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Terror organization: IRGC Intelligence Organization

Status: Associated with Iran-based cyber company Afkar System Yazd Co. (Afkar) since at least 2015. He is working in cyber command of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (Division 2000).

Roll: Amir Hossein Nickaein Ravari (Nickaein) is wanted for his alleged involvement in a coordinated campaign that compromised hundreds of computer networks across the United States and abroad.

Terror organization: Hamas

Status: Operative, leading the branch in Turkey

Roll: Responsible for facilitating activities for the terror group. Yaghmour’s nefarious activities began in the early 90’s when he was implicated in the Hamas-coordinated abduction of IDF soldier Nahshon Waxman in 1994. Although he was sentenced to life in prison by an Israeli court in October 94, he was released from Israeli prison in 2011 at the “Shalit deal” (prisoner swap between Hamas and Israel), exiled to Turkey, and became the head of Hamas’ Turkey branch. He was in the closest circle to Salah al Aruri, was directly involved in Hamas’ clandestine operations, planning terror attacks in Judea and Samaria, involved in planning 2014 “boys kidnap” and was involved in money laundering and maintain strong connections with the Turkish intelligence agencies and the Turkish government.

Terror Organization: Al-Qaeda;

Status: On the run, escaped from jail in Yemen;

Roll: Elbaneh is charged of providing, and conspiring to provide, material support to Al-Qaeda.;

Location: Last known location is Yemen;

Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah;

Status: Head of Rada clan Latin America;

Roll: Leading the clan for decades in the Latin American region. Connected to high figures in Hezbollah. Lebanese – Venezuelan, involved in money laundering, drug smuggling and weapon trafficking for Hezbollah. Above all, he had an operational and critical part on the ground in both terror attacks that took place in Argentina in the 90’s against Israeli targets. At least in one case he was the guy who provided the suicide terrorist his c4 explosives for the attack;

Terror organization: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella group for the Iran-backed Iraqi militias;

Status: Chief of Staff. served before as the secretary-general of Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militia Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the units of the PMF;

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an Iraqi state security service that Iran has infiltrated and uses to wield significant influence in Iraq. Iran’s cooptation of the PMF enables Tehran to pursue its objectives in Iraq while obfuscating its actual involvement in Iraqi internal affairs. Understanding how Iranian leaders wield direct and indirect influence over this significant component of the Iraqi security sector is crucial as the United States considers how to deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The “Salvation” government operating in the city of Idlib issued a decision to create an administration called the “Public Security Administration” that operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, in the wake of the demonstrations that criticized the “General Security Service” in Idlib.

Key points

1. The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly for the 3,400 personnel in Syria and Iraq. Since October 7, 2023, dozens of U.S. troops have been injured in attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed Shia militias in both countries, at times resulting in U.S. retaliatory strikes.
2. Defensive measures and luck have prevented U.S. fatalities thus far. But U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq are at significant risk as long as they remain deployed there.
3. If a U.S. ground presence served a core security interest, that risk might be reasonable. But there is no good reason to risk U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the group’s remnants, and the United States can still strike from long distance, if necessary, without local bases.
4. Instead of enhancing U.S. security, the U.S. force presence in Syria and Iraq pointlessly risks war with Iran. Sending additional troops to the Middle East compounds the problem and grants U.S. adversaries in the region added leverage by giving them the ability to threaten U.S. forces.
5. The added danger to U.S. forces is one more reason to withdraw from Syria and Iraq as a step toward de-prioritizing the Middle East more generally.

The Israel-Hamas war increases the danger to U.S. troops

Last week, five British special forces soldiers were arrested for alleged war crimes during their deployment in Syria two years ago.

They stand accused of using excessive force in the killing of a suspected militant, found with a suicide vest nearby, although the suspect was reportedly not wearing it when killed. The five soldiers deny these charges, saying they believed he posed a genuine threat.