collapse that was exploited by terrorist forces. Most international parties did not expect that their support for this or that party would result in the formation of the “ideal opportunity” for the establishment of a “barbaric, bloody rule” similar to what was prevalent in the Middle Ages.
Accordingly, it can be assumed that influential countries will seek to avoid creating the appropriate conditions for the return of occupation terrorism again, due to the dire consequences that ISIS has caused for regional and international peace. Foreign orientations towards the Middle East at this stage agree on not supplying any unofficial formation with weapons, so that these weapons do not leak into the “wrong hands” as happened in a previous period.
In addition, the birth of ISIS came at a moment of extreme turmoil on more than one level. Iraq and Syria were exhausted by societal tensions, and the “cold” war was at its peak between the main regional powers. Now, the picture is less murky and more clear, and most countries want to harness their capabilities for internal priorities related to recovering from the repercussions of the Covid-19 outbreak, and thus they no longer have the luxury of financial and security support to parties outside their borders.
In this context, the Biden administration must address the Iranian nuclear issue in a way that does not anger regional rivals to Iran, because this could lead to political reactions that deepen the “contradictions” of positions and eliminate the possibility of formulating a regional consensus on the broad outlines, which could increase the gaps through which terrorist forces could infiltrate again.
In short , the Iraqi arena is still fertile ground for the growth of terrorism, which calls for more official steps to strengthen the internal front, especially since the country is approaching elections in which moderate forces seek to be representative of the Iraqi political spectrum.
Achieving more political and security stability would advance the outcomes of the strategic dialogue that the Kadhimi government has embarked on with Washington, leading to the implementation of what was agreed upon regarding the reduction of US forces and the regulation of the uncontrolled weapons possessed by some groups close to Iran. Any withdrawal of foreign forces and any restriction of these groups is subject to the government’s assessment that “security is stable and there is no need for support from outside state structures.”
After this review of the overall circumstances related to the Iraqi security file, it is not expected that the central mind of terrorism will seek a new occupational population control, due to the tactical difficulties that beset this control, and because it is thus mobilizing international and regional forces to fight it.
However, terrorism represented by ISIS is expected to continue to appear from time to time, exploiting local tensions – which will intensify due to the upcoming elections – and regional tensions that will also increase due to potential fluctuations in the Iranian nuclear file. This return of waves of terrorism may be carried out by unconventional means such as drone bombs or by cyber and biological means; inspired by the outbreak of the Corona virus as a scenario for an upcoming scene.
Zhao Dingqi: During the Cold War, how did the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conduct the “Cultural Cold War”? What activities did the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom carry out, and what impact did it have?
Geopolitics is an approach to politics that stresses the features imposed on foreign policy by geographical location, environment, and natural resources. Geopolitics as a discipline contributes to the emphasis on continuity in contemporary political realism. The focal idea of geopolitics is that those who control the Eurasian landmass (Heartland) dominate global politics. Regarding this idea, Ukraine has always been a significant part of Heartland. Therefore, many great powers have been fighting to impose their control over the territory of contemporary Ukraine (or part of it) from the Middle Ages up to today (for instance, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Sweden, Vikings, Ottoman Empire). Nevertheless, Ukraine up to 1923 (the creation of the USSR) was just a geographical notion but not a political-administrative subject.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending in August 2021, created favorable conditions for Russia to reassert itself as a regional hegemon in broader Central Asia. Historically, as great powers retrench from a territory, the resulting void can be filled either by rival powers or by friendly successor states responsive to the retrenching power’s agenda. While the United States has lacked reliable successors to take its place in the region, Russia has asserted itself in a number of ways to boost its own power and influence. Moscow has not only cultivated bilateral ties with each of the five Central Asian states, but it has also instrumentalized regional security organizations to advance its interests. However, the full-scale assault against Ukraine beginning in 2022 has undermined Russia’s initiatives in Central Asia and its aspirations for regional hegemony. The Central Asian countries fear Moscow’s apparent neo-imperial ambitions and prefer to develop multi-vectored foreign relations. In this situation, China is poised to supplant Russia as the dominant power and security provider in the region, which could create tensions within the so-called partnership without limits between Moscow and Beijing.