Special Analysises

Russia rethinks the status quo in southern Syria

Introduction

In June 2021, southern Syria once again dominated the headlines when the regime laid siege to the Daraa al-Balad area of Daraa city. A few days after the monthlong siege, an agreement to end the escalation collapsed and the Syrian army’s Fourth Division spearheaded a major military push in the area. Intense clashes broke out as groups of unreconciled rebels violently repelled the advancement of Syrian military forces. Armed confrontations spread into eastern and western Daraa amid heavy bombardment via missiles, artillery, and mortar shells, marking the deadliest and most intense fighting in Syria’s south-west since the conclusion of the 2018 “reconciliation” agreements.

Local and external actors expected Russia to intervene and mitigate hostilities. Such expectations were based on a record of rapid interventions, whereby Moscow had managed to resolve localized conflicts and prevented the eruption of large-scale armed clashes in Daraa over the past three years. In the case of Daraa al-Balad, however, Russia was slow to intervene and showed an extraordinary reluctance to end armed violence, broker serious negotiations, and enforce a final agreement. Despite the catastrophic humanitarian implications it has on the exhausted local population, this delay seems to be warranted.

Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or Miscommunication?

The central media apparatus of the Islamic State group is mis-reporting on the activities of its cells in central Syria. Rather than exaggerating their capabilities, something that it is conventionally assumed to be doing all the time,1 its Central Media Diwan appears either to be deliberately under-playing them, or, less likely, to be unaware of their full extent, possibly due to communication issues. Indeed, there is a significant disconnect between what the Islamic State is saying its cells in central Syria are doing versus what its adversaries are saying they are doing. This is starkly evident in the fact that the vast majority of attacks that pro-regime sources attributed to the Islamic State in the Badia, Syria’s expansive central desert region, in 2020 went entirely unclaimed by the group, according to data collected and cross-analyzed by the authors. Based on the dynamics that characterize this data, which is supported by fieldwork inside Syria, it appears that this under-reporting on the part of the Islamic State, which has continued unabated into 2021, is at least partially intentional. This suggests that its covert network in Syria may be attempting to surreptitiously establish a strategic hub in this remote central region, something that could act as a rear base for a resurgence in the rest of the country and Iraq in years to come.

Russia Analytical Report, Nov. 2-9, 2020

This Week’s Highlights

While European officials hope U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will soften America’s tone with traditional allies, senior Western officials in the U.S. capital are braced for an abrasive change when it comes to U.S.-Russia relations, the Financial Times reports. “We expect a massive toughening of the stance towards Russia,” a high-ranking Western diplomat in Washington told the Financial Times. “There is a hatred for Russia amongst [Biden’s team] that is really amazing. It’s not just rational; it’s also very emotional.”

Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor

Introduction

Regaining the tribal loyalty lost in the first years of the Syrian Revolution was an inevitable step in the regime’s eastern offensives. During the first half of the war, managing the weakened and fractured tribes, particularly in Deir ez-Zor, seemed to be a low priority. However, the rise of ISIS in central Syria in 2014 proved an opportunity for Damascus, eliminating “third way” options and forcing tribesmen to choose between Bashar al-Assad and ISIS. This led to the first large movement of opposition tribal factions back to Assad’s camp. By the time Damascus launched its 2017 central Syria campaign, the regime’s intelligence agencies had successfully re-integrated significant portions of tribes from Homs, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, forming loyalist militias under the command of long-loyal tribal leaders.

Global Migration Is Not Abating. Neither Is the Backlash Against It

The Migrant Crisis of 2015 has abated, but European nativist and populist parties continue to attempt to stoke the popular backlash against immigrants to fuel their rise.

Italy’s Matteo Salvini, the golden boy of Europe’s anti-immigrant populists, even rode the issue into government last year, before marginalizing himself with a bid to force early elections and, more recently, misplaying the politics of the COVID-19 crisis.

Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement

Though overdue, the 23 October Libya ceasefire deal is worthy of applause. With help from the UN and their foreign backers, the warring parties should now close the loopholes in the agreement’s text, lest rival interpretations derail movement toward peace.

The South Syria Deal: Two Years Later

Two years have passed since Syria’s south and southwestern regions were seized by government forces. Dubbed the “South Syria Deal,” a U.S.-Russian understanding with Jordan’s and Israel’s blessings, government forces and “state Symbols” took control of the countrysides of Daraa and Qunaytirah. Daraa-based opposition forces had to surrender and make do with a limited presence in the form of local councils while “non-Syrian elements” (a euphemism for pro-Iran militias) were removed from the Jordan and Golan borders.

ISIS in the North Caucasus

More foreign fighters are thought to have joined the Islamic State (ISIS) from the former Soviet Union than from any other region of the world. The most prominent and active contingent came from the North Caucasus in southern Russia. Many of the underlying causes of radicalization and recruitment remain unresolved, and violence and instability may grow in the region in the post-ISIS era. The international community and U.S. government should engage constructively with Russian and local authorities in addressing the legacy of over two decades of fighting in the region, ineffective deradicalization programs, and the impunity and corruption seen as inherent in both government and law enforcement.

Justice, Terrorism, and Nairobi’s Westgate Mall

The 2013 al-Shabab attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall lasted four days and left sixty-seven shoppers dead, the youngest an eight-year-old child. The attack was fully captured on the mall’s security cameras and broadcast around the world. The attack was seen as a response to Kenyan military activity in Somalia against al-Shabab that began in 2011. At the time, the attack became, for the developed world, the face of jihadi terrorism in Africa. It also highlighted the incapacity of the Kenyan security services: soldiers and police fired on one another and looted shops.